

## Galates 1–2

### Quelle fonction et quelle démonstration?

Depuis l'article pionnier de H.D. Betz<sup>(1)</sup>, de nombreuses études sont parues sur la composition d'ensemble de *Galates*<sup>(2)</sup>, mais sur la composition et la fonction de Ga 1–2, les titres ne sont pas légion<sup>(3)</sup>. Et les questions de composition sont souvent déterminées par les approches rhétoriques, dont la pertinence fait aujourd'hui l'objet de débats très vifs. Nonobstant les divergences, il est néanmoins possible de souligner les résultats fermes et acquis, pour proposer de nouvelles pistes.

Sans faire l'exégèse des versets, en nous intéressant seulement à la *τάξις* (ou *dispositio*) du passage, laquelle nous mènera à l'*εὑρεσις* (ou *inventio*), nous montrerons que Ga 1,11–2,21 est une unité discursive, dont Ga 1,11–12 constitue la *πρόθεσις*, et Ga 1,13–2,21 les arguments ou

<sup>(1)</sup> H.D. BETZ, «The Literary Composition and Function of Paul's Letter to the Galatians», *NTS* 21 (1975) 353–387.

<sup>(2)</sup> Signalons seulement quelques monographies importantes: G.A. KENNEDY, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill 1984); A. PITTA, *Disposizione e messaggio della lettera ai Galati: Analisi retorico-letteraria* (AB 131; Roma 1992); P.H. KERN, *Rhetoric and Galatians. Assessing an Approach to Paul's Epistle* (SNTSMS 101; Cambridge 1998); D.F. TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians. A Text-Centered Rhetorical Analysis of a Pauline Letter* (WUNT 2.190; Tübingen 2005).

<sup>(3)</sup> J.D. HESTER, «The Rhetorical Structure of Galatians 1,11–2,14», *JBL* 103 (1984) 223–233; ID., «Epideictic Rhetoric and Persona in Galatians 1 and 2», *The Galatians Debate. Contemporary Issues in Rhetorical and Historical Interpretation* (éd. M.D. NANOS) (Peabody, Mass. 2002) 181–196; J.S. VOS, «Die Argumentation des Paulus in Galater 1,1–2,10», *The Truth of the Gospel. Galatians 1:1–4:1* (éd. J. LAMBRECHT) (Rome 1993) 11–43. On trouvera une version anglaise abrégée de l'article en *The Galatians Debate*, 169–180.

Sur Ga 1–2, signalons encore Ruth SCHÄFER, *Paulus bis zum Apostelkonzil. Ein Beitrag zur Einleitung in der Galaterbrief, zur Geschichte der Jesusbewegung und zur Pauluschronologie* (WUNT 2.179; Tübingen 2004). Mais, strictement historiques, ses analyses ne mettent pas Ga 1,13–2,21 en relation avec la *πρόθεσις* (ou *propositio*) de Ga 1,11–12, autrement dit ne le considèrent pas d'abord comme une série de *πίσταις*, comme une argumentation, ce qui en fragilise les résultats, car, pour évaluer la fiabilité historique d'un passage, l'analyse de son genre littéraire et/ou rhétorique est la plupart du temps déterminante.

πίστεις<sup>(4)</sup>. Cela étant fait, nous nous interrogerons, après tant d'autres, sur le statut et de la fonction de Ga 2,16, verset difficile entre tous.

### 1. La question d'un modèle et d'une dénomination pour Ga 1-2

Comme on vient de le dire, si l'orientation donnée par Betz a été dans un premier temps largement suivie — ce qui ne veut pas dire que sur la *dispositio* et sur le genre rhétorique même il y ait eu unanimité<sup>(5)</sup> —, les exégètes se montrent aujourd'hui plus réticents. Ainsi, Kern et Tolmie ont récemment proposé une *dispositio* de Ga qui ne soit pas calquée sur celle, standard, qu'on peut trouver dans les manuels de rhétorique gréco-latine<sup>(6)</sup>. En d'autres termes, ils ne partent pas des traités de rhétorique, mais du tissu paulinien pour déterminer sa configuration et sa *dispositio*. Rappelons seulement ici que les écrits rhétoriques d'Aristote, Cicéron et Quintilien ne sont pas des manuels que les élèves des *progymnasmata* et même les auteurs anciens auraient suivis. Il s'agit bien plutôt de traités, dont la fonction est avant tout taxinomique, théorique et réflexive, sur les tendances mais aussi sur les idéaux des écoles de rhétorique à chacune de leurs époques. Et si Quintilien s'inspire plutôt de la *dispositio* des discours judiciaires, c'est parce qu'elle est plus ample que celles des deux autres genres (délibératif et épideictique). L'erreur serait de croire que cette *dispositio* était la seule existante et, par là même, la seule susceptible de servir de grille de lecture des lettres pauliniennes. Il est donc méthodologiquement déconseillé d'imposer comme modèles de *dispositiones* aux lettres pauliniennes celles des traités de l'époque.

Mais s'il est bon de ne pas appliquer inconsidérément les schémas

<sup>(4)</sup> Les spécialistes de rhétorique ayant jusqu'à présent préféré la terminologie latine pour étiqueter les composantes de la *dispositio*, nous les suivrons, sauf lorsque les exégètes cités utilisent eux-mêmes les dénominations grecques.

<sup>(5)</sup> Pour la *dispositio*, les différences touchaient surtout le nombre et la place des *propositiones* (en Ga 1,6-9; 1,11-12; 2,15-21, voire 3,1-5); pour le genre rhétorique, les trois ont été proposés, (a) le judiciaire: Galates serait alors une «apologetic letter»; voir par ex. H.D. BETZ, *Galatians* (Philadelphia 1979) 14-15; (b) le délibératif; la lettre répondrait dans ce cas à la question: « Faut-il que les ethnico-chrétiens se fassent circoncire? »; ainsi, KENNEDY, *Interpretation*, 146-147, et J. SMIT, «The Letter to the Galatians: A Deliberative Speech», *NTS* 35 (1989) 1-26; tout dernièrement, TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians*, 45; (c) épideictique; plus que de répondre directement à la situation concrète des Galates, Paul montrerait combien l'enjeu ultime est la vérité de l'Évangile; voir par ex., A. PITTA, *Lettera ai Galati* (Bologna 1996) 45-46.

<sup>(6)</sup> KERN, *Rhetoric and Galatians*; TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians*.

des traités rhétoriques gréco-romains, on ne voit pas en revanche pourquoi il faudrait se priver de leur comparer les textes pauliniens. Que les développements de l'apôtre ne correspondent pas exactement aux *dispositiones* présentées par les traités de rhétorique, que ses réflexions se développent de manière spécifique, n'interdit pas de mesurer la distance qui les sépare: le rapport n'est jamais à sens unique, et le va-et-vient, entre des modèles possibles et des textes concrets ne peut qu'être fécond — il fait partie intégrante du cercle herméneutique<sup>(7)</sup>. Et si certaines composantes de la *dispositio* de Ga correspondent à celles indiquées par les traités d'alors, on ne voit pas pourquoi on s'interdirait de leur donner les mêmes noms.

Cela dit, lorsqu'on en est venu à comparer la *dispositio* de Ga et celles mentionnées par les traités, l'étiquette la plus retenue pour Ga 1–2 a été celle de *narratio*<sup>(8)</sup>, même si tous ne lui ont pas donné la même extension<sup>(9)</sup>. Quelles raisons ont amené ces exégètes à nommer

(7) TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians*, 24, reconnaît une certaine valeur heuristique à ces modèles: «The advantages of choosing a particular model (ancient or modern) as the point of departure for a rhetorical analysis are evident. This enables one to search the text accurately as most rhetorical models describe in rather exact terms what to look for». Il refuse pourtant d'analyser la lettre aux Galates en opérant ce va-et-vient, et l'on ne voit pas bien pourquoi, car, s'il évite la nomenclature gréco-romaine (*exordium*, *propositio*, *narratio*, etc.), il n'en est pas loin, et il n'y aurait aucun anachronisme à reprendre les mots des anciens pour des unités rhétoriques ayant la même fonction. Ainsi, pour Tolmie, Ga 1,11-12 est «a concise statement highlighting the basic issue», et Ga 1,13-24 une série d'énoncés visant à appuyer les deux précédents; il aurait été tout aussi juste et pertinent d'appeler Ga 1,11-12 une *propositio*, et Ga 1,13-24 une *probatio*.

(8) En grec, διήγησις. Voir par ex. CICÉRON, *de inventione* 1.19. C'est ainsi qu'à la suite de BETZ, *Galatians*, 58, plusieurs commentaires et études étiquettent ces chapitres. Voir par ex., B. STANDAERT, «La rhétorique antique dans l'épître aux Galates», *FoiVie* 84 (1985) 33-40; R. HALL, «The Rhetorical Outline for Galatians. A reconsideration», *JBL* 106 (1987) 277-287; J.M.F. SMIT, «The Letter to the Galatians: A Deliberative Speech», *NTS* 35 (1989) 11 (1-26); B.W. LONGENECKER, *Galatians* (WBC 41; Dallas, TX 1990) 20; M. BACHMANN, *Sünder oder Übertreter. Studien zur Argumentation in Gal 2,15ff.* (WUNT 59; Tübingen 1992) 158-160; J. BECKER, *Paulus. Der Apostel der Völker* (Tübingen 1992) 291; D. KREMENDAHL, *Die Botschaft der Form. Zum Verhältnis von antiker Epistolographie und Rhetorik im Galaterbrief* (NTOA 46; Freiburg – Göttingen 2000) 177-203.

(9) Par ex., pour Betz, «Literary Composition», elle va de 1,11 à 2,14; pour B. STANDAERT, «La rhétorique antique», de 1,13 à 2,14; pour R. HALL, «Rhetorical Outline», de 1,10 à 2,21; de 1,13 à 2,21, pour PITTA, *Dispositio*, 100, ainsi que pour KREMENDAHL, *Botschaft*, tableau de la p. 160; de 1,11 à 2,21 pour R.D. ANDERSON Jr, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*. (Leuven <sup>2</sup>1999) 45 (cette *narratio* serait une *narrative apology*).

ainsi la presque totalité de Ga 1–2? C’est que les réflexions de l’apôtre sur l’Évangile semblent divisées en deux ensembles, un premier de type narratif et autobiographique (Ga 1–2), un deuxième, plus théorique (Ga 3–4). Et si l’on compare ces développements avec les *dispositiones* des traités contemporains, où la *narratio* — lorsqu’elle existe — précède la *probatio*, il est tentant de conclure que Ga 1–2 est à Ga 3–4 ce que la *narratio* est à la *probatio*. On a avec juste raison objecté que si, dans les traités gréco-romains anciens, la *narratio* précède l’argumentation, elle n’en fait pas partie, alors que Ga 1–2 a les caractéristiques d’une argumentation<sup>(10)</sup>. C’est pour répondre à cette difficulté que certains commentateurs ont voulu combiner les deux appellations, disant que si Ga 1–2 est une *narratio*, elle est aussi une véritable argumentation<sup>(11)</sup>. Y aurait-il là un écart par rapport à la *dispositio* gréco-romaine? Peut-être, mais dans le cas qui nous occupe, nommer Ga 1–2 *narratio* a au moins deux inconvénients, (a) celui de donner à penser que ces chapitres ne constituent pas une véritable argumentation, alors qu’ils le sont et que leur fonction argumentative est première; (b) celui d’utiliser une terminologie aujourd’hui piégée; en effet, à la *narratio* des discours — disons, des rhéteurs — il manque en général ce qui fait un récit, à savoir l’intrigue: dans le récit, c’est cette dernière qui détermine le choix et l’agencement des événements, alors que dans la *narratio* rhétorique, c’est une idée (la vérité des faits rapportés). Et l’on voit bien que les événements choisis par Paul en Ga 1–2 ne sont pas liés entre eux par une intrigue, bien plutôt par l’idée énoncée dans la *propositio* de Ga 1,11-12, à savoir que son Évangile ne vient pas des hommes mais est le fruit d’une révélation divine<sup>(12)</sup>. Bref, pour ne pas donner l’impression de traiter Ga 1–2 comme un récit, on évitera l’appellation *narratio*, et l’on dira plutôt que Ga 1,11–2,21 est une argumentation basée sur quelques données autobiographiques.

<sup>(10)</sup> Ainsi, KENNEDY, *New Testament Interpretation*, 144-147, car le passage «does not present an account of the facts at issue».

<sup>(11)</sup> PITTA, *Disposizione*, 90. La dénomination est plus ou moins la même chez A. BUSCEMI, *Lettera ai Galati*. Commentario esegetico (Jerusalem 2004) 75-77, qui parle de manière répétée de *narratio* (ou διήγησις), sans pour autant nier la finalité argumentative de Ga 1,11–2,21.

<sup>(12)</sup> Voilà pourquoi il serait erroné de suivre toutes les étapes de l’analyse narrative pour interpréter les passages biographiques des lettres pauliniennes, comme par ex. 1 Co 9; 2Co 11,16-33; 2 Co 12,1-13; Ga 1–2; Ph 3, qui sont en réalité des argumentations.

Si tous ou presque admettent aujourd'hui que la fonction de Ga 1,11–2,21<sup>(13)</sup> est celle d'une *probatio*, son genre rhétorique reste discuté. Certains font du passage une apologie (le genre en serait alors judiciaire), d'autres une *périautologie* (éloge de soi-même, dont le genre est manifestement épideictique)<sup>(14)</sup>. Les événements autobiographiques retenus par Paul en Ga 1,13–2,21 constituent-ils un éloge? Selon Hester, Ga 1–2 en sa presque totalité aurait la *dispositio* d'une *périautologie*<sup>(15)</sup>. Non seulement il faut reconnaître, avec Buscemi et contre Hester, que leur présence ne suffirait pas à elle seule à faire de Ga 1–2 un éloge de l'Évangile ou de Paul<sup>(16)</sup>, mais il faut ajouter que la triple dénomination γένος, ἀνατροφή et πράξεις est totalement inadéquate pour Ga 1,13–24. Il suffit de comparer le passage avec Ph 3,5–6, qui est une véritable *périautologie*. En Ph 3, les éléments sont bien présents: les syntagmes περιτομή ὀκτῆμερος, ἐκ γένους Ἰσραήλ, φυλῆς Βενιαμίν, Ἑβραῖος ἐξ Ἑβραίων illustrent le γένος, le κατὰ νόμον Φαρισαῖος renvoie à la παιδεία (nommée ἀνατροφή chez Hester); quant aux deux derniers, κατὰ ζήλος διώκων τὴν ἐκκλησίαν et κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ γεγόμενος ἄμεμπτος, ils désignent les πράξεις de Paul<sup>(17)</sup>. Mais en Ga 1,13–14, Paul ne dit rien sur son origine et son éducation — il utilise d'ailleurs le terme ἀναστροφή au v. 13, qui ne doit pas être confondu avec celui d'ἀνατροφή —, et n'insiste que sur son agir dans le judaïsme. Le choix des éléments de Ga 1,13–14 ne s'explique que par leur fonction: voulant en effet

(13) Est ici laissé pour compte le *praescriptum* épistolaire constitué par Ga 1,1–5, et composé de trois éléments: (a) la *superscriptio* (v. 1–2a), (b) l'*adscriptio* (v. 2b), (c) et la *salutatio* (v. 3–5). Le statut rhétorique de Ga 1,6–9 sera considéré *infra*.

(14) Mentionnons seulement ici un représentant de chaque option: pour le genre judiciaire, BETZ, *Galatians*, 56; et pour l'éloge de soi-même, J.D. HESTER, «Placing the Blame. The Presence of Epideictic in Galatians 1 and 2», *Persuasive Artistry. Studies in New Testament Rhetoric* (FS G.A. Kennedy) (éd. D.W. WATSON) (JSNTSS 50; Sheffield 1991) 289–291.

(15) Ga 1,11–12 serait le προοίμιον, 1,13–14 commencerait par présenter l'origine de Paul (le γένος), 1,15–17 sa formation (ἀνατροφή), 1,18–24 son agir et les vertus (πράξεις), 2,1–14 le présenterait par comparaison (entre Pierre et Paul, σύγκριστις) et 2,15–21 conclurait (ἐπίλογος). Cf. HESTER, «Epideictic in Galatians 1 and 2», 188.

(16) BUSCEMI, *Galati*, 76–77, qui suit néanmoins la *dispositio* de Hester.

(17) Sur l'éloge de soi-même, voir L. PERNOT, «*Periautologia*. Problèmes et méthodes de l'éloge de soi-même dans la tradition éthique et rhétorique gréco-romaine», *Revue des études grecques* 111 (1998) 101–124, où l'on trouvera une bonne bibliographie.

montrer que l'Évangile qu'il proclame ne vient pas de lui, Paul doit mettre en valeur tout ce qui de et dans son propre passé allait contre. Origine et formation juive ne sont pas ici les composantes d'un éloge de soi, elles servent bien plutôt à montrer que l'apostolat de Paul, comme annonce du Christ, ne vient pas des hommes, et donc de Paul en particulier, puisqu'il était autrefois un juif zélé, ennemi déclaré de l'Église<sup>(18)</sup>.

Si Ga 1–2 n'est pas une périautologie, est-ce une apologie? Si apologie il y a, elle ne peut être que celle de l'Évangile, comme l'indique la *propositio* de 1,11–12. Et si Paul défend son Évangile, c'est parce que les judaïsants l'auraient attaqué en disant qu'il ne vient pas de Dieu. Ga 1–2 laisse-t-il entendre qu'il en fut ainsi? Cela n'est pas certain, car Ga 1–2 ne répond par aucun argument théorique à ceux qui auraient pu déclarer que l'Évangile de Paul ne valait pas le leur. Au demeurant, le ton polémique n'est pas propre au genre judiciaire: on le trouve aussi dans les deux autres genres rhétoriques, en particulier l'épidictique, à savoir dans les blâmes et les reproches. Enfin, comme nous l'avons montré ailleurs<sup>(19)</sup>, en la plupart de ses argumentations l'apôtre ne répond aux problèmes et questions des communautés qu'après un détour plus ou moins long et radical. Cela signifie qu'il faut se garder de croire trop vite que les problèmes des communautés ou les propos des adversaires déterminent le genre rhétorique des lettres pauliniennes: le détour que l'apôtre impose à ses correspondants modifie le paysage rhétorique. Ces remarques valent pour Ga (en particulier les deux premiers chapitres). En effet, si la question à laquelle les chrétiens de cette contrée, en majorité d'origine païenne, devaient donner une réponse est la circoncision, la lettre que leur envoie Paul ne leur enjoint pas immédiatement de ne pas se faire circoncire. On peut noter les flous de Ga 1–2, où la question de la circoncision n'apparaît que progressivement (et pas avant Ga 2,7). C'est seulement en Ga 5,2 que Paul déclare à ses lecteurs: «Si vous vous faites circoncire, Christ ne vous servira plus de rien»<sup>(20)</sup>. Or, en Ga 1–2 et 3–4, l'apôtre s'est employé à rappeler l'essentiel de

<sup>(18)</sup> Avec raison, BUSCEMI, *Galati*, 89.

<sup>(19)</sup> J.-N. ALETTI, «La rhétorique paulinienne: construction et communication d'une pensée», *Paul, une théologie en construction* (éd. A. DETTWILER – J.D. KAESTLI – D. MARGUERAT) (Genève 2004) 52–55.

<sup>(20)</sup> Trad. *TOB*. Le verbe *ὀφελέω* désigne ce que le genre délibératif vise, à savoir l'*utile*. C'est ce qui a poussé certains interprètes à dire que Galates appartient à ce genre.

l'Évangile, en leur montrant que la circoncision (et donc l'être-sous-la-Loi) n'en fait pas partie, car elle ne peut faire d'eux ni des fils ni des héritiers. Si la lettre aux Galates consiste en une reprise de contact radicale avec l'Évangile, c'est que sa finalité première n'est pas apologétique, mais heuristique et pédagogique<sup>(21)</sup>.

## 2. La dispositio de Ga 1–2 et ses difficultés

Si Ga 1,11–2,21 est une argumentation, quelle est sa *dispositio*? Nous avons jusqu'ici admis que cette argumentation commence avec la *propositio* de 1,11–12. Or, ce point de départ n'est pas admis de tous les exégètes. Pour plusieurs, 1,11–12 ferait déjà partie de la *probatio*, et il faudrait voir la *propositio* en Ga 1,6–9<sup>(22)</sup>. La thèse ou *propositio* — de toute la lettre, et de Ga 1–2 en particulier — serait alors qu'il n'y a pas d'autre Évangile que celui proclamé par Paul. Mais pour isoler une *propositio* en ces versets il faut interpréter de travers la construction grecque, car en réalité, les v. 6–7 n'énoncent pas la thèse de l'unicité de l'Évangile, ils continuent seulement à décrire la situation tumultueuse des Églises de Galatie<sup>(23)</sup>.

S'il y a une *propositio* en Ga 1–2, on la trouvera en Ga 1,11–12, la plupart des commentateurs l'admettent aujourd'hui, même s'ils lui donnent des noms différents: certains y voient formulé «il tema della prima parte»<sup>(24)</sup>, d'autres la définissent comme «thesis statement»<sup>(25)</sup>,

(21) Ce qui, comme l'a bien vu PITTA, *Galati*, 43–46, la rapproche davantage du genre épictétique.

(22) Ainsi, VOS, «Argumentation», 21–22: «Die These, daß es für die Galater kein anderes gültiges Evangelium außer dem von Paul verkündigten gibt, deckt den ganzen Inhalt des Briefes». Il se range à l'avis de KENNEDY, *Interpretation*, 148–151, et de HALL, «Rhetorical Outline».

(23) Voir A. VANHOYE, «La définition de l'«autre évangile» en Ga 1,6–7». *Bib* 83 (2002) 392–398, dont la traduction des v. 6–7 («Je m'étonne que [...] vous passiez [...] à un autre évangile, qui n'est autre que [ceci:] il y a des gens qui vous troublent et qui veulent subvertir l'évangile du Christ»; p. 396) montre bien qu'aux v. 6–9 l'apôtre continue de décrire la situation des Églises de Galatie; contre Kennedy, Vos et d'autres, il faut donc maintenir que ces versets n'énoncent pas sous forme de thèse qu'un autre évangile n'existe pas ou qu'il n'y a pas deux sortes d'évangile. La fonction de 1,6–10, où Paul présente la situation de l'Église locale et sa propre réaction négative, est manifestement introductive.

(24) Par ex. A. VANHOYE, *Lettera ai Galati* (Milano 2000) 40. Par première partie, l'auteur entend Ga 1–2.

(25) R. LONGENECKER, *Galatians* (WBC 41; Dallas, TX. 1990) 20. BETZ, *Galatians*, 56, notait déjà le rapport existant entre ce v. 11 et la thèse de Paul en Ga, et l'interprète comme une annonce: «[this verse] announces the argument



ou comme «a concise statement highlighting the basic issue»<sup>(26)</sup>, d'autres encore, n'hésitant pas à utiliser le vocabulaire ancien, parlent de *subpropositio*<sup>(27)</sup> ou de *propositio*<sup>(28)</sup>.

Quelle est donc la fonction d'une *propositio*? Pour les anciens rhéteurs, «the purpose of the *propositio* is to define the case to be proven»<sup>(29)</sup>, description qui convient tout à fait pour Ga 1,11-12, dans la mesure où en Ga 1-2 Paul va effectivement montrer que son Évangile ne vient pas des hommes mais lui fut révélé par le Seigneur<sup>(30)</sup>.

Étant admis que Ga 1,11-12 est une *propositio*, jusqu'où va l'argumentation qu'elle engendre? Selon la plupart des commentateurs, elle va jusqu'à 2,10, 2,14a, voire 2,14b. S'il est admis par tous que 2,14b-21 a des liens réels avec 2,11-14a, parce qu'y sont exprimées et résumées en style direct les paroles que Paul a dû adresser à Pierre lors de l'incident d'Antioche<sup>(31)</sup>, le statut rhétorique

---

Paul is going to prove in the 'statement of facts' and in the rest of the letter. The rather formal tone of this announcement underscores the significance of his thesis».

<sup>(26)</sup> TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians*, 51.

<sup>(27)</sup> VOS, «Argumentation», 21, pour le v. 11. Cet auteur, voyant en Ga 1,6-9 la *propositio* (principale) de Ga en son entier, fait de 1,11 et 3,1-5 les *subpropositiones* respectives de 1,11-2,21 et 3,1-4,31.

<sup>(28)</sup> PITTA, *Disposizione*, 88-90; ID., *Galati*, 79-84. Cet essai ayant pour seul objet Ga 1-2, on ne se demandera pas avec cet auteur si Ga 1,11-12 constitue la *propositio* générale de la lettre, ni si, comme le disent J. JEREMIAS, «Chiasmus in den Paulusbriefen», ZNW 49 (1958) 152-153, et J.C. BEKER, *Paul the Apostle. The Triumph of God in Life and Thought* (Philadelphia 1980) 44-45, ces mêmes versets déterminent en un vaste chiasme — au demeurant, il vaudrait mieux parler de *reversio* — la disposition d'ensemble de la lettre: (a) l'évangile de Paul n'est pas κατὰ ἄνθρωπον (1,11) et pas davantage (b) παρὰ ἀνθρώπου (1,12), ces deux idées étant reprises par le reste de la lettre: (B) l'Évangile annoncé par Paul n'est ni παρὰ ἀνθρώπου (1,13-2,21), ni (A) κατὰ ἄνθρωπον (3,1-5,25).

Si les commentateurs étiquettent les v. 11-12 comme *propositio*, en réalité seul le v. 11 l'est, car le v. 12 en est la première *ratio* — les *rationes* (en grec, πίστεις) étant les preuves, explications ou explications de la *propositio*. Pour simplifier, j'appellerai pourtant indistinctement *propositio* le v. 11 et le v. 12. Le binôme *propositio-ratio* se trouve aussi en Rm 1,16-17.

<sup>(29)</sup> KERN, *Rhetoric and Galatians*, 108, chez qui on trouvera toutes les références *ad hoc* des traités anciens sur la *propositio*.

<sup>(30)</sup> Comme cet article traite de la *dispositio* et de l'*inventio* de Ga 1-2, sans entrer dans l'exégèse des versets, je n'examinerai pas le génitif (objectif, subjectif, d'origine) Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ du v. 12.

<sup>(31)</sup> Discours en style figuré (en grec, ἐσχηματισμένος λόγος); cf. ANDERSON, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 154. On trouvera en PITTA, *Disposizione*, 96; ID., *Galati*, 138, une autre désignation, celle de *mimesis*.



de ces versets est loin d'être évident. Paul veut-il encore y montrer que son Évangile n'est pas d'origine humaine mais divine? Ne va-t-il pas plutôt dans une autre direction, en soulignant les contradictions dans lesquelles tombent ceux qui se remettent sous le régime de la Loi<sup>(32)</sup>? L'ambivalence rhétorique du passage mérite un traitement à part.

### 3. *Quelles preuves en Ga 1,13–2,14?*

Commençons par les unités dont la fonction rhétorique ne soulève pas de difficulté majeure, celles de Ga 1,13–2,14. Il s'agit de preuves visant à étayer la *propositio* de 1,11–12 et tirées de l'expérience même de Paul: en choisissant les périodes significatives de sa propre vie, ce dernier va montrer que ni lui ni les grandes figures apostoliques de Jérusalem ne sont à l'origine de son Évangile. En ces développements, les commentateurs distinguent trois étapes: 1,13–24; 2,1–10 et 2,11–14. Dans un premier temps en effet (Ga 1,13–24), l'insistance est mise sur la distance, entre les idées du Saul pharisien et l'Évangile, mais aussi, géographiquement cette fois, entre le nouveau disciple de Jésus et les apôtres. Le deuxième temps n'est plus celui de l'éloignement, mais de la rencontre: lorsque, bien longtemps après la révélation sur le chemin de Damas, il y eut une réunion à Jérusalem (2,1–10), durant laquelle Paul dut s'expliquer sur son Évangile, les apôtres eux-mêmes en ont reconnu le contenu, la valeur et l'origine divine. La troisième étape se situe à Antioche (2,11–14), où l'on passe de l'accord au désaccord, pour souligner que Paul a préféré la vérité de son Évangile à l'attitude prudente ou timorée de Pierre.

Si le caractère probatoire des trois unités rhétoriques à peine mentionnées ne fait aucun doute, leur choix peut cependant provoquer l'étonnement. N'est-il pas bizarre qu'immédiatement après avoir déclaré que son Évangile lui fut révélé, Paul ne livre pas le contenu de cette révélation, pour gagner l'assentiment de ses lecteurs? Car les événements sollicités par lui comme preuves n'ont apparemment rien à voir avec ce qui fait le coeur de cet Évangile! Avant de dire en quoi

(32) Voir par ex. BACHMANN, *Sünder oder Übertreter*, 103–160, selon qui la *narratio* va de 2,11 à 2,14, car l'*argumentatio* commence en 2,15 pour finir en 6,17 (avec deux séries de preuves: 2,15–21, pour les judéo chrétiens, et 3,1–6,17 pour les ethnico-chrétiens). Il y aurait ainsi une césure rhétorique nette entre 2,14 et 2,15 (même si Bachmann fait de 2,14b une *partitio*, 14bα annonçant les preuves fournies aux judéo-chrétiens, et 14bβ celles aux ethnico-chrétiens).

consiste cette révélation, l'apôtre veut montrer qu'elle ne vient pas des hommes, et en premier lieu de lui<sup>(33)</sup>, car on pourrait lui objecter que s'il annonce aujourd'hui un Évangile dont la circoncision et (donc) la Loi<sup>(34)</sup> ne font pas partie, c'est parce que sa foi et sa religion juive étaient tièdes, ou son tempérament instable. Pour écarter toute objection concernant son passé juif, Paul veut faire entendre que s'il annonce cet Évangile là, cela ne vient pas de l'incapacité où il était de vivre pleinement ses convictions juives<sup>(35)</sup>. Il fait d'ailleurs d'une pierre deux coups, car si la mention d'un zèle fort et durable dans le judaïsme montre qu'il ne change pas d'avis à la légère, elle explique aussi sa fidélité constante à la révélation reçue et sa promptitude à morigéner un Pierre jugé inconstant, lui, dans ses convictions... En mentionnant d'autre part le fait qu'il persécutait l'Église, Paul signifie indirectement qu'il n'a pu lui-même créer ou inventer ce qu'il annonce maintenant — concernant la circoncision et la Loi, comme il va le dire en 2,16 —, puisqu'il vivait et pensait le contraire: comment aurait-il pu être à l'origine d'un discours qu'il haïssait<sup>(36)</sup>?

Ce n'est pas la révélation du Fils de Dieu qui est soulignée en Ga 1,15-17, car elle se trouve dans la proposition subordonnée temporelle, bien plutôt l'éloignement physique de l'apôtre, lequel met indirectement en valeur la *propositio* de 1,11-12, à savoir qu'aucun homme, même apôtre de Jésus Christ, ne lui a annoncé le kérygme ni ne l'a catéchisé<sup>(37)</sup>. Quant à la rencontre mentionnée en 1,18-19, elle a la même fonction: si Paul a vu les autres apôtres, ce n'est pas pour s'être fait catéchiser. Car certains savaient sans doute qu'il était monté à Jérusalem après sa 'conversion' et auraient pu lui objecter: «Tu prétends n'avoir pas été catéchisé par les apôtres de Jérusalem, pourquoi donc y es-tu allé peu de temps après la révélation reçue?» Paul ne pouvait pas passer l'épisode sous silence, mais il multiplie les traits qui en minimisent l'importance: il ne s'est rendu à Jérusalem que

<sup>(33)</sup> Voir par ex. TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians*, 55.

<sup>(34)</sup> Le mot Loi, avec une majuscule, désigne la *Torah*.

<sup>(35)</sup> Cf. les observations semblables de TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians*, 56-57: «As he [Paul] aims to portray the 'former Paul' as a fanatic who would never have changed had God not intervened, he has to recount his former life in such a way as to convey his total devotion to Judaism forcefully».

<sup>(36)</sup> L'observation des Églises de Cilicie en 1,23 va dans le même sens.

<sup>(37)</sup> Comme le note TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians*, 62, «Le fait qu'il dit être allé en Arabie sert à prouver l'origine divine de son Évangile», et à la page suivante: «le fait qu'il n'est pas tout de suite allé à Jérusalem est une preuve supplémentaire de l'origine divine de son Évangile».

trois ans plus tard, il n'y est resté que quinze jours, il n'a habité que chez Pierre et n'a vu personne d'autre, excepté Jacques. La visite est manifestement présentée comme privée: Paul a voulu connaître Pierre<sup>(38)</sup>, le seul chez qui il a logé là-bas. Il n'y est donc pas allé pour recevoir une approbation officielle de son Évangile. Cette dernière ne lui sera donnée que lors de la visite suivante, bien plus tard. Bref, en Ga 1,13-24, tout ce qui souligne la distance dans l'espace et le temps, a pour fonction de montrer que l'Évangile de Paul ne vient pas des hommes.

Les preuves jusqu'à présent fournies ont illustré la partie négative de la *propositio* (ou, mieux, de la *ratio* qui se trouve en 1,12a), à savoir que l'Évangile de Paul ne vient pas des hommes. Elles ne suffisent évidemment pas, surtout si ce dernier est le seul à déclarer que son Évangile n'est pas d'origine humaine. Les apôtres de la première heure auraient pu en effet lui objecter que, pour le reconnaître tel, ils devaient auparavant l'entendre. Et Paul lui-même sentit la nécessité d'une telle reconnaissance ecclésiale, puisqu'il dit en 2,2: «J'exposai l'Évangile que j'annonce<sup>(39)</sup> parmi les Nations..., pour ne pas courir ou avoir couru en vain». Par esprit d'union et comme confirmation, il a lui-même voulu cette reconnaissance par les autorités compétentes en matière de prédication et d'enseignement de l'Évangile<sup>(40)</sup>. Ga 2,1-10 rend compte de ce tournant: les autorités de Jérusalem ont déclaré officiellement et sans réticence aucune que Dieu avait confié à Paul l'évangélisation des Nations<sup>(41)</sup>. S'il n'est pas question de commenter ici l'épisode en toutes ses finesses, il importe néanmoins de noter que

(38) Le syntagme ἵστορήσαι Κηφᾶν peut être traduit «pour chercher à connaître Pierre», ou encore «pour interroger Pierre». Sur ce verbe, voir les commentaires, en particulier VANHOYE, *Galati*, 49, et BUSCEMI, *Galati*, 129-130, qui insistent, avec d'autres, sur le fait qu'étant donné le contexte (et surtout la *propositio* de 1,11-12), l'expression ne peut connoter une demande de catéchèse. Pierre a sans doute dû parler du Jésus qu'il a suivi, aimé, renié, et rencontré ressuscité, bref il a dû narrer son expérience; en ne disant rien sur les informations qu'il a alors reçues, Paul laisse entendre qu'elles n'ont pas modifié le paysage christologique ou sotériologique de son Évangile.

(39) Avec le présent κηρύσσω Paul veut signifier qu'il annonce toujours le même Évangile, depuis qu'il lui fut révélé. Voir VANHOYE, *Galati*, 55.

(40) Position analogue de TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians*, 69-83.

(41) Voir Ga 2,7-8, avec πεπίστευμαι, qui est évidemment un passif théologique, comme l'admettent les commentaires, puis avec une ellipse, encore théologique: «Celui qui avait agi en Pierre pour l'apostolat des circoncis avait aussi agi en moi en faveur des païens» (trad. TOB).

les faits sont présentés pour souligner que rien ne fut imposé à Paul: il se rendit à Jérusalem bien après l'événement de Damas<sup>(42)</sup>, sans contrainte aucune de la part des autorités locales, mais sous l'effet d'une inspiration divine; aucun changement ou ajout à son Évangile ne lui fut demandé (2,6); il n'y eut donc aucun 'marchandage', aucune compromission, en particulier avec ceux qu'il appelle les faux frères (2,5). Il indique même que les colonnes, comme il les appelle, donnèrent à son ministère la même importance qu'à celui de Pierre<sup>(43)</sup>. Il insiste surtout sur le fait que Tite ne dut pas se faire circoncire. Cette information permet raisonnablement de conclure que Paul lui-même n'avait pas imposé la circoncision aux non juifs demandant à appartenir au groupe des disciples de Jésus Christ. Ainsi, pour la première fois, l'apôtre donne indirectement quelques indications sur le contenu de son Évangile, qui est fait pour un auditoire de non juifs, et n'inclut pas la circoncision.

De ces versets, on peut encore inférer que l'Évangile a mis Paul du côté des ethnico-chrétiens<sup>(44)</sup>, car pour pouvoir fréquenter des non circoncis, vivre et manger avec eux, il dut au moins abandonner les règles de la Loi relatives à la pureté alimentaire et à la séparation, relativisation qu'il ne considère pas comme une déchéance, bien plutôt une vraie liberté<sup>(45)</sup>. Indirectement donc, Ga 2,4 indique l'effet que l'Évangile a eu sur le rapport de Paul à la Loi, et complète les preuves fournies en Ga 1,13-14: si cet homme qui était on ne peut plus fidèle et intransigeant avec les coutumes ancestrales et les règles de la Loi en est venu à les relativiser, c'est que cela ne vient pas de sa propre initiative, mais de celle de Dieu. On voit ainsi comment ces allusions aux changements qu'a provoqués l'Évangile dans le comportement de Paul préparent l'épisode suivant, où Pierre aura une position beaucoup plus fluente: la *synkrisis* entre un Paul vivant avec les ethnico-chrétiens par obéissance aux implications de son Évangile, et un Pierre changeant d'attitude au gré des circonstances, cette *synkrisis* est

(42) Exégètes et commentateurs sont divisés sur le nombre d'années séparant l'événement du chemin de Damas de la visite officielle signalée en Ga 2,1-10. La technique rhétorique utilisée ici — à savoir l'insistance sur la distance dans l'espace et le temps — invite à fortement à choisir la période la plus longue, dix sept ans.

(43) Ga 2,7-8. La technique utilisée est bien celle de la σύγκρισις, comme la nomment Hester et Buscemi. Elle va continuer jusqu'au v. 14. Voir *supra*, n. 15.

(44) Comme l'indiquent, au v. 4, les pronoms personnels et le verbe à la première personne du pluriel: ἡμῶν, ἡμᾶς, ἔχομεν.

(45) Cf. le substantif ἐλευθερία en Ga 2,4.

préparée dès Ga 2,4-5. La présence de l'unité rhétorique suivante (Ga 2,11-14, et même 2,11-21 en son entier, on le verra) prend tout son sens du contraste de ces deux attitudes.

Si les colonnes de l'Église ont officiellement reconnu l'origine divine de l'Évangile et de l'apostolat de Paul, ce dernier a-t-il encore besoin de fournir d'autres preuves? L'argumentation engendrée par la *propositio* de Ga 1,11-12 serait-elle arrivée à son terme? La reconnaissance officielle de l'origine divine de l'Évangile de Paul aurait dû porter l'argumentation à son climax, mais l'incident d'Antioche montre qu'elle pouvait être purement formelle, et ne pas faire concrètement changer l'attitude des judéo-chrétiens envers les croyants d'origine non juive. Les judéo-chrétiens pouvaient-ils admettre que l'Évangile de Paul venait bien de Dieu, et continuer à observer les règles juives de séparation à l'encontre de leurs frères d'origine païenne? Paul va devoir maintenant montrer qu'en confessant l'origine divine de son Évangile, les apôtres, et tous les croyants d'origine juive avec eux, ne pouvaient en rester à une pure reconnaissance formelle, mais qu'ils devaient avoir la même attitude que lui envers les ethnico-chrétiens d'une part et envers la Loi d'autre part: l'incident d'Antioche permet de rappeler que la position ferme de Paul vient du respect donné à la révélation reçue et qu'elle est la seule cohérente. La preuve fournie par le passage à la *propositio* de Ga 1,11-12 a, comme les précédentes, quelque chose d'incongru: si lui, Paul, le dernier des apôtres, n'a pas hésité à réprimander Pierre, le premier et le plus connu de tous, ce n'est pas par supériorité humaine ou par rodomontade, mais par fidélité à la révélation reçue.

Quant à la notification du contenu de l'Évangile de Paul, elle devient nécessaire (cf. Ga 2,15-21), dans la mesure où Pierre lui-même n'eut pas nécessairement conscience d'aller contre son Évangile ni contre celui de Paul, lorsqu'il cessa de prendre ses repas «avec les non circoncis»<sup>(46)</sup>. Paul doit maintenant montrer pourquoi, de l'accord de Jérusalem à leur attitude subséquente à Antioche, les judéo-chrétiens sont tombés dans une contradiction catastrophique à tous égards.

<sup>(46)</sup> On pourrait encore traduire «avec les Gentils» ou, à la rigueur, «avec les ethnico-chrétiens» le μετὰ τῶν ἔθνων de Ga 2,12., mais certainement pas «avec les païens», comme le font de nombreuses Bibles (BJ; TOB; CEI; *Einheitsübersetzung*; etc.).

#### 4. Ga 2,14b-21 et sa fonction<sup>(47)</sup>

Les analyses précédentes ont, espérons-le, montré pourquoi Ga 2,14b-21 ne saurait être séparé de ce qui précède, même si, rhétoriquement, le passage a toutes les caractéristiques d'un discours<sup>(48)</sup>, car il s'agit d'une apostrophe de Paul à Pierre, en style direct (v. 14b), suivie d'une argumentation très brève (v. 15-21)<sup>(49)</sup>. À cause du triple changement de personne, ces versets donnent l'impression de n'être pas unifiés rhétoriquement. Les personnes se suivent en effet sans transition: une apostrophe, à la deuxième personne du singulier («Si toi, tu ...», v. 14b), suivie d'une déclaration à la première du pluriel («Nous, juifs...», v. 15-17), elle-même suivie de réflexions à la première du singulier («Si donc, moi, je...» v. 18-21). En réalité, le passage du *tu* au *nous*, puis au *je*, correspond à une progression en profondeur: (a) une apostrophe à Pierre, en *tu*, sous forme de question, pour ce que Paul estime être une contradiction (v. 14b); (b) en contraste, un rappel de l'accord passé entre judéo-chrétiens sur l'Évangile à Jérusalem (accord illustré, comme il se doit, par une déclaration en *nous*), avec les conséquences que le retour en arrière — celui de Pierre et d'autres judéo-chrétiens — a pour la situation salvifique des croyants (v. 15-17); (c) une explicitation<sup>(50)</sup> de la

<sup>(47)</sup> Cet essai ne s'intéressant qu'au développement de l'argumentation (*dispositio* et *inventio*), on n'y trouvera pas une exégèse de Ga 2,14b-21 (en particulier des expressions du v. 16, encore très discutées, sur la justification, sur la πίστις Χριστοῦ, etc.).

<sup>(48)</sup> Discours en style direct, à la puissance deux, car préparé par un premier discours, celui qui va de Ga 1,11 à 2,14a. L'une ou l'autre étude a proposé de voir en ces versets un discours succinct mais complet, autrement dit une *dispositio* allant de l'exorde à la conclusion. Voir par ex. les divisions de J. BECKER, *Paulus*, 292: *exordium* (v. 14b); *narratio* (v. 15-16); *propositio* (v. 17); *probatio* (v. 18-20); *peroratio* (v. 21); également KREMENDAHL, *Botschaft*, 188: *exordium* (v. 14b); *propositio* (v. 15-16); *argumentatio* (v. 17-20), divisée en *refutatio* (v. 17) et *probatio* (v. 18-20); *peroratio* (v. 21). Ces auteurs ont raison de faire commencer le mini-discours au v. 14b, car il ne commence qu'avec l'apostrophe à Pierre. Pour la fonction rhétorique des différents versets, voir *infra*.

<sup>(49)</sup> On a vu plus haut (n. 32) que Bachmann sépare rhétoriquement 2,15-21 de 1,11-2,14. Sans nous attarder sur une position dépassée à cause des études rhétoriques subséquentes, notons seulement (a) que 2,14b ne finit pas une unité rhétorique, mais en commence une, (b) que ce même verset n'est pas une *partitio*. Pour le rattachement de Ga 2,15-21 à Ga 1,11-12, voir la démonstration récente de TOLMIE, *Persuading the Galatians*, 83-100.

<sup>(50)</sup> Comme souvent en ses argumentations, Paul procède ici aussi par précisions successives. BUSCEMI, *Galati*, 199-204, divise en deux parties (de trois

situation décrite au v. 17, explicitation basée sur l'expérience personnelle et forte du croyant (pour laquelle le *je* convient parfaitement, v. 18-21)<sup>(51)</sup>.

Quelle est la fonction de Ga 2,14b-21? On y a vu une *peroratio* <sup>(52)</sup>. Mais la teneur fortement argumentative du passage<sup>(53)</sup> et le style diatribique ne favorisent pas cette hypothèse. Car, si les propos de Paul ont une tournure pathétique aux v. 19-20, ils restent démonstratifs: il s'agit bien de *rationes* (ou *πίσταις*). On a aussi proposé de voir en ces versets la *propositio* (générale) de Ga<sup>(54)</sup>. Mais pour être aisément identifiables, les *propositiones* doivent être brèves, et celles de Paul le sont toutes<sup>(55)</sup>: où se trouve-t-elle donc en cette unité? Aux v. 14b, 15-16, 17 ou encore 18<sup>(56)</sup>? Il semble plutôt indiqué de restreindre la *propositio* de Ga 3–4 au seul v. 16, qui a toutes les allures d'une thèse, car les idées de 2,16 sur la justification, par la foi seule et sans les œuvres de la Loi, sont bien reprises et prouvées de différentes manières dans les chapitres suivants<sup>(57)</sup>. Néanmoins, la fonction de ce même verset à l'intérieur de l'unité rhétorique 2,14b-21 n'est pas celle d'une *propositio*. Pour des raisons logiques d'abord. Le *δέ* qui rattache le

---

éléments chacune): A - v. 14b-17 (v. 14b, thèse; v. 15-16: démonstration; v. 17: conclusion); B - v. 18-21 (v. 18: thèse; v. 19-20: démonstration; v. 21: conclusion). Il est vrai que les v. 18-21 reprennent (selon un schéma concentrique: situation négative [si... alors] – situation positive [moi – Christ] – situation négative [si... alors]) le v. 17 en l'élargissant. Mais l'apostrophe du v. 14b n'est pas une thèse, et le v. 16 certainement pas une démonstration, on va le voir, seulement le résumé de l'Évangile de Paul sur lequel les judéo-chrétiens sont tombés d'accord à Jérusalem, et que l'apôtre met en contraste avec l'attitude de Pierre. Pour mémoire, mentionnons l'étude de J. LAMBRECHT, «The Line of Thought in Gal 2,14b-21», *NTS* 24 (1977/78) 484-495.

<sup>(51)</sup> Plusieurs commentaires signalent aussi avec raison que Paul passe au *je* pour éviter, par délicatesse, de trop insister sur les torts de Pierre.

<sup>(52)</sup> PITTA, *Disposizione*, 95; ID., *Galati*, 139 (*peroratio* qui ne commence pour lui qu'au v. 15).

<sup>(53)</sup> Avec les *γάρ*, les formulations logiques en «si, alors» des v. 17, 18 et 21.

<sup>(54)</sup> BETZ, *Galatians*, 113-114. LONGENECKER, *Galatians*, 80-82.

<sup>(55)</sup> Pour cette caractéristique de la *propositio*, voir KERN, *Rhetoric and Galatians*, 108: «So then, the *propositio* exists only to state clearly concisely and in order, that is, unmistakably, what is being argued».

<sup>(56)</sup> Voir aux n. 48 et 50, les positions respectives de Becker, Kremendahl et Buscemi, pour qui, soit dit en passant, ces différents versets ne seraient la *propositio* que du discours des v. 14b-21.

<sup>(57)</sup> Appliquer à Ga 2,16 la dénomination ancienne de *propositio* pour Ga 3–4 semble ainsi indiqué. Voir par ex. M. RASTOIN, *Tarse et Jérusalem*. La double culture de l'Apôtre Paul en Galates 3,6–4,7 (AB 152; Rome 2003) 45.



v. 17 au v. 16 n'introduit ni une explication ni une démonstration, mais une opposition («*mais* si, en cherchant à être justifiés... ») ou une simple coordination («*si, alors*, cherchant à être justifiés ...»)(<sup>58</sup>). Quant au γάρ du v. 18, il renvoie bien au v. 17, mais pas au v. 16. En ces v. 15-21, ce n'est pas la déclaration solennelle(<sup>59</sup>) du v. 16 mentionnant les termes de l'accord sur l'Évangile de Paul, qui est éclaircie ou prouvée — car elle ne sert ici que de point de départ à une réflexion sur la situation salvifique des les judéo-chrétiens qui, comme Pierre, sont revenus aux règles juives de séparation. En d'autres termes, ce que l'unité 2,14b-21 montre, ce n'est pas l'idée du v. 16, à savoir que la justification se fait par la foi, mais que cette vérité autrefois admise ne l'a plus été ensuite, et que cela a des conséquences dramatiques pour la situation des croyants ainsi que pour leur sotériologie. Que Ga 2,16 soit une reprise concise de l'accord conclu à Jérusalem sur le contenu de l'Évangile de Paul entre judéo-chrétiens(<sup>60</sup>), accord relaté en Ga 2,1-10, les deux verbes du verset, l'insistance énonciative du v. 15(<sup>61</sup>), le participe εἰδότες et l'indicatif ἐπιστεύσαμεν l'indiquent également: il s'agit de choses déjà connues et crues. Et comme cet accord ne fut pas formellement remis en question par Pierre, Paul se contente de le rappeler, sous forme de déclaration. La fonction rhétorique du v. 16 en ce mini-discours devient claire, si l'on voit qu'elle est en contraste avec l'attitude concrète (différente d'un désaccord formel) de Pierre et des judéo-chrétiens à Antioche, attitude montrant que la reconnaissance formelle antérieure de l'Évangile paulinien n'a servi à rien; ceux qui sont autrefois tombés d'accord sur le fait que les Gentils n'avaient pas à être circoncis pour faire partie de la famille des sauvés, et ont reconnu

(<sup>58</sup>) Cf. par ex. VANHOYE, *Galati*, 63; BUSCEMI, *Galati*, 214. Les deux interprétations (dé à nuance adversative ou temporelle) ne s'opposent pas, loin de là.

(<sup>59</sup>) Cf. BUSCEMI, *Galati*, 77 et 183-184, nomme cet énoncé du v. 16 χρεία ἀποφαντική. Il renvoie au *Handbooch* (sic!) de Lausberg, §1117-1120 (en particulier §1118; H. LAUSBERG, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* [2 vol.], München 1960). La distinction entre χρεία ἀποφαντική (simple déclaration) et χρεία ἀποκριτική (déclaration en réponse à une question) se trouve pour la première fois dans le *progymnasmata* de Théon (97.11-16). Cf. R.F. HOCK – E.N. O'NEIL, *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric* (SBL Texts & Translations 27; Atlanta 1986) I, 85–87.

(<sup>60</sup>) Voilà pourquoi l'unité rhétorique Ga 2,15-21 en son entier est métonymiquement intitulée «l'Évangile de Paul» par BUSCEMI, *Galati*, 195-226.

(<sup>61</sup>) La déclaration commence solennellement, en une formule d'extension maximale et de facture officielle («Nous, Juifs, sachant que ..., nous avons cru»), renvoyant à un événement important, et qui, étant donné le contexte rhétorique antérieur, ne peut être que celui de Jérusalem.

que la foi en Jésus Christ seule donnait le salut, etc., ceux-là mêmes continuent pourtant à pratiquer la ségrégation envers les ethnico-chrétiens, position dont Paul va notifier les effets tragiques aux v. 17 et 18-21.

Si Ga 2,16 n'est pas la *propositio* de Ga 2,14b-21, qu'est-elle donc, et quelle est la fonction respective des unités rhétoriques du passage? Pour certains, on l'a vu, Ga 2,16, qui forme d'ailleurs une unité énonciative avec le verset précédent<sup>(62)</sup>, est une *narratio*<sup>(63)</sup>, et pour d'autres la première des *rationes*<sup>(64)</sup>. Même si, *stricto sensu*, le terme *narratio* ne convient pas, il indique néanmoins que la déclaration du v. 16 ne fait pas partie des *rationes*. En effet, si l'interrogation initiale dénonce, sous forme de blâme<sup>(65)</sup>, ce qui, dans l'attitude de Pierre, serait contradictoire, elle ne suffit pas; ce dernier a ou aurait pu répondre qu'il fallait s'adapter aux circonstances, observer les règles strictement lorsqu'on était entre juifs, et les relativiser lorsqu'on était en compagnie des Gentils. En rappelant sous forme de déclaration (la *χρεία* du v. 16) les termes de l'accord antérieur, quand les judéo-chrétiens avaient reconnu, en acceptant l'Évangile de Paul, que nul ne pouvait être justifié par les œuvres de la Loi, Paul porte le débat à un plan nettement plus radical, celui du statut salvifique des croyants.

En bref, la première argumentation commencée avec la *propositio* de 1,11-12 a pour fonction ultime de mener à la deuxième (Ga 3–4). Sa progression est d'ailleurs continue, puisque d'externes au départ, les *rationes* touchent la vie même du croyant en fin de parcours; de même, si au commencement, l'Évangile de Paul est seulement mentionné, au cours des développements il est progressivement repris en ses lignes saillantes; et si au départ, l'apôtre se décrit comme un pharisien intransigeant en matière de séparation<sup>(66)</sup>, à la fin, il est tout

(62) Ga 2,15-16 forme une seule déclaration ainsi composée: (a) une mention des énonciateurs au début (au v. 15: «Nous, juifs...»), (b) un attendu (v. 16a «sachant que...»), (3) l'objet principal de la déclaration (v. 16b: «nous aussi nous crûmes en Christ Jésus») et ses raisons («afin que..., parce que...»).

(63) BECKER, *Paulus*, 292.

(64) BUSCEMI, *Galati*, 199-204.

(65) Par cette apostrophe initiale, l'unité entière (Ga 2,14b-21) devient en quelque sorte un blâme, lequel appartient, comme on sait, au genre épictique. La difficulté («Les judéo-chrétiens doivent-ils ou non partager les repas avec des ethnico-chrétiens?») semblait requérir un discours de genre délibératif, et Paul la traite autrement. Cela est typique de sa manière de procéder. Voir l'article cité en n. 19.

(66) Réaction non explicitement mentionnée en Ga 1,13-14, mais dont on comprend peu à peu, surtout en 2,15-21, qu'elle était telle.

simplement avec et au milieu des Gentils. À cet égard, on pourrait même dire qu'en Ga 1,11–2,21, deux parcours différents se croisent: celui, positif de Paul, et celui négatif, des autres judéo-chrétiens.

En résumé, on peut dire que Ga 2,16 a une double fonction: (a) dans le mini-discours constitué par Ga 2,14b-21, il joue comme point de référence à partir duquel est jugée l'attitude de Pierre et des autres judéo-chrétiens, avec ses conséquences; (b) et pour le reste de la lettre, le même v. 16 énonce les idées sur la justification qui seront démontrées systématiquement et scripturairement en Ga 3–4<sup>(67)</sup>. Il devient alors clair que le discours adressé à Pierre en Ga 2,14b-21 sert de tremplin aux développements théoriques de Ga 3–4: comme les judéo-chrétiens ne pensaient pas être en contradiction avec l'Évangile, la réflexion de l'apôtre va progressivement vers un traitement approfondi et radical du problème.

\*  
\* \*

Sans entrer dans l'exégèse de Ga 1–2, cet essai a eu pour objet de reprendre les acquis des différentes études rhétoriques publiées depuis l'article décisif de H.D. Betz en 1975, en les portant à leur terme — même si en ces domaines rien n'est définitif. La compréhension de la *dispositio* (et par là, de l'*inventio*) des écrits pauliniens est des plus importantes, dans la mesure où elle permet de saisir la dynamique de la réflexion de l'apôtre, ce qu'il veut montrer et comment il le montre. L'exégèse des détails ne reçoit son véritable relief que de cette compréhension d'ensemble.

Les résultats de cet essai peuvent être aisément résumés. Il y a été montré (a) que Ga 1,11–2,21 forme bien une argumentation unifiée, (b) dont Ga 1,11-12 est la *propositio*, (c) que Ga 2,14b-21 est un mini-discours portant l'argumentation à son acmé, et (d) que Ga 2,16 reprend les termes de l'Évangile de Paul tel qu'il fut reconnu à Jérusalem, (e) qu'il a en outre une double fonction rhétorique, à l'intérieur du mini-discours, mais aussi pour l'argumentation subséquente, Ga 3–4, dont il énonce les idées maîtresses, celles qui vont être prouvées scripturairement.

Partant du texte paulinien, mais en le comparant avec différents modèles rhétoriques connus, nous avons été amenés à reprendre,

<sup>(67)</sup> Le terme ancien de *propositio* ou *πρόθεσις* correspond bien à ce statut rhétorique. Ga 2,16 semble ainsi être la seule thèse (ou *propositio*) des lettres pauliniennes à ne pas être immédiatement suivie de ses *rationes*.

lorsqu'elles étaient appropriées, les dénominations anciennes. Sans doute est-il bon de rappeler que l'étiquetage, quel qu'il soit, n'a de valeur que s'il est adéquat au discours paulinien et à l'intelligence qu'il en donne.

Pontificio Istituto Biblico  
Via della Pilotta, 25  
00187 Roma

Jean-Noël ALETTI

#### SUMMARY

This article is an attempt to show the following: (1) Galatians 1,11–2,21 is a unified argument in which vv. 11–12 constitute the *propositio*; (2) Gal 2,14b–21 represent a short speech bringing the argument to its climax, and (3) Gal 2,16 takes up the Jerusalem agreement about Paul's Gospel and not only fulfills a rhetorical function within the short speech of v. 14b–21 but also provides the thesis of the argument that unfolds in Galatians 3–4.

## **Source of Law in the Biblical and Mesopotamian Law Collections**

Numerous scholarly studies have compared biblical and cuneiform laws, and noted the many similarities between them. I wish to take a somewhat different approach here, and emphasize what I think is the fundamental difference between the two types of laws. I acknowledge scholarly assumptions that though there were external influences on Israelite law, its uniqueness consists of the changes effected for the purpose of adapting it to its particular theology<sup>(1)</sup>. The pivotal factor in this uniqueness is, in my opinion, the perceived source of the law. Biblical law is perceived to be of divine source. Cuneiform law, in contrast, has its source in the king.

This distinction entails several consequences. The source of law affects what is classified as an offence, and how and by whom the offence is to be redressed. In biblical law, some offences disrupt the divine order; in cuneiform law an offence affects public order. Consequently, redress in biblical law is often primarily concerned with punishing the perpetrator; in cuneiform law, it is generally concerned with compensating the injured party. Biblical law admits of no change nor commutation of punishment; cuneiform law not only reflects changes, but allows punishment to be deferred or delegated.

### *1. Methodology*

I will not be limiting my biblical examples to the Book of the Covenant. I have frozen my analysis in a different moment of time than most scholars — that is, after the compilation of the assumed later books of the Pentateuch. Questions about the priority of the laws of the different books and their interrelation have been raised by various scholars<sup>(2)</sup>. In general, however, these books represent the further

<sup>(1)</sup> See, e.g. S.M. PAUL, *Studies in the Book of the Covenant in the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law* (VTS 18; Leiden 1970), as well as the works of J.J. Finkelstein and others, particularly with respect to the laws of the goring ox.

<sup>(2)</sup> See, e.g., A. FITZPATRICK-MCKINLEY, *The Transformation of Torah from Scribal Advice to Law* (Sheffield 1999) 176-177. Cf R.H. PFEIFFER, *Introduction to the Old Testament* (New York – London 1941) 216; J. VAN SETERS, “Cultic Laws in the Covenant Code and their Relationship to Deuteronomy and the Holi-

development of the same “theologizing process” of existing customs and laws<sup>(3)</sup>, as well as the transformation from secular to sacral law. My assumption, in other words, is that biblical law should not be studied diachronically, but as a “comprehensive system of thought” and as “a coherent conceptual system”<sup>(4)</sup>.

From this point of view, the biblical laws should be perceived as complementary. For instance, the rules equalizing the sanctions for killing a son or daughter to that of their father reflect a shared theological foundation, whether they are found in the Book of the Covenant or in Leviticus and Numbers, and they share a common distinction from the other Near Eastern law collections. It is also irrelevant whether, as debated by scholars, biblical laws had an effect on social norms, whether they were a law code or a collection of judgments, or whether some or all the rules of the Covenant Code were influenced by or even reproduced from the Mesopotamian collections. The main point is that they were appropriately adjusted to be compatible with Israelite theology, in the same manner that certain Genesis narratives, though similar to Mesopotamian mythology, have radical differences that support the particular Israelite theology.

## 2. Source of law in the Bible and in other Near Eastern law collections

As a wealth of scholarly material attests, there are many similarities between biblical and cuneiform law, in content, in concept<sup>(5)</sup> and even at a philological level<sup>(6)</sup>. Nonetheless, the distinct sources of the law are evident in each case.

---

ness Code”, *Studies in the Book of Exodus*. Redaction-Reception-Interpretation (ed. M. VERVENNE) (Leuven 1996) 337-340; and C.M. CARMICHAEL, *The Origins of Biblical Law*. The Decalogues and the Book of the Covenant (Ithaca 1992) 2-15.

<sup>(3)</sup> See, e.g. R. ALBERTZ, “Die Theologisierung des Rechts im Alten Israel”, *Religion und Gesellschaft*. Studien zu ihrer Wechselbeziehung in den Kulturen des Antiken Vorderen Orients (ed. R. ALBERTZ – S. OTTO) (Münster 1997) 115-132; and O. ECKART, *Wandel der Rechtsbegründungen in der Gesellschaftsgeschichte des Antiken Israel*. Eine Rechtsgeschichte des “Bundesbuches” Ex XX 22 – XXIII 13 (Leiden 1988) 69-73.

<sup>(4)</sup> D. PATRICK, “Studying Biblical Law as a Humanities”, *Semeia* 45 (1989) 27-28.

<sup>(5)</sup> Akkadian phrases such as *dīnât meshârim* “rightful justice” and *dīn kitti* “true judgment” have their poetic parallels in Ps 119,137 and in Zech 7,9.

<sup>(6)</sup> The Hebrew root דן in its various ramifications relating to judging is cognate with the Akkadian terms: *dīnum* “judgement” *dayyānum* “judge”, etc.

Although Hammurapi, in the Prologue to his Laws (LH), speaks in the name of the gods, he emphasizes that they entrusted him with the duty “to make justice prevail in the land” (LH i 27-49)<sup>(7)</sup>. It is he, the king, “who proclaims truth, who guides the population properly” (iv 53-58), and whom “the god Marduk commanded to provide just ways for the people of the land” (v 14-24)<sup>(8)</sup>. In the Epilogue this reality is yet more explicit. The king praises the excellence of his laws, emphasizing his role: “My pronouncements are choice, my ability is unrivaled” (xlvii 79 – xlviii 2)<sup>(9)</sup>. Law in Mesopotamia was a strictly secular institution<sup>(10)</sup>.

In contrast, the biblical laws are, in most occurrences, pronounced directly by God. Whatever their real origin, they are attributed absolutely to the Deity, and not to wisdom. The Israelites believed that God’s laws are based on reason, and “rationality is an aspect of God”<sup>(11)</sup>. Even when we do encounter a record of a king promulgating a law, as for example in 1 Sam 30,23-25, the law is not presented as his creation<sup>(12)</sup>.

Thus laws in the Book of the Covenant are spoken by God in the first person. Wording such as that in Exod 22,23-24, “...and they cry out to me, I will certainly hear their cry, my anger will be aroused”, indicates not only the divine source of the law, but also God’s direct involvement and intervention to ensure its implementation.

Such divine involvement is particularly apparent in the

<sup>(7)</sup> All references to and translations of cuneiform laws are from M. ROTH, *Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor* (SBL Writings from the Ancient World Series 6; Atlanta 1995).

<sup>(8)</sup> See also the prologue of the Laws of Ur-Namma: “[by the might] of the god Nanna, my lord, [by the true command of the god Utu (?)] I established [justice in the land (?)]” (LU A iii 104-113). In the Prologue of the Laws of Lipit-Ishtar, we read: “the gods An and Enlil called Lipit-Ishtar ...to establish justice in the land” (LI I 20-37) and: “With a ...decree (?) I made the father support his children” (LI ii 16-24).

<sup>(9)</sup> See PAUL, *Studies in the Book of the Covenant*, 5-10, and ALBERTZ, *Religion*, 115-116.

<sup>(10)</sup> See PAUL, *Studies in the Book of the Covenant*, 8, and M. WEINFELD, “Israelite and Non-Israelite Concepts of Law”, *Beth Mikra* 17 (1964) 58-63.

<sup>(11)</sup> M.J. BASS, “Legal Science and Legislation”, *Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law*. Revision, Interpolation and Development (ed. B.M. LEVINSON) (JSOTSS 181; Sheffield 1994) 90.

<sup>(12)</sup> As noted by B.S. JACKSON, *Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal History* (Leiden 1975) 53, n. 156.



punishment of excision in Lev 20,3.5.6<sup>(13)</sup>. The wording specifies God's "personal" participation in the punishment of the transgressor. The foundation of this participation is the belief that God rules the world in all its manifestations.

A most interesting example of this phenomenon is the case of unintentional homicide, described in Exod 21,13 by the phrase "if he does not do it intentionally" (KJV translation, in accord with the LXX and *Tg. Onq.*<sup>(14)</sup>). The literary structure of the sentence, as well as the verbs employed, suggest that the writer/redactor wanted to emphasize the passive role of the human: "but if he did not lie in wait", in contrast to the active divine participation that follows<sup>(15)</sup>. This idea is further supported in the next part of the verse by God's active intervention in providing a safe haven for the human perpetrator: "he is to flee to a place I will designate"<sup>(16)</sup>.

This is not, as some scholars argue, a *force majeure*<sup>(17)</sup>, or an accident related to an act of the perpetrator; it is an act of divine providence, ultimately performed by a human. The Rabbis presented just such a scenario in which divine intervention redresses past evils and ensures just retribution (bMak 10b)<sup>(18)</sup>. In this occurrence the human is merely God's messenger and executioner, a common

<sup>(13)</sup> The ambiguity of the various scriptural forms of כרת, as well as the actual substance of this punishment, are debated issues. For our purposes, it suffices to note this term as evidence of divine involvement.

<sup>(14)</sup> The LXX translates: "but God has given him into his hands". *Tg. Onq.* translates similarly: "and he was delivered by God into his hands".

<sup>(15)</sup> It seems odd that our v. 13 lacks a verb indicating what the perpetrator has done, which we would expect after the phrase "but if he did not lie in wait". It is plausible that this too was deliberate, intending to hint that he is not the real perpetrator.

<sup>(16)</sup> See B. JACOB, *The Second Book of the Bible*. Exodus (transl. from German by W. Jacob) (Hoboken, NJ 1992) 642-649.

<sup>(17)</sup> E.g., PAUL, *Studies in the Book of the Covenant*, 64.

<sup>(18)</sup> We read there: "Exod 21,13 refers to two people who [each] killed a person, one unintentionally and the other intentionally, without witnesses to their deeds. [The first did not escape to City of Refuge and the second was not killed]. To reestablish the divine order with respect to each one [according to his deed], God causes them to meet in an inn. The one who killed intentionally sits under a ladder; the one who killed unintentionally climbs down the ladder and falls upon the one [sitting below] killing him; the intentional murderer is killed and the unintentional murderer escapes [to the Cities of Refuge]". The *Mek* on the biblical verse quotes the same story, but in a shortened and rather obscure style, and I therefore chose to cite the BT source.

theological approach in the Bible<sup>(19)</sup>, and is completely exonerated of any guilt in Deut 19,10. He has not committed any act against the divine order; on the contrary, he has taken part in reconstituting it. The residence in the cities of refuge (Exod 21,13) is not a punishment; this would be against the concept of theodicy, as he has accomplished a divinely designed act. He is saved from the anger of the avenger by this divine provision.

This active divine involvement in human affairs, the investiture of God as the initial and supreme creator and custodian of the law, is also apparent in the deuteronomic laws uttered by Moses. Deut 6,1 shows clearly that the laws are of divine origin and that Moses only mediates their transmission

In emphasizing the divine source of the Israelite law as its distinctive feature, I am not placing myself with those scholars who consider ethical values as the distinctive feature of the Israelite system. The weighing of ethical values is a matter open to debate<sup>(20)</sup>. For example, a number of Mesopotamian laws, protecting women, would seem to us more ethical than the biblical laws, in which they are absent. The Ur-Namma codex (LU)<sup>(21)</sup> provides a fixed amount to be paid by the man divorcing his wife. While the *Ketubah*, a compulsory payment assuring the divorcee's subsistence, was instituted in the first century BCE by Simeon ben Shatah<sup>(22)</sup>, it is unclear what prior Israelite custom was. It is possible that Israelite custom allowed the divorcing man the choice of whether to grant his ex-wife any payment, similar to the rule in the Middle Assyrian Laws (MAL A 37)<sup>(23)</sup>. The fact that the compulsory payment rule is attributed to Simeon ben Shatah may indicate its previous want. As another example, the Hammurapi laws allow a betrayed husband to forgive his adulterous

<sup>(19)</sup> See Lev 26,25; Deut 28,25; 32,30; Ezek 14, 21; Isa 10,5-13

<sup>(20)</sup> As noted by M. GREENBERG, "Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law", *Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume* (ed. M. HARAN) (Jerusalem 1960) 5-28. B.S. Jackson maintains that Mesopotamian laws also obey high ethical principles: "Reflections on Biblical Law", *JJS* 24 (1973) 27-28; *id.*, *Essays*, 35.

<sup>(21)</sup> LU 9. A similar rule appears in the Sumerian Law Handbook of Forms iv 12-14.

<sup>(22)</sup> We read in bShab 14b that Simeon ben Shatah established the endowment of a *Ketubah* (a pledge of funds in the event of the husband's death or divorce) at a woman's marriage. He was active in the first part of the first century BCE.

<sup>(23)</sup> It is also possible that in Ancient Israel, all male relatives of a deceased childless husband were obligated to marry the widow, similar to the Mesopotamian custom. A widow's sustenance would thus be assured, but this would not solve the problem of a divorcee.

wife, and thus save her life and that of her adulterer<sup>(24)</sup>. Biblical law provides only for death in such a case.

Since value judgments are obviously subjective, it seems to me that this criterion cannot be used as the crucial distinguishing factor between the biblical and other ancient Near Eastern law. The distinction regarding the source of law between the Israelite and the cuneiform collections does, however, have far-reaching consequences with respect to the philosophical concepts, procedures and punishments in each legal system.

### 3. *Fundamental attributes of biblical and cuneiform law*

#### a) Redressing of "Harm"

One of the philosophical foundations of the cuneiform law is the aim of redressing the harm caused to another member of society. This is attained by pecuniary composition of the damage, with or without an additional fine. In occurrences that are *prima facie* inappropriate for compensation, such as rape or murder, the redress is accomplished through an equitable punishment, inflicting the same harm on the offender<sup>(25)</sup>. In some cases it is the injured party who chooses between revenge and composition. It is thus the injured party who assesses, according to his or her own perception, what is the greater harm — the emotional grief, resolved by the act of revenge, or the economic loss caused by the killing of a working member of the family, compensated by a suitable payment<sup>(26)</sup>. Both avenues have the identical philosophical motive of rectifying the harm endured by the injured party. There is no offence involved against a higher authority, the state or the gods<sup>(27)</sup>, in the harm that was done, and the episode is conclusively settled after suitable redress. In some of the cuneiform rules there is a

<sup>(24)</sup> LH 129.

<sup>(25)</sup> For example, according to the Assyrian rule in MAL A 55, the father of an unmarried daughter who has been raped takes the wife of the fornicator and hands her over to be raped. If he has no wife, he must pay a "triple" indemnification to her father and marry the daughter, if the father wishes.

<sup>(26)</sup> MAL 10 grants to the head of the household the choice to kill the murderer of a household member, or receive pecuniary compensation.

<sup>(27)</sup> L.J. BORD, "La loi, le droit et la justice. Réflexions sur le droit cunéiforme et biblique, à propos de deux livres récents", *Bib* 82 (2001) 100 states that in contrast to Rome, the Mesopotamian civilizations have not left any doctrinal opus of the law.

supplementary penalty of a monetary fine or corporal punishment, possibly for destabilizing the social and public order<sup>(28)</sup>.

Although some of the compositions, fines and corporal punishments are precisely defined in the cuneiform laws, certain decisions remain the prerogative of the king<sup>(29)</sup>, and in a great variety of occurrences the injured parties determine the kind of punishment<sup>(30)</sup> and its mode of application<sup>(31)</sup>.

Biblical law also has at its foundation the obligation to redress harm caused to another member of society. A distinctive feature of this law, however, is that a number of crimes against humans are also an offence against the Deity. Since God is the source of the law, a transgression constitutes a “sin” against Him.

It is the laws pertaining to capital offences and sexual misbehaviour that most clearly demonstrate the consequences of a distinct theological foundation. Taking the life of a person, as well as certain types of sexual misconduct, are perceived as offences against the divine order of the universe, created by God; the Deity has an interest in the world’s orderly existence, as essential and advantageous to its subsistence<sup>(32)</sup>. In a certain sense one can compare this to the punishments in Mesopotamian law — pecuniary and corporal — inflicted for actions that destabilize the public order<sup>(33)</sup>. But there are differences. The biblical theology that God cares for His creatures and that His laws are devised for their benefit, not for His gratification<sup>(34)</sup>,

<sup>(28)</sup> J.J. FINKELSTEIN, “Ammišaduqua’s Edict and the Babylonian ‘Law Codes’”, *JCS* 15 (1961) 98 writes that some crimes were considered detrimental to the welfare and moral order of the society at large, and punishable by the public authority.

<sup>(29)</sup> See MAL C 8 and 10: For theft and embezzlement the punishment is determined by the king. In LE 58, on the other hand, which states “a capital case is only for the king”, it seems that the king does not decide the issue of the law in this case, but the question of fact whether there has been an intentional murder or manslaughter.

<sup>(30)</sup> MAL B 2 grants to the next of kin of the murdered person the right to choose whether to kill him in revenge, or receive compensation.

<sup>(31)</sup> We read in MAL A 15 that the betrayed husband can kill his adulterous wife, or cut off her nose, or release her altogether. A 16 declares that the betrayed husband “shall impose whatever punishment he chooses upon his wife”.

<sup>(32)</sup> See Lev 18,5; Ezek 20,11; Deut 4,5-8; 12,28; 22,7; Mic 6,8; Jonah 4,11.

<sup>(33)</sup> MAL B 18 specifies corporal punishment for the man who does not agree to cooperate with his fellow citizens in the just sharing of irrigation water.

<sup>(34)</sup> God castigates the Israelites to “stop bringing meaningless offerings” (Isa 1,13), and instead “...stop doing wrong, learn to do right, seek justice, encourage the oppressed” (1,16-17).

is a cornerstone of the Israelite credo and constitutes, in my opinion, the most essential distinction between the classical mythologies and their view of the relationship between gods and humans, and the Israelite conception. The Israelite laws founded upon this axiom bear the same distinction.

#### b) Revisions of Laws and their Execution

Another decisive feature of the cuneiform laws is their ability to be changed. The same power that promulgated the law has, by its nature, the authority to alter them. Hammurapi, in his Epilogue, curses the man who will “overturn the judgments that I rendered, change my pronouncement”, and implores the gods to punish him. Such a statement suggests that laws were or could be changed after the demise of the king who promulgated them. Hittite laws, for instance, clearly demonstrate reforms<sup>(35)</sup>. It is a matter of scholarly debate whether such changes always represent underlying development in sociological and philosophical thought<sup>(36)</sup>, or are limited to changes in prices and penalties<sup>(37)</sup>. I suggest that there are changes in legal thinking between the different law collections<sup>(38)</sup>.

In the Eshnunna Laws (LE), for instance, there is no public corporal punishment or service to the king required in addition to the appropriate settlement to the injured party. The public seems not to be affected in a quarrel between two citizens. In the later Middle Assyrian Laws, in contrast, we observe a well-organized society in which there is a public interest in the private affairs of the citizens. We may note, for instance, the complex administrative process for the acquisition of real estate (MAL B 6), the corporal punishments and service to the king for harmful acts against citizens (MAL B 14), and, on the other hand, the public authority's responsibility for the wellbeing of the

(35) The Late Version (c. 1500 – 1180 BCE) parallels of a great number of laws in the Old Version (c. 1650 – 1500 BCE) clearly demonstrate substantial alterations.

(36) As suggested by S. GREENGUS, “Some Issues Relating to the Compatibility of Laws and the Coherence of the Legal Tradition”, *Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law*, 60-87.

(37) As argued by R. WESTBROOK, “What is the Covenant Code?”, *Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law*, 15-36.

(38) I follow here the opinion of P. Koschaker; see, e.g., the arguments presented in *Rechtsvergleichende Studien zur Gesetzgebung Hammurapis, Königs von Babylon* (Leipzig 1917).

citizens<sup>(39)</sup>. Such rules demonstrate the development of social concepts and the creation of appropriate legislation.

Israelite law in contrast, instituted by God, does not permit any change of His decrees and ordinances. As I have argued elsewhere<sup>(40)</sup>, the Torah does not offer even a hint that any apparently valid reason would allow disregarding or transgressing a divine decree. Such laws are eternal<sup>(41)</sup> and inalterable<sup>(42)</sup>; they are final and nothing can be added to them or subtracted<sup>(43)</sup>.

Punishments are also precisely determined by God, and no one, including the injured party and the court, can deviate from them, choose another penalty or forgive a sin, as this is an offence against God<sup>(44)</sup> in addition to the harm to another human. In Mesopotamian

<sup>(39)</sup> We read in MAL B 14 that if a man makes bricks in a plot not his own, an act which seems to have had much more severe implications for social and public order than other unauthorized appropriations and uses, he is liable to a complex and harsh punishment. Misappropriations for other uses are punished solely with financial compensation. The particular penalty of service to the king indicates that the mischief caused harm to the public order, which had to be redressed by service to the public. One assumes that a father having sex with his daughter was also perceived to be offensive to morality and social order, and therefore he was banished, as decreed in LH 154. Both the citizens and the public authority were obligated for the maintenance of social and public order, as we may see in the following few examples: lost property and loss of life resulting from a robbery are compensated by the public, if the robber was not seized (LH 23–24); the wife of a prisoner is financially supported by the city authorities for two years, if she provides evidence that she is unable to feed herself (MAL 45); a captive soldier will be redeemed by public funds, if he does not have enough liquid assets, and he is not required to use his own estate for this purpose (LH 32); a superior mistreating or oppressing a soldier is convicted of capital punishment (LH 34); protection is afforded the borrower in times of distress (LH 48–49).

<sup>(40)</sup> Specifically with respect to the question of whether war may be waged on Sabbath; see P. HEGER, *The Pluralistic Halakhah*. Legal Innovations in the Late Second Commonwealth and Rabbinic Periods (*Studia Judaica XXII*; Berlin – New York 2003), 28–30.

<sup>(41)</sup> Divine laws are characterized as חקת עולם “a lasting ordinance” (Lev 16,29; 23,14.31.41; Num 19,10.21; Deut 12,28; 23,4 and others), and as כל הימים “[to be obeyed] always” (Deut 6,24; 11,1; 19,9; 31,13).

<sup>(42)</sup> Despite the perceived inalterability of divine law, the later sages did indeed change and add to biblical commands. However, they represented themselves as simply interpreting Scripture, stressing their adherence to the rule not to add to or subtract from divine law.

<sup>(43)</sup> See Deut 13,1 (12,32 in KJV).

<sup>(44)</sup> PAUL, *Studies in the Book of the Covenant*, 100 writes: “Since law is an expression of the divine will, all crimes are considered sins, and certain offences become absolute wrongs incapable of pardon by human agency”.

law, the king, or a wronged citizen empowered by him, possesses the authority to fix the sanctions for sexual offenders, and to change them or decline to apply them altogether.

#### 4. *Legal and practical consequences of differences in the source of law*

##### a) Homicide

As noted above, homicide affects the Deity in addition to the injured human party. A number of specific comparisons will illustrate the consequences of this distinct credo.

##### i. Talion versus Composition for the Taking of Life

In the early laws of Ur-Namma, a homicide is punished by death, and in the extant tablets there is no provision for pecuniary composition for this crime. In the Hammurapi laws, there is no explicit sanction for a premeditated murder, nor mention of composition for such an act<sup>(45)</sup>; there is, however, a rule that decrees capital punishment for causing death of an *awilu* woman, and composition for the same act committed against a woman of the commoner class. In MAL A 10 and B 2, the family of a murdered person can choose whether to kill the murderer or receive composition. The Hittite codex, section 1, goes a step further; there is no capital punishment, but only composition.

Biblical law, in contrast, never permits the commutation of capital punishment for murder. The express prohibition against monetary payment for death appears only in Num 35,31; there is nonetheless no provision in the Book of the Covenant for allowing such commutation. Exod 21,12 unequivocally requires a death for a death, and this mandatory punishment is bolstered in the subsequent v. 14. There is absolutely no relief for a murderer, and God's sanctuary does not grant him safe haven<sup>(46)</sup>.

<sup>(45)</sup> LH 229-230 decree capital punishment for death caused by the collapse of a house negligently built, if the deceased is the householder or his son (while a slave is replaced with a slave of equal value); we must assume that the same sanction would apply for an intentional murder.

<sup>(46)</sup> The decree in Exod 21,22, that a father, or the court, can establish the amount of composition for the loss of a fetus, is not a contradiction of the mandatory death sentence for killing a person. In biblical law, as understood by the sages (in contrast to Qumran scholars), a fetus is not a living person and its loss is perceived as financial damage, whose redress remains within the domain of humans. See mHul 4,5 and mAr 1,4; and HEGER, *The Pluralistic Halakhah*, 381-383.



The rule in Exod 21,30 authorizing compensation for death caused by the goring ox might appear to be an exception to the biblical principle allowing no relief to a murderer. Certain scholars<sup>(47)</sup> in fact conjecture that this type of payment was also allowed in other cases of death, at the choice of the family of the injured party. One basis of such argument is that the term נָתַן in Exod 21,23, “Thou shalt give life for life”, implies giving money.

I disagree with this conjecture for several reasons: first, early translations, such as the LXX and *Tg. Onq.*, took this phrase literally. Second, the expression פָּדִין נַפְשׁוֹ “he may redeem his [the ox’s owner’s] life”, used in connection with the goring ox, is not a paradigm for a pecuniary composition<sup>(48)</sup>. It is unequivocally a ransom for the defendant’s misconduct, not a composition. The second segment of the phrase is expressed in third person, and refers to the ox’s owner<sup>(49)</sup>. The כֶּפֶר “ransom”<sup>(50)</sup> is thus instituted from the perspective of the giver of the payment. The wronged party is not involved in the settlement, and is not mentioned in the text; the court establishes the amount of the ransom. This is not composition for the life of the person killed. The owner has facilitated a criminal occurrence by his negligence, but he did not intend to disturb the divine order, and this does not represent a direct affront against God. It is therefore perceived to a greater degree as an issue between humans<sup>(51)</sup>, and to a lesser degree as a sin towards God, for which capital punishment is not required.

Another exception to the prohibition against composition for taking a life is seen by some scholars in Exod 21,20-21. This releases the killer of a slave from capital punishment; this could include a Hebrew slave, in the opinion of some scholars, and is thus an exception to the rule requiring a life for a life<sup>(52)</sup>. These verses cannot

<sup>(47)</sup> See, e.g., R. ROTHENBUSCH, *Die kasuistische Rechtssammlung im ‘Bundesbuch’* (Ex. 21,2-11.18-22,16) (Münster 2000), 320, n. 401, as well as the scholars listed in C. HOUTMAN, *Exodus* (Historical Commentary on the Old Testament; Leuven 2000) 166-167.

<sup>(48)</sup> Contra Rothenbusch.

<sup>(49)</sup> As is also perceived by PATRICK, “Studying Biblical Law as a Humanities”, 32, 40.

<sup>(50)</sup> This term has various meanings; much has been written on its ritual connotations. In our case, it must be understood as “forgiveness”, i.e. for the sinner.

<sup>(51)</sup> JACKSON, *Essays*, 128, writes that because of his failure to take the required measures to prevent the death of a person, he is “accountable to the kin”.

<sup>(52)</sup> See, e.g., ROTHENBUSCH, *Die kasuistische Rechtssammlung*, 33.

apply to a Hebrew slave, because Scripture explicitly adds the justification: *כי כספו הוא* “since he is his property”. This rationalization stresses the fact that the slave is his master’s property, justifying the exception to the general rule. This justification cannot apply to a Hebrew slave. His body and life are not his master’s property; he has only sold his services for a limited period of a maximum of six years (Exod 21,2). In the rules of Lev 25,40, his particular status as *כשכיר כתושב* is explicitly stated, and this is again emphasized in the calculation of his redemption in Exod 25,53. Exod 21,20-21 thus unequivocally refers only to an alien slave.

In fact, the difference in status between the gentile and Israelite slave is founded on a theological basis, justified by the divine declaration: “For the Israelites belong to me as servants” (Exod 25,55). Furthermore, the release from capital punishment is not a disregard of the value of human life, since it does not apply in the event the slave dies on the spot from the owner’s actions. If he dies later, his death is not perceived as an unequivocal killing. I speculate that the alien slave had a hybrid status between a full-fledged human, who enjoys all the rights and obligations of a member of society, and a slave, who is already born with drastically restricted human rights, as we read in Lev 25,46. For a society that accepts or perhaps even creates such a hybrid and lower status the divine order is therefore disrupted differently, in minor measure, by the loss of the life of a slave. Alternatively, the slave’s death cannot be traced directly to his master’s blows, since he has a right to beat him<sup>(53)</sup>.

## ii. Punishing the Perpetrator versus Compensating the Victim

Another significant philosophical difference between the cuneiform and the Israelite laws regards the taking of life. In cuneiform laws, the primary intent is to redress the damage done to the wronged party. In Israelite law, God is the affected party, and the restoration of the divine order takes priority over the interests of the wronged human party. This reversal triggers another consequence: the emphasis on redressing the damage done, the objective of the cuneiform law, is shifted in biblical law to the obliteration of the perpetrator’s sin. This is attained by his death for premeditated murder. The stoning of an ox that killed a person and the prohibition against eating its flesh constitute a unique rule in Israelite legislation. I follow

<sup>(53)</sup> As suggested by D. DAUBE, “Direct and Indirect Causation in Biblical Law”, *VT* 11 (1961) 246-269.

here scholars who argue that this is the outcome of a completely different *Weltanschauung*"<sup>(54)</sup>, and disagree with those scholars who maintain that it is the outcome of logical considerations<sup>(55)</sup>. The goring ox rules in Exodus are very similar in many aspects to the Mesopotamian parallels, and their connection is "virtually certain"<sup>(56)</sup>. It would thus be extremely difficult to assume that the exceptional insertion of the manner of the ox's disposal should have been added to the Israelite law without any specific motive and intention; its unique elements were added to adapt the law to Israelite theology.

The ox has "has objectively committed a *de facto* insurrection against the hierarchic order established by the Creation"<sup>(57)</sup>, and must be eliminated from the world. The negligent owner of the goring ox pays an indemnity to the family of the person killed, to expiate his failure; but the next-of-kin of the person killed by the ordinary ox are left without any composition for their loss, since the owner has not performed any sin against God. Payment to the next-of-kin might have been perceived, in the case of the goring ox, as compensation for the loss of life, and that had to be avoided. Similarly, the family of the unintentionally killed person could not receive compensation.

Israelite law, at least with respect to loss of human life, is primarily concerned with the action of the perpetrator, not the loss of the affected party. In the Mesopotamian rules, in contrast, not only is composition the primary focus, it may also vary according to the status of the injured party. This is the case for both death and injury, as well as affecting remuneration for services performed. The penalty for negligent construction causing death, for instance, varied in LH 229-231 according to whether the deceased was the property owner (the builder is killed), the owner's son (the builder's son is killed), or the owner's slave (the builder must provide a slave of equal value). As to injury, if a man hit a pregnant *awilu* woman and caused a miscarriage, he paid ten shekels (LH 209); but if she were a commoner, the amount was five shekels (LH 211), and for the fetus of a slave woman he paid two shekels (LH 213). As a final example, the physician's remuneration

<sup>(54)</sup> See, e.g. M. MALUL, *The Comparative Method in Ancient Near East and Biblical Legal Studies* (Neukirchen 1990) 132-135; and J.J. FINKELSTEIN, "The Ox that Gored", *TAPhS* 71 (1981) 28.

<sup>(55)</sup> HOUTMAN, *Exodus*, 174-176 records their different conjectures. See also JACKSON, *Essays*, 108-152 for a lengthy discussion of this peculiar rule.

<sup>(56)</sup> R. YARON, *The Laws of Eshnunna*, (Jerusalem – Leiden 1988) 293.

<sup>(57)</sup> J.J. FINKELSTEIN, "Ox", 28.

ation for successful surgery was different for healing an *awilu* (ten shekels), a commoner (five shekels) and a slave (two shekels) (LH 215-217).

Restoring the divine order thus has priority in biblical law over the financial interest of the human party. A crime against God cannot be forgiven by humans, nor can it be “atoned for by a pecuniary or property settlement”<sup>(58)</sup>. Spilling the blood of a person is a blatant affront against God, whose breath gave life to man, as a נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה “a living soul”. The soul is intrinsically connected with blood, as we read in Lev 17,11: “For the life of a creature is in the blood”; consequently, the blood is only temporarily given to the living and must be returned to the divine realm. The strict prohibition against ingesting animal blood and the requirement to dispose of it in a dignified manner by covering it are also consequences of this doctrine. Sprinkling the animals’ blood on the altar symbolizes the return of the blood to the divine, as stated subsequently in the above verse: “...it is the blood that makes atonement for one’s life”<sup>(59)</sup>. Similarly, only the death of the murderer constitutes atonement for his spilling of blood; this is the theological foundation of the decree “you shall give life for life” (cfr. 2 Sam 21,1-3.6, regarding Saul’s murder of the Gibeonites)<sup>(60)</sup>.

#### b) Sexual Misconduct

The biblical sexual prohibitions are of utmost gravity, and transgressions of them have, like the spilling of blood and idolatry, far-reaching consequences. The rules against sinful sexual acts in Leviticus are in fact the only ones introduced by the pronouncement “Speak to the Israelites and say to them. I am the Lord your God” (Lev 18,2). This not only demonstrates their significance, but also suggests that their transgression affects the Deity. Both sexual misbehaviour and the spilling of blood are said to defile the land, God’s dwelling, and cause the people to be vomited out of it, while idolatry defiles the

<sup>(58)</sup> PAUL, *Studies in the Book of the Covenant*, 61.

<sup>(59)</sup> Cf. T. ABUSCH, “Blood in Israel and Mesopotamia”, *Emanuel. Studies in Hebrew Bible, Septuagint, and Dead Sea Scrolls in Honor of Emanuel Tov* (ed. S. PAUL ET AL.) (VTS 94; Leiden 2003) 675-684, who argues that this Israelite “blood-consciousness” derived from a semi-nomadic element that organized itself in tribes along common blood lines (684). This may be correct; nonetheless, it is clear that this idea, like many other scriptural elements of nomadic origin, was adapted to an entirely new theology.

<sup>(60)</sup> The Gibeonites demanded no monetary compensation, but rather the death of seven of Saul’s descendants.

sanctuary and profanes God's Holy Name. Defiling the land has a "direct" impact on the Deity (cfr. Num 35,34). Scripture emphasizes the defilement of the land as the manifest consequence of sexual misconduct with numerous citations. The term שִׁמְמָה "polluted" used in these occurrences suggests a completely different concept than the impurity that results from touching human bodies, carcasses of unclean creatures, people suffering from skin diseases and various discharges, or buildings and cloth stricken by mildew. The one expresses defilement, and the other merely uncleanness. The LXX translates the countless scriptural terms referring to the latter type (except in a few instances that may be due to a particular emphasis or a matter of style) as ἀκάθαρτος "unclean", while all the occurrences referring to sexual misconduct, spilling of blood or idolatry have the term μαιίνω "defile", "sully", "stain".

We encounter this defilement terminology for all types of sexual misconduct: in Gen 34 in the Dinah narrative, in abundance in Lev 18 in the concluding admonitions after the sexual prohibitions, in Num 5 concerning the unfaithful wife, and in Deut 24,4 in the prohibition against remarrying one's divorced wife after having married another. Finally, Lev 20,15-16, regarding sexual misdemeanours with animals, has in common with Exod 21,28-29 the disruption of the divine order; in both occurrences the animals must be killed. Even adultery is against the order of creation<sup>(61)</sup>. The defilements caused by these particular misdeeds offend the Deity and it is within His exclusive domain to establish the rules and the penalties for their transgression. It would be inconceivable to assume that the husband, or human authorities, king or court, could change or entirely annul these divine decrees for whatever rational or practical motive.

Thus, for instance, the plight of a wife whose husband has been taken captive could not override the divine rule against adultery. In Mesopotamian law, in contrast, human problems and judgment prevail, and the woman is permitted to go and live with another man (LH 135). This biblical priority of God's decrees over human interests is the primary philosophical basis of the Israelite law, the indicator of its distinct character, and the foundation of the Jewish fundamentalist's *Weltanschauung* and comportment.

The Book of the Covenant, within its scholarly-established boundary, includes only one explicit sexual prohibition, regarding sex

<sup>(61)</sup> CARMICHAEL, *Origins*, 39-42 asserts that adultery invalidates marriage, the sexual union that restores the original male-female oneness that was Adam.

with an animal (22,18) but one must assume, nonetheless, that many other kinds of sexual immorality were forbidden. The Seventh Commandment against committing adultery, and the indirect prohibition of sex with a betrothed woman that we may deduce from the text of Exod 22,15 serve as evidence for such an assumption. We have no valid reason to presume that the sexual prohibitions in the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy were significantly different than in the period of redaction of the Book of the Covenant. Sexual taboos are usually entrenched in the deepest layers of society and are not easily changed or removed; despite general abhorrence against them, there are always individuals who disregard them.

In Mesopotamian society, adultery is regarded as one of the most, if not the most, severe infringements on the husband's rights. The relevant laws have as their philosophical foundation the prevention of harm to citizens and appropriate punishment for transgressors. This is particularly emphasized in the language of LU 6: "If a man violates the rights of another and deflowers the virgin wife of a young man, they shall kill that male". In LU 8 the deflowering of a slave woman is also described as a violation of the slave-holder's rights, but in this case only composition is decreed. As with the issue of sexual taboos, adultery may also have been perceived as damaging the social fabric.

Just as in the matter of taking a life, there is no offence involved in Mesopotamian law against a higher authority, and no deity is involved, either in the promulgation of the relevant laws for sexual misdemeanours, or in their mode of application. The lawgiver decides when and how to apply a sanction. LH 156, for instance, decrees composition to a bride if her prospective father-in-law has sexual intercourse with her before her marriage, but LH 155 commands capital punishment if it took place after the marriage was consummated. In the first instance, the woman is the injured party and is compensated for her loss of virginity, whereas in the second case the bridegroom is the injured party; as his harm is perceived as more severe, the death penalty is provided. LH decrees capital punishment for a number of incestuous relations, but LH 154 requires only banishment for incest between father and daughter. It seems that the lawgiver assumes it is the father's right, *potestas patris*, to do what he pleases with his daughter, and he is not liable for any compensation to her. The public perceives such incest as harmful to society, and the father is banished from the city so as not to serve as a corrupting model.

In a number of occurrences the lawgiver has transferred his

authority to the injured party, or declared that no offence has been committed. Adultery is punished by death (LH 12), but it is the husband's prerogative to forgive both parties, or impose a lesser penalty. A socially motivated regulation allows a wife to live with another man, have children with him and be maintained by him if her husband did not provide for her sustenance during his extended absence; at his homecoming she returns to him (LH 134 and 135). The Hittite codex has a long list of non-permitted sexual intercourse between relatives and between man and animal, but there are no fixed sanctions provided for their transgression. It seems that the betrayed husband may kill his adulterous wife and the involved man on the spot, but if he brings them to court, the king decides their fate. Similarly, the king can forgive and spare the life of both.

### c) Use of Divine Punishment

Israelite social decrees for the protection and support of the poor and vulnerable members of society are, due to their nature, directed at the individual, not to the public authority. Their implementation is not precisely specified, and therefore remains primarily dependent on the goodwill of the persons directly involved. On the other hand, since God is the lawgiver and also involved in the implementation of His decrees (as argued above), He is expected to punish those who disregard those commands that cannot be established and punished by human courts. Precepts whose quantities or details are not specified, such as the laws of gleaning in Lev 19,9,10, conclude with the utterance "I am the Lord your God", or an abbreviated form, "I am the Lord". From the legal point of view, if the owner leaves just a minimal edge of the field or a scant quantity of fallen grain or overlooked grapes, he has fulfilled the command. Therefore, God warns such a man that He is aware of the extent of his performance, and will punish him for circumventing the essence of the command. This same utterance appears many times in this chapter, which abounds with ethical commands. These commands all share the particular feature that their performance, or lack thereof, cannot be established by other humans, and is only known to the offender and to God. This is probably the motive for the extraordinary reiteration of the utterance "I am the Lord your God". Certain illicit sexual relations, if undetected or witnessed by only one person, are considered to be punished by God, not humans.

Slander is a further example. In Israelite law it is, reasonably enough, punished by God, not by humans (Lev 19,16). In Assyrian law



it is punished with a fine, beating, and service to the king. If the slanderer insinuates that one's wife is philandering, he is additionally dishonored by cutting off his hair (MAL A 18).

In light of the above theory concerning the Israelite concept of offences against the Deity, we must note a problem that seems to contradict this theory. Theft, for instance, is not dealt with as a "crime" in biblical law, as it often is in modern law. The transgression of the biblical command "You shall not steal" (Exod 20,13; Deut 5,17) is obviously a sin, a religious concept, an idea that is absent in the cuneiform laws. One would therefore expect some penal sanction and method of atonement for theft<sup>(62)</sup>, as are established for a number of other misdemeanours and involuntary transgressions in Lev 5; 6, excluding direct theft<sup>(63)</sup>. Yet there are no sanctions or punishments for theft other than payment of a prescribed fine according to the type of property stolen<sup>(64)</sup>, which represents simply a compensation for the inconvenience of the injured party<sup>(65)</sup>.

There is a similar anomaly with respect to physical injury. Although there is no specific biblical prohibition against striking someone, one could assume such a prohibition from the general biblical emphasis on social welfare. However, Scripture seems to exonerate the aggressor — ונקה המכה — once he has paid for the injured person's healing and loss of income (Exod 21,18-19). I suspect, however, that these particular differences between crimes and non-crimes are simply of a pragmatic nature and are not the result of a distinct theology.

\*  
\* \*

It has been demonstrated that the perceived divine source of the Israelite law and the divine involvement in its application are the

(62) ROTHENBUSCH, *Die kasuistische Rechtssammlung*, 406 states that the private payment of a fine for intended mischief, such as theft, makes it difficult to discern between penal and civil law. He approaches the same issue as I do, but uses modern terminology, in contrast to my emphasis on the religious foundation.

(63) The biblical text in its introductory section is clumsy and confusing; nonetheless, it is clear that atonement is stipulated for a number of transgressions, but excludes theft.

(64) The thief must pay a double fine if the stolen animal is recovered alive (Exod 22,3; v. 4 in KJV), a fourfold fine for a sheep, and fivefold fine for an ox if he sold the animals or slaughtered them (Exod 21,37; 22,1 in KJV).

(65) B.S. JACKSON, "Ideas", 197 states, in another connection: "subjective guilt was hardly beyond the cognitive competence of the ancient Hebrews."

crucial factors that separate it from all man-made legal codices, both in the past and in the present. The theological foundation of the Israelite law, absolutely evident in Scripture, calls for different explanations of these laws than logical and literary analysis provide; we must attempt to understand their philosophical foundation and internal logic. Its unique quintessence, its source from a God who has decreed the law because He cares for His creatures, has a comprehensive influence on its spiritual and ethical character, and an overwhelming effect on its practice. In particular, the holiness of the human soul, a divine element, shaped the idea of the superiority of human life over all other considerations, and eliminated any possibility of pecuniary composition for the taking of a human life. Further, the belief that divine laws cannot be changed or abolished by humans ensured a stability of values, immune from transitory theories or particular interests.

65 Harbour Sq. #3308  
Toronto, On. Canada  
M5J 2L4

Paul HEGER

#### SUMMARY

This study argues that the source of the law constitutes the crucial ideological and practical difference between man-made and God-given codices. In the Mesopotamian codices, while the gods grant to the sovereign the authority to govern, it is he who ultimately creates the relevant laws. He is thus the source of the law and controls its application. God is the only source of biblical law, and is involved in its implementation. This crucial difference has far-reaching consequences. In particular, Mesopotamian laws focus on the redress of harm done to humans and on disruption of human order; further, legal procedures, sanctions and modes of compensation can be changed, forgiven or abolished. Biblical law regards some infractions as harms against humans, but others are also perceived as crimes against the Lord and a disruption of the divine order. Punishments are fixed by God in both cases, and are eternal and inalterable.

## **“Deine Gnade ist besser als Leben” (Ps 63,4) Ausformungen der Grundkonstellation von Leben und Tod im alten Israel**

Leben und Tod — diese spannungsreiche und zugleich asymmetrische Grundkonstellation stellt so etwas wie eine ‘anthropologische Konstante’ dar. In nahezu allen Kulturen und Religionen spielt das Gegensatzpaar eine eminente Rolle<sup>(1)</sup>; dabei ist die positive Wertung von ‘Leben’ und die negative von ‘Tod’ weithin selbstverständlich, zumal im alten Orient, im alten Israel und im Alten Testament<sup>(2)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> Vgl. zur ersten Orientierung die Lexikonartikel, bes. T. SUNDERMEIER, “Leben”, *TRE* 20 (1990) 514-520 (Lit.); A. GRÜNSCHLOSS, “Leben”, *RGG* V, 133-134 (Lit.).

<sup>(2)</sup> Es sei nur exemplarisch verwiesen auf einige Aussagen im Deuteronomium. Hier statuiert 30,15: “Siehe, ich habe dir heute vorgelegt das Leben und das Glück/das Gute, den Tod und das Unglück/das Böse (רָאָה נָתַתִּי לְפָנֶיךָ חַיִּים וְאַתְּחַיִּים וְמוֹת וְאַתְּמוֹת וְאַתְּהָרָע)”; dies wird noch unterstrichen durch die Parallelisierung von Leben und Segen bzw. von Tod und Fluch im unmittelbaren Kontext 30,19 (entsprechend gilt dann der Inhalt der Segenssprüche 28,3-6 auch für das Leben [mit H. RINGGREN, “חַיָּה”, *ThWAT* II, 874-898, 885; s.a. M.L. HENRY, “‘Tod’ und ‘Leben’, Unheil und Heil als Funktionen des richtenden und rettenden Gottes im Alten Testament”, *Hüte dein Denken und Wollen. Alttestamentliche Studien. Mit einem Beitrag zur Feministischen Theologie* (Hrsg. B. JANOWSKI – E. NOORT) (Neukirchen-Vluyn 1992) 57-86, 67, 85]); s.a. die Wendung ‘leben und nicht sterben’ (Dtn 33,6 u.ö.). — Zum Gegensatzpaar im AT generell: C. BARTH, *Die Errettung vom Tode. Leben und Tod in den Klage- und Dankliedern des Alten Testaments* (Stuttgart – Berlin – Köln 1997) 20-51; G. GERLEMANN, “חַיָּה”, *THAT* I, 549-557, 551, 553; RINGGREN, “חַיָּה”, 883-884; H. SEEBASS, “Leben”, *TRE* 20 (1990) 520-524, 523; S. TALMON, “Die Wertung von ›Leben‹ in der Hebräischen Bibel”, DERS., *Juden und Christen im Gespräch. Gesammelte Aufsätze 2* (Neukirchen-Vluyn 1992) 48-60, 51-52; K.H. RICHARDS – N.R. GULLEY, “Death”, *ABD* II, 108-111, 109 (Richards); und jetzt K. LIESS, *Der Weg des Lebens. Psalm 16 und das Lebens- und Todesverständnis der Individualpsalmen* (FAT 2/5; Tübingen 2004) 293-322; für den alten Orient s. bloß L. DÜRR, *Die Wertung des Lebens im Alten Testament und im antiken Orient. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des Segens des vierten Gebots* (Münster 1926) bes. 19-20, 30-36; W. WESTENDORF, “Leben und Tod”, *LÄ* III, 951-954; und bes. E. YAMAUCHI, “Life, Death, and the Afterlife in the Ancient Near East”, *Life in the Face of Death. The Resurrection Message of the New Testament* (ed. R.N. LONGENECKER) (Grand Rapids, MI 1998) 21-50 sowie jüngst A.F. SEGAL, *Life after Death. A History of the Afterlife in the Religions of the West* (New York, NY 2004) 27-119.

Positiv gewendet lautet diese asymmetrische Grundkonstellation: “Leben ist die große Sache, die zählt. Das Leben zu erhalten, ist das wirkliche Ziel allen religiösen Tuns”<sup>(3)</sup>.

Dies trifft bekanntlich auch auf das alte Israel und das AT zu. Hier findet sich eine breite Palette an Aussagen zur Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation. Dabei variieren in unterschiedlichen Textcorpora — bei einigen konstanten Gemeinsamkeiten (s.u. I.V) — die wechselseitigen Zuordnungen von Leben und Tod auf vielfältige und für den jeweiligen Kontext aufschlussreiche Weise.

Forschungsgeschichtlich ist dabei festzustellen, dass das Lebensthema am Rand atl. Forschung steht, obwohl חַיָּה\* mit rund 800 und מוֹת\* mit rund 1000 Belegen zu den häufigen Lexemen im AT zählen<sup>(4)</sup>. Freilich bildet der hier verhandelte Gegensatz von Leben und Tod eine gewisse Ausnahme (s. die Lit. o. Anm. 1-2); zudem erhielten in den letzten Jahren einzelne Aspekte stärkere Beachtung, so etwa im Rahmen der Jenseitsvorstellungen der v.a. die private und familiäre Religionsausübung betreffende Totenkult<sup>(5)</sup> oder die Segensthematik<sup>(6)</sup>. Trotzdem gilt im Blick auf die Grundkonstellation von Leben und Tod mutatis mutandis, was R.N. Whybray in seiner letzten Publikation für das Thema des guten Lebens bilanziert hat: Es ist ein “major topic of the Old Testament” “and deserves more intense research”, denn es “has been neglected in recent Old Testament study”<sup>(7)</sup>.

<sup>(3)</sup> Diedrich Westermann, zit. nach SUNDERMEIER, “Leben”, 515 (vom ‘Leben in den Stammesreligionen’). Entsprechend asymmetrisch erfasst J.-M. Husser (“Vie et non-vie dans l’Ancien Testament”, *RSR* 73 [1999] 425-444) den Tod als Nicht-Leben.

<sup>(4)</sup> Vgl. die Übersichten bei GERLEMAN, “חַיָּה”, 550; DERS., “מוֹת”, *THAT* I, 893-897, 893-894; RINGGREN, “חַיָּה”, 882-883; DERS. – K.-J. ILLMANN – H.-J. FABRY, “מוֹת”, *ThWAT* IV, 763-787, 768 (Illmann).

<sup>(5)</sup> Vgl. dazu ausführlich K. SPRONK, *Beatific Afterlife in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East* (AOAT 219; Neukirchen-Vluyn 1986); J. TROPPER, *Nekromantie*. Totenbefragung im Alten Orient und im Alten Testament (AOAT 223; Neukirchen-Vluyn 1989); B.B. SCHMIDT, *Israel’s Beneficent Dead*. Ancestor Cult and Necromancy in Ancient Israelite Religion and Tradition (FAT 11; Tübingen 1994) sowie die Zusammenstellung bei PH.J. KING – L.E. STAGER, *Life in Biblical Israel* (Louisville, KY – London 2001) 363-381.

<sup>(6)</sup> Vgl. einstweilen M.L. FRETTLÖH, *Theologie des Segens*. Biblische und dogmatische Wahrnehmungen (Gütersloh 1998); zu den religions- und theologiegeschichtlichen Transformationen von Segen und Segenstheologien im alten Israel erarbeite ich gegenwärtig eine umfassende Untersuchung.

<sup>(7)</sup> *The Good Life in the Old Testament* (London – Edinburgh 2002) 291. — Das hat sich mittlerweile durch den Abriss von LIESS, *Weg*, 293-322 etwas verbessert.

Vor diesem Hintergrund sollen einige ausgewählte, profilierte Ausformungen der asymmetrischen Grundkonstellation von Leben und Tod beschrieben und die an ihnen wie ihrer Einbettung in den größeren Kontext des jeweiligen religiösen Symbolsystems zu beobachtenden Verschiebungen nachgezeichnet werden. Zweierlei ist m.E. dabei zu beachten: (1) Zum einen besteht eine grundlegende Asymmetrie im Verhältnis von Leben und Tod, die eine selbständige Erfassung des Lebensverständnisses erfordert, bevor die Oppositionsstellung zum Tod bedacht wird. (2) Zum andern empfiehlt sich für unsere Zwecke eine Konzentration auf die unterschiedlichen Grundkonstellationen von Leben und Tod (im betreffenden religions- und theologiegeschichtlichen Horizont); denn davon profitiert die Vergleichbarkeit und die sich abspielenden Verschiebungen und Entwicklungen der Ausformungen der Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation können deutlicher miteinander in Beziehung gesetzt werden.

1. *Die ‘klassische’ Ausformung: Leben als von JHWH gegebenes Wohlergehen im Diesseits*

Bekanntlich nimmt das AT in weiten Teilen an Tod und Sterblichkeit des Menschen, die dessen diesseitiges Leben begrenzen, grundsätzlich keinen Anstoß. Der Mensch ist nach Gen 6,3 — wie alle Kreatur bzw. alles “Fleisch” — sterblich geschaffen. Dies hat sich seit Gen 1 ja nicht verändert, sodass die Qualifikation des priesterlichen Schöpfungsmythos, dergemäß die Erschaffung des Menschen wie der ganzen Schöpfung “sehr gut” ist (Gen 1,31), ein für alle Mal Gültigkeit beansprucht<sup>(8)</sup>. In keiner Weise “sehr gut” ist hingegen alle Minderung des Lebens im Diesseits und dessen vor- und d.h. unzeitiges Ende.

Dies zeigen in gleichsam ‘klassischer’ Ausformung die Zeugnisse israelitisch-judäischer Religion der frühen und mittleren Königszeit (Eisenzeit II). Leben — und dabei handelt es sich immer um diesseitiges Leben<sup>(9)</sup> — soll von JHWH umfassend gesichert und

<sup>(8)</sup> Zur selbstverständlich vorausgesetzten Sterblichkeit im AT vgl. außer Gen 3,19 etwa 2 Sam 14,14; 1 Kön 2,2; Pss 89,49; 90,3-12; Ijob 14,1-2.

<sup>(9)</sup> Das trifft auch für das AT weitestgehend zu: “Die alttestamentliche Religion ist ... bis in die Ausgänge des letzten vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts wesentlich diesseitig orientiert” (DÜRR, *Wertung*, 2) und überschreitet “abgesehen von einigen Randaussagen ... die Schwelle der Diesseitigkeit nicht” (W. ZIMMERLI, *Die Weltlichkeit des Alten Testaments* [KVR 327S; Göttingen 1971] 114; s.a.u. bei Anm. 51-52). Anders die ägyptische Vorstellung, wo Leben den

gesteigert werden: Vitales, dem Tod und aller Minderung entgegengesetztes Wohlergehen im Diesseits wird erstrebt.

Orientiert man sich für die Lebensthematik an der Wurzel  $\text{חַי}^*$ , so stehen neben den im Folgenden eingehender behandelten biblischen Aussagen nun einige archäologische ‘Primärquellen’ zur Verfügung. Die Textzeugnisse sind indessen — abgesehen von zwei indirekt relevanten Funden aus Chirbet el-Qom und Ketef Hinnom (s.u. II) — nicht sehr ergiebig und beschränken sich i.W. auf einige spätvorexilische Belege der Schwurformel ‘ $\text{חַי}^*(\text{י})\text{דְּהוּה}$ , bei JHWHs Leben’ aus Arad und Lachisch kurz nach 600 v.Chr. <sup>(10)</sup>. Sodann findet sich der Personenname ‘ $\text{חַיִּיעֵל}$ , lebendig macht/mache(/ist) der Höchste’ <sup>(11)</sup>, und atl. ist der Ortsname ‘ $\text{בְּאֵר לַחַי רֵאִי}$ , Brunnen des Lebendigen, der mich sieht’ bekannt (Gen 16,14). Auch ikonographisch ist das Lebensthema in vielfältigen Motivkonstellationen recht präsent; nennen kann man etwa den Lebensbaum <sup>(12)</sup> oder das mit Schutzmächten verbundene Lebenszeichen <sup>(13)</sup>.

Diese Befunde, die eigenständige Analysen und Interpretationen erforderten, belegen auf jeden Fall die Virulenz des Lebensthemas im Rahmen eisenzeitlicher Religion in Syrien-Palästina. Es fällt auf, dass — wie im atl. Befund — Begriff und Vorstellung von Leben eng mit JHWH resp. göttlichen Mächten verbunden werden (wenngleich JHWH selber im AT vergleichsweise selten als lebendig bezeichnet wird: Er ist eher Spender und Quelle allen Lebens [Ps 36,10 u.a.]); dabei kommt der diesen Mächten entgegengesetzte Pol von Tod und Chaos kaum zur Darstellung. Und bezüglich der inhaltlichen Füllung

---

dies- und v.a. auch den jenseitigen Bereich umfasst (vgl. R. SCHLICHTING, “Leben”, *LÄ* III, 949-951).

<sup>(10)</sup> Die Texte sind leicht zugänglich in J. RENZ – W. RÖLLIG, *Handbuch der althebräischen Epigraphik* (Darmstadt 1995-2003, zit. als: *HAE* I; II/1; II/2; III) I, 387 (Arad [6] 21,5), 417, 427, 431 (Lachisch [6] 1.3,9; 1.6,12; 1.12,3). — Zur nominalen Interpretation der Schwurformel s. RINGGREN, “ $\text{חַיִּיעֵל}$ ”, 892-893; J. WOŹNIAK, “Bedeutung und Belege der Schwurformel *haj* Jahwe”, *BZ* 28 (1984) 245-249, 249; S. KREUZER, *Der lebendige Gott*. Bedeutung, Herkunft und Entwicklung einer alttestamentlichen Gottesbezeichnung (BWANT 116; Stuttgart – Berlin – Köln 1983) 30-36.

<sup>(11)</sup> Vgl. RENZ – RÖLLIG, *HAE* II/1, 71; s.a. 2 Chr 29,14.

<sup>(12)</sup> Vgl. O. KEEL – C. UEHLINGER, *Göttinnen, Götter und Gottessymbole*. Neue Erkenntnisse zur Religionsgeschichte Kanaans und Israels aufgrund bislang unerschlossener ikonographischer Quellen (QD 134; Freiburg – Göttingen <sup>2</sup>2001) bes. 174-189, 264-282 und 518 (Register); H. YORK, “Heiliger Baum”, *RLA* V, 269-282; I. GAMMER-WALLERT, “Baum, heiliger”, *LÄ* I, 655-660.

dominieren bereits auf den ersten Blick die Elemente von Schutz und Wohlergehen.

Wenden wir uns den Texten aus dem AT zu, so tritt diese klassische Ausformung des Lebensverständnisses repräsentativ in zwei Weisheitssprüchen aus Spr 3 in Erscheinung: V. 2 mahnt dazu, Tora und Gebote (des Weisheitslehrers) zu halten,

כי ארך ימים ושנות חיים	denn Länge der Tage und Jahre des Lebens
ושלום יוסיפו לך:	und Wohlergehen (/Frieden) mehrten sie dir.

Und VV. 16-17 preisen die Weisheit selber:

ארך ימים בימיה	Länge der Tage ist in ihrer Rechten,
בשמאלה עשר וקבוד:	in ihrer Linken Reichtum und Ehre.
דרכיה דרכי נועם	Ihre Wege sind Wege der Wonne,
וכל־תהיבֹותיה שלום:	und alle ihre Pfade Wohlergehen (/Frieden).

Es überrascht nicht, dass solche und zahlreiche ähnliche Aussagen vorab in der Weisheitsliteratur geballt auftreten, ist doch weisheitliches Denken — primär Ausdruck privater Religion<sup>(13)</sup> — genuin mit der Lebensbewältigung und der Frage nach gelingendem Leben im Rahmen der (göttlichen) Ordnung der Welt befasst.

Spr 3 mit den herangezogenen Logien entstammt dem jüngsten Teil des Sprüchebuchs (1–9) und eröffnet mit der Erörterung des Gottesverhältnisses materialiter die Ausführung des ‘Lehrprogramms’ der Weisheit<sup>(15)</sup>. Dieser späte Kontext ist zweifellos dafür

<sup>(13)</sup> Vgl. KEEL – UEHLINGER, *Göttinnen*, 282-298, bes. 288-298.

<sup>(14)</sup> Vgl. dazu knapp R. ALBERTZ, *Religionsgeschichte Israels in alttestamentlicher Zeit* (GAT/ATD Erg 8/II, Göttingen 1992) II 561-569, der entsprechend Spr 1–9 (und Ijob) als private Oberschichttheologie bestimmt. Diese Affinität zeigt sich bei unserem Thema auch im weiteren Verlauf (s.u. II), deckt sich aber in der klassischen Ausformung wohl wesentlich mit ‘offizielleren’ Bereichen höfisch-staatlicher Weisheit.

<sup>(15)</sup> So überzeugend A. MEINHOLD, *Die Sprüche* (ZBK 16; Zürich 1991) I, 72, 46; R.B.Y. SCOTT, *Proverbs. Ecclesiastes*. Introduction, Translation, and Notes (AB 18; Garden City, NY 1965) 46; im Grundsatz zustimmend auch G. BAUMANN, *Die Weisheitsgestalt in Proverbien 1–9*. Traditionsgeschichtliche und theologische Studien (FAT 16; Tübingen 1996) 254, 257; kritisch hingegen der Forschungsüberblick von A. MÜLLER, *Proverbien 1–9*. Der Weisheit neue Kleider (BZAW 291; Berlin – New York, NY 2000) 268-283 (s. aber 275). Die verschiedenen Gliederungsvorschläge von Spr 3 (vgl. R. SCHÄFER, *Die Poesie der Weisen*. Dichotomie als Grundstruktur der Lehr- und Weisheitsgedichte in Proverbien 1–9 [WMANT 77; Neukirchen-Vluyn 1999] 76-103; MÜLLER, *Proverbien 1–9*, 151-169) kommen darin überein, dass VV. 1-2 die Einleitung darstellt und V. 2 sachlich eng mit VV. 16-17 verwandt ist (wobei VV. 16-17 “die



verantwortlich, dass nach unseren Versen prosperierendes Leben dezidiert von Tora und Geboten — mithin von der Gottesfurcht — abhängig ist (V. 2) bzw. der Weisheit selber zugeschrieben wird (VV. 16-17). Hier konkretisiert sich die für das Sprüchebuch kompositionell und inhaltlich programmatische Maxime von der Gottesfurcht als Anfang der Weisheit<sup>(16)</sup>. Umgekehrt weist die Substanz der beiden Logien sicherlich ein ungleich höheres Alter auf und repräsentiert die klassische Ausformung des Lebensverständnisses eisenzeitlicher Religion in Syrien-Palästina, wie sich im Folgenden aus den inhaltlichen Aspekten ergeben wird. (Literarhistorisch weist m.E. auch die kontextuelle Einbindung von VV. 16-17 in diese Richtung: Die Zuordnung von Weisheit und materiellem Wohlergehen steht im Kontrast zur Entgegensetzung beider bzw. zur Überbietung des letzteren durch erstere in VV. 14-15<sup>(17)</sup>. Doch sind eingehendere Erörterungen zur Textentstehung, welche die eigentümlichen Gegebenheiten von Spr einzubeziehen hätten, an dieser Stelle nicht möglich.)

(1) Dabei fußt die junge Formulierung von Spr 3 mit den vermittelnden Zwischengliedern Tora, Weisheit und Gottesfurcht auf dem klassischen Lebensverständnis mit seinem Gottesbezug; letzteren bringen im konkreten Fall VV. 5-12 prominent zum Ausdruck, wenn sie umfassend das Gottesverhältnis umschreiben. Entscheidend bleibt somit — auch in der Spätzeit — die Bindung des (gelingenden) Lebens an JHWH<sup>(18)</sup>. Sie hält sich seit frühe(st)e atl. Zeit durch, wie

---

‘zentralen’, d.h. mittleren Verse des Abschnitts” VV. 13-20 bilden [BAUMANN, *Weisheitsgestalt*, 238]); diese Fragen tragen indes für unser Thema wenig aus.

<sup>(16)</sup> Vgl. die Inklusion des Prologs durch 1,2/1,7 (דָּעַת/דָּעַת וּמוֹדָר (הַכְּמָה וּמוֹדָר)). Das Motto 1,7 — nach breitem Konsens redaktionell (vgl. bes. SCHÄFER, *Poesie*, 255-269; BAUMANN, *Weisheitsgestalt*, 251-260; komplizierter MÜLLER, *Proverbien 1–9*, 297-313, 321) — rahmt ja zudem mit 9,10 den ersten, wesentlich vom Gegensatz zwischen Leben und Tod geprägten Buchteil und verleiht ihm dadurch mit sein Gepräge (so etwa SCOTT, *Proverbs*, 15; O. PLÖGER, *Sprüche Salomos* [Proverbia] [BK 17; Neukirchen-Vluyn 1984] 13; MEINHOLD, *Sprüche*, 50-51; BAUMANN, *Weisheitsgestalt*, 226, 255-256, 259; SCHÄFER, *Poesie*, 19-20). Exemplarisch wird die Konkretisierung von Spr 10,27 bestätigt, wonach die Gottesfurcht ebenfalls des Lebens Tage und Jahre verlängert (וְיָמֶיךָ וְשָׁנֶיךָ יִמְדָּךָ וְיָמֶיךָ וְשָׁנֶיךָ יִמְדָּךָ).

<sup>(17)</sup> Dies ist m.W. allerdings in der Forschung bisher nicht berücksichtigt worden (vgl. die Anm. 15-16 genannte Lit. z.St.).

<sup>(18)</sup> Eben via Weisheitsgestalt bzw. Tora/Gebote und Gottesfurcht (vgl. H. RINGGREN – W. ZIMMERLI, *Sprüche/Prediger*. Übersetzt und erklärt [ATD 16/1; Göttingen 1962] 20 [Ringgren]); MEINHOLD, *Sprüche*, 51 summiert: “Auf der

nicht nur die erwähnten Primärzeugnisse belegen, sondern auch zahlreiche loci classici der Lebensthematik<sup>(19)</sup>: Immer ist es JHWH, der Leben gibt, es bewahrt und in seiner Fülle und Vielfalt fördert; Gott und Leben ‘gehören zuhaufe’<sup>(20)</sup>. Dies gilt im polytheistischen Horizont in beide Richtungen: Nicht nur gehört JHWH auf die Seite des Lebens, sondern umgekehrt kommt auch das Leben auf die Seite JHWHs und nicht anderer Götter zu stehen<sup>(21)</sup>.

Typisch für die (spätere) Weisheit ist an unseren Stellen, dass durch die Einführung der Zwischenglieder Tora, Weisheit und Gottesfurcht (richtiges und gelingendes) Leben prinzipiell als lernbar und damit — wenn auch bedingt — verfügbar und machbar erscheint. So formuliert es — dem Deuteronomismus nicht unähnlich — der Prolog in 1,2-6 programmatisch; im Blick auf unser Thema nennt V. 4 am deutlichsten das Ziel der Sprüche: “den Unerfahrenen (Lebens-) Klugheit zu geben (לְהַחֲמִיץ לַפְּתָאִים עֲרֻמָּה)”<sup>(22)</sup>. Die Lernbarkeit gelingenden Lebens bildet den Hintergrund aller Lehrreden der Frau Weisheit in Spr 1–9, wiewohl seit je und zumal in dieser späteren Zeit offenkundig war, dass die Empirie dies nur teilweise bestätigt. Und an diesem

---

Grundlage der JHWH-Furcht befindet sich der Weise in der richtigen Beziehung zu Gott, dem Menschen und der sonstigen Schöpfung”.

<sup>(19)</sup> Ohne nähere theologiegeschichtliche Einordnungen diskutieren zu können sei nebst dem Dtn (s.o. Anm. 2) verwiesen auf Spr 21,21; Ex 20,12 und den Ausdruck ‘Gott des Lebens’ (s.u. Anm. 24). Hierher gehören auch Schöpfungstexte mit Aussagen, wie sie Ps 104,27-30; Ijob 33,4; 34,14-15 oder urgeschichtlich Gen 2,7; 6,3.17; 7,15.22 machen: Sie beziehen sich auf das diesseitige Leben (von Mensch und Tier) und stellen die radikale Abhängigkeit des Lebens von JHWHs Atem (רוּחַ יְהוָה) heraus. Vgl. umgekehrt die Aussagen zur Trennung von Todesbereich und JHWH, bes. Pss 6,6; 30,10; 88,11-19; 115,17; Jes 38,18. Wohl bereits jünger und JHWHs Zuständigkeit schon ausweitend sind 1 Sam 2,6; Dtn 32,39; 2 Kön 5,7, vollends Pss 49,15-16; 73,24-28 u.a. (s.u. bei Anm. 51-52).

<sup>(20)</sup> Wie man im Anschluss an M. LUTHER formulieren kann (vgl. *BSLK*, 560). D.h.: “Gott ist Leben und Lebensspender. Er ist der positive Pol, der dem negativen Pol Tod gegenübersteht” (TALMON, “Wertung”, 51), und der “Tod bedeutet das Ausscheiden aus dem göttlichen Lebensbereich; im Tod endet mit dem Gotteslob auch die Gottesbeziehung” (so summarisch LIESS, *Weg*, 293).

<sup>(21)</sup> Vgl. etwa Am 5,4-6.14-15 (dazu J. JEREMIAS, “Tod und Leben in Am 5,1-17”, *DERS.*, *Hosea und Amos*. Studien zu den Anfängen des Dodekapropheten [FAT 13; Tübingen 1996] 214-230, bes. 224-230) oder Hos 6,1-3 (dazu *DERS.*, *Der Prophet Hosea* [ATD 24/1; Göttingen 1983] 84-86).

<sup>(22)</sup> Zur Übersetzung vgl. die Komm. Zu beachten ist die Parallelität von נֶגַד/פְּתָאִים und von דַּעַת וְחִזְקָה/עֲרֻמָּה, was m.E. die Deutung als ‘(Lebens-)Erfahrung’ und ‘lebenspraktische Klugheit’ nahelegt.

Anspruch halten die Spr dezidiert fest, mögen sie auch durch den (jetzt vermittelten) Gottesbezug und generell den dynamischen, an JHWH gebundenen<sup>(23)</sup> Konnex von Tun und Ergehen ein Bewusstsein um die Grenzen der eigenen Möglichkeiten signalisieren.

(2) Derart bestätigt sich durchwegs die eingangs erwähnte, axiologische wie theologische Asymmetrie von Leben und Tod; der Tod wird nicht nur negativ bewertet, sondern er steht in einem diametralen und hier noch weitgehend ‘beziehungslosen’ Gegensatz zu JHWH. Der “Gott des Lebens (אלהים חיים)”<sup>(24)</sup> ist ‘verhältnislos’ zum Tod und besitzt in dessen Machtbereich keinen Ort, geschweige denn Einfluss<sup>(25)</sup>: Die “Macht des Gottes Israels endet” “an den Pforten der Unterwelt”<sup>(26)</sup>. Insofern bildet der Tod in dieser klassischen Sicht, die JHWH und Leben zusammenschweißt, eine Leerstelle im Horizont des (sei es privaten, sei es offiziellen) JHWH-Glaubens. Sie wird innerhalb des ‘polytheistischen’ religiösen Symbolsystems des eisenzeitlichen

<sup>(23)</sup> Dies ist spätestens seit K. KOCH, “Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?”, DERS., *Spuren des hebräischen Denkens*. Beiträge zur alttestamentlichen Theologie. Gesammelte Aufsätze 1 (Neukirchen-Vluyn 1991) 65-103 allseits anerkannt (vgl. B. JANOWSKI, “Die Tat kehrt zum Täter zurück. Offene Fragen im Umkreis des ‘Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhangs’”, *ZThK* 91 [1994] 247-271); und zwar unabhängig davon, ob man den Konnex — notabene je unter Einbezug Gottes — näherhin als “schicksalwirkende[n] Tatsphäre” (KOCH, “Vergeltungsdogma”, 88 u.ö.) oder als “Kategorie der sozialen Interaktion” nach dem “Prinzip der ‘konnektiven Gerechtigkeit’” interpretiert (JANOWSKI, “Tat”, 266; s.a. die kritischen Anmerkungen zu Koch von T. KRÜGER, *Geschichtskonzepte im Ezechielbuch* [BZAW 180; Berlin – New York, NY 1989] 87-94).

<sup>(24)</sup> Dtn 5,26; 1 Sam 17,26.36; Jer 10,10; 23,36; vgl. אל Jos 3,10; Hos 2,1; Ps 42,3; 84,3, אלהים 2 Kön 19,4.16 par Jes 37,4.17 und aram. אלהים Dan 6,21.27.

<sup>(25)</sup> Selbst wenn er den Tod zulässt resp. später gar bewirkt (1 Sam 2,6 usf. [s.o. Anm. 19]); wie erwähnt zeigen sich hier jedoch Verschiebungen (vgl. dazu die älteren Abrisse von G. VON RAD, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, I. Die Theologie der geschichtlichen Überlieferung Israels [KTB 2; München <sup>10</sup>1992] 288-293, 399-403, 417-420; II. Die Theologie der prophetischen Überlieferung Israels [KTB 3; München <sup>9</sup>1987] 371-372; H.W. WOLFF, *Anthropologie des Alten Testaments* [KTB 91; Gütersloh <sup>6</sup>1994] 162-176; und jetzt überzeugend die kritischen Modifikationen bei LIESS, *Weg*, 294-322 — die sich freilich [allzu] stark an B. LANG [vgl. DERS. – K. WOSCHITZ, “Leben nach dem Tod”, *NBL* II, 599-602] anlehnt).

<sup>(26)</sup> W. DIETRICH – S. VOLLENWEIDER, “Tod, II. Altes und Neues Testament”, *TRE* 33 (2002) 582-600, 585; summarisch auch Z. ZEVIT, *The Religions of Ancient Israel. A Synthesis of Parallactic Approaches* (London – New York, NY 2001) 664.

Syrien-Palästina von Gottheiten neben JHWH abgedeckt und beherrscht<sup>(27)</sup>. Insofern widerspiegelt diese klassische Grundkonstellation von Leben und Tod — auf der menschlichen wie der göttlichen Ebene — die konzeptionelle Leitdifferenz von Kosmos und Chaos<sup>(28)</sup>.

(3) Inhaltlich sind in Spr 3 die Lebensdauer (VV. 2.16) und das umfassende, aber prioritär durchaus materielle Wohlergehen (VV. 2.16-17) bestimmend: (a) Gutes Lebens zeichnet sich durch eine bestimmte Lebensdauer aus. Denn angesichts der damaligen durchschnittlichen Lebenserwartung von nicht einmal drei Dezennien ist der vor- und unzeitige Tod eher die Regel als die Ausnahme (s.o.). Die atl. Idealvorstellung geht dahin, mit 70, 80 Jahren (Ps 90,10) “alt

<sup>(27)</sup> Vgl. LIESS, *Weg*, 297 mit Anm. 27 (Lit.). Im Anschluss v.a. an den aus der ugaritischen Mythologie bekannten Todesgott Mot (vgl. nur *TUAT* III/6 1091-1198 [M. DIETRICH – O. LORETZ]) wird auch im AT diskutiert, wie stark ein solcher in Pss 18,5-6; 49,15; 116,3; Spr 13,14; Jer 9,20; Hos 13,14; Hab 2,5 u.a. präsent ist (vgl. DIETRICH – VOLLENWEIDER, “Tod”, 589-590); vor dem mythologischen Hintergrund eines Götterkampfes lässt sich auch die beliebte Rede von der Verhältnis- bzw. Beziehungslosigkeit JHWHs zum Tod(esbereich) präzisieren, denn JHWH hat ja offenbar durchaus ein — antagonistisches — Verhältnis zum Tod(esbereich), über den er zwar keine Macht ausübt, den er aber von der gesicherten Lebenssphäre fernhält (was übrigens auch gilt, wenn im AT der Kampf gegen das Chaos immer schon entschieden sein sollte). — Im Weiteren sei auf die vielfältigen Aspekte von Totenkult, Ahnenverehrung und Unterwelt verwiesen, wo ständig mit göttlichen Mächten operiert wird (s. K. BIEBERSTEIN, “Der Umgang mit dem Tod im Alten Israel. Leben mit dem Tod — Leben gegen den Tod”, *Welt und Umwelt der Bibel* 27 [2003] 4-11, 8-9; LIESS, *Weg*, 301; SCHMIDT, *Dead*). Freilich bleibt zu beachten, dass damit unterschiedliche Ebenen des religiösen Symbolsystems miteinander verglichen werden (vgl. M. WEIPPERT, “Synkretismus und Monotheismus. Religionsinterne Konfliktbewältigung im alten Israel [1990]”, DERS., *JHWH und die anderen Götter. Studien zur Religionsgeschichte des antiken Israel in ihrem syrisch-palästinischen Kontext* [FAT 18; Tübingen 1997] 1-24; F. HARTENSTEIN, “Religionsgeschichte Israels — ein Überblick über die Forschung seit 1990”, *VF* 48 [2003] 2-28, 4-8), wenngleich mit Interaktionen zu rechnen ist; dazu wären genauere Untersuchungen zu Sitz im Leben und Funktion der jeweiligen Quellen erforderlich.

<sup>(28)</sup> Vgl. dazu methodisch F. STOLZ, *Weltbilder der Religionen. Kultur und Natur. Diesseits und Jenseits. Kontrollierbares und Unkontrollierbares* (Theophil 4; Zürich 2001) 9-15; DERS., *Grundzüge der Religionswissenschaft* (UTB 1980; Göttingen 2001) 229-230; inhaltlich DERS., *Einführung in den biblischen Monotheismus* (Darmstadt 1996) 114-120; M. BAUKS, “‘Chaos’ als Metapher für die Gefährdung der Weltordnung”, *Das biblische Weltbild und seine altorientalischen Kontexte* (Hrsg. B. JANOWSKI – B. EGO) (FAT 32; Tübingen 2001) 431-464 und das Material bei KEEL – UEHLINGER, *Göttinnen*, 123-148.

und [lebens]satt” (זָקֵן וְשָׂבַט) zu sterben<sup>(29)</sup> und ‘zu den Vätern versammelt zu werden’ (s. Gen 25,8 u.a.). Dabei zeigt das unterschiedliche Alter der Personen, von denen dies gesagt wird, ebenso wie die Verbindung von Alter und Lebenssatttheit, dass die Sättigung — oder modern formuliert: die Lebensqualität — das Alter bestimmt und nicht umgekehrt. Erstrebt wird somit nicht, gleichsam als formale Bedingung der Möglichkeit eines guten Lebens, eine möglichst große quantitative Lebensdauer; diese braucht nicht, wie angesichts mancher Bemühungen der heutigen Geriatrie und Gerontologie bemerkt sei, über die Maßen verlängert zu werden. Erstrebt wird vielmehr umfassendes Wohlergehen.

(b) Das Wohlergehen, das hier als Inbegriff gelingenden Lebens gilt, umfasst einerseits ganz materielle Elemente wie Reichtum und Ehre (V. 16)<sup>(30)</sup> sowie vieles mehr, das hier nicht angeführt wird (etwa Fruchtbarkeit, Gesundheit, Land und Besitz), andererseits auch geistige Güter wie Freude (V. 17) usf. Darüber hinaus bezeichnet der verwendete Begriff שְׁלוֹם, Friede’ umfassend “die Qualität eines ganzen, unversehrten, vollen und heilen Lebens”<sup>(31)</sup> in all seinen vielfältigen Aspekten.

Zusammenfassend können wir festhalten: Anhand von Spr 3 ließ

<sup>(29)</sup> Gen 25,8; 35,29; 1 Chr 23,1; 2 Chr 24,15; Ijob 42,17; vgl. Gen 15,15; Ri 8,32; 1 Chr 29,28. Demgegenüber sind die Lebensspannen im goldenen Zeitalter vor der Flut noch gewaltig (s. Gen 5; 11,10-32), und in der Endzeit werden sie sich diesen nach Erwartung prophetischer Spätschriften und apokalyptischer Auffassung wieder annähern (vgl. Jes 65,20 und zum Ganzen immer noch DÜRR, *Wertung*, 2-20).

Erst nach der Zeitenwende und unter massivem griechischen Einfluss — in der Tradition von Menanders Diktums “Wen die Götter lieben, stirbt jung” (ὅσοι θεοὶ ἀγαποῦσι, ὅσον χρόνον ζήσουσι) — bestimmt Weish 4,7-9 auf der Basis einer Unsterblichkeitshoffnung (ὅσοι ἐμὲ φοβούνται, ὅσον χρόνον ζήσουσι 3,4; s. 1,15; 6,18-19; 8,17; 15,3) Klugheit und tadellosen Lebenswandel, nicht lange Dauer, als Kennzeichen eines gelungenen Lebens und verheißt (ewige) Ruhe (bei Gott?): ἡ ἀνάπαυσις ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ (V. 7).

μὴ φοβηθῆτε τὸν κριτὴν τοῦ σώματος (V. 8).

<sup>(30)</sup> So auch 8,18; 22,4 (mit חַיִּים); die Attribute, die sonst nur Königen zukommen (vgl. BAUMANN, *Weisheitsgestalt*, 102-107), werden hier demotisiert bzw. präziser sapientialisiert und jedem zugesagt, der sich an die Weisheit hält.

<sup>(31)</sup> MEINHOLD, *Sprüche*, 73; ebenso konsensuell R.E. MURPHY, *Proverbs* (WBC 22; Nashville, TN 1998) 20-21; H.F. FUHS, *Sprichwörter* (NEB 35; Würzburg 2001) 35; K. LIESS – J. ZUMSTEIN, “Leben, II. Biblisch”, *RGG* V, 135-137, 135 (Liess); K. SCHMID, “Fülle des Lebens oder erfülltes Leben? Religionsgeschichtliche und theologische Überlegungen zur Lebensthematik im Alten Testament”, *Leben. Verständnis, Wissenschaft, Technik* (Hrsg. E. HERMS) (VWGTh 24; Göttingen 2004) 154-164.

sich die für die israelitisch-judäische Religion der frühen und mittleren Königszeit (Eisenzeit II) typische, insofern klassische Ausformung der Grundkonstellation von Leben und Tod erheben. (1) JHWH-Bindung: Leben, zumal gelingendes Leben, hängt ganz von JHWH ab. (2) Asymmetrie: Das von JHWH abhängige Leben spielt sich im Diesseits ab und ist deshalb — in Spr 3 implizit zu erschließen — dem Tod und aller Lebensminderung diametral entgegengesetzt, sodass zwischen Leben (bzw. JHWH) und Tod nicht nur ein fundamentaler Gegensatz, sondern nachgerade eine elementare Asymmetrie besteht. (3) Lebensdauer und Wohlergehen: Erstrebt wird nicht die nackte Existenz, sondern eine ‘sättigende’ Dauer des Lebens, das sich durch umfassende Prosperität und Vitalität im Diesseits auszeichnet. Von diesen drei Zügen gilt pauschal: “Das alles stimmt mit allgemeiner israelitischer Anschauung gut überein”<sup>(32)</sup>. Es handelt sich um Gemeinsamkeiten, die sich im AT weithin durchhalten und als atl. Rahmenvorstellung der Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation gelten können.

## 2. *Eine Ausweitung: JHWH verdanktes Leben an der Grenze des Todes – und darüber hinaus*

Eine interessante Weiterentwicklung belegen die beiden in Gräbern gefundenen Segenstexte aus Chirbet el-Qom und Ketef Hinnom<sup>(33)</sup>. Da es sich um Segenstexte handelt, betreffen sie die Lebensthematik nur indirekt: aufgrund der Affinität von Segen und Leben sowie der Fundorte in Gräbern, d.h. dem Bereich von Tod und Toten.

Die dominierende Segensthematik ist dafür verantwortlich, dass die Texte bislang für die Grundkonstellation von Leben (bzw. JHWH) und Tod kaum herangezogen wurden. Dies wurde in jüngerer Zeit zu Recht korrigiert<sup>(34)</sup>, zuletzt ausführlich von K. Liess<sup>(35)</sup>.

<sup>(32)</sup> So RINGGREN – ZIMMERLI, *Sprüche/Prediger*, 20 (RINGGREN) für Spr 3,1-2.

<sup>(33)</sup> Von den bekannten Funden sind das die beiden einzigen, die für das Thema relevant sind (vgl. LIESS, *Weg*, 302 Anm. 60).

<sup>(34)</sup> Vgl. für Chirbet el-Qom bereits SPRONK, *Afterlife*, 307-310; weiter A. BERLEJUNG, “Tod und Leben nach den Vorstellungen der Israeliten. Ein ausgewählter Aspekt zu einer Metapher im Spannungsfeld von Leben und Tod”, *Das biblische Weltbild und seine altorientalischen Kontexte* (Hrsg. B. JANOWSKI – B. EGO) (FAT 32; Tübingen 2001) 465-502, 489; JANOWSKI, “Toten”, 14-15, 31; DERS., *Konfliktgespräche mit Gott. Eine Anthropologie der Psalmen* (Neukirchen-Vluyn 2003) 49, 230; DIETRICH – VOLLENWEIDER, “Tod”, 590; für Ketef Hinnom BERLEJUNG, “Tod”, 489; JANOWSKI, “Toten”, 31-32.

<sup>(35)</sup> *Weg*, 302-312.



Wertet man die Segensaussagen und den Fundkontext aus — was allerdings gewisse method(olog)ische Schwierigkeiten mit sich bringt (s.u.) — so sind diese außerbiblischen Primärquellen sehr aufschlussreich für das Verhältnis von JHWH und Tod(esbereich).

(1) Die Segensinschrift aus einem Grab in Chirbet el-Qom, die paläographisch in die zweite Hälfte des 8. Jahrhunderts v.Chr. datiert werden kann, lautet in den für unser Thema relevanten Z. 2-3<sup>(36)</sup>:

<i>brk ʾryhw lyhwh</i>	Gesegnet ist/sei Uriyahu vor JHWH.
<i>wmšryh lʾšrth hwšʿ lh</i>	Und von seinen Feinden hat er ihn durch seine Aschera gerettet.

Es wird also deklariert, dass Uriyahu jetzt<sup>(37)</sup> von JHWH selber gesegnet ist bzw. sei. Das ist daran ersichtlich bzw. daraus zu folgern — so wird man die beiden parataktisch mit *w* verbundenen Sätze interpretieren müssen —, dass JHWH Uriyahu zu Lebzeiten durch seine Aschera vor seinen Feinden gerettet hat (Perfekt *hwšʿ*). Berücksichtigt man nun, dass in dieser Epoche Segen mindestens ebenso diesseitig konzipiert ist wie Leben<sup>(38)</sup>, so ist die Segensaussage an der Grenze des Lebens — ja sogar deutlich jenseits davon: im Grab Uriyahus und d.h. im Bereich des Todes — höchst auffällig. Denn damit wird offenkundig JHWH ein (kontinuierlicher) Einfluss<sup>(39)</sup> im Reich des

<sup>(36)</sup> Zu Fundumständen und Rekonstruktion vgl. RENZ – RÖLLIG, *HAE* I, 202-211; KEEL – UEHLINGER, *Göttinnen*, 270-272; LIESS, Weg, 302-307; zur Deutung im Rahmen der Monotheismusdebatte bes. SCHMID, “Differenzierungen und Konzeptualisierungen der Einheit Gottes in der Religions- und Literaturgeschichte Israels”, *Der eine Gott und die Götter. Polytheismus und Monotheismus im antiken Israel* (Hrsg. M. OEMING – K. SCHMID) (AThANT 82; Zürich 2003) 11-38, 19-28 (Lit.).

<sup>(37)</sup> In Z. 2 ist *brk* als Partizip *qal* passiv und somit präsentisch bzw. ohne betonten Zeitindex zu deuten (vgl. entsprechend die zumeist präsentischen Übersetzungen); hingegen bezieht J. Renz (*HAE* I, 203-204.208; unentschieden auch BERLEJUNG, “Tod”, 489) den Segen auf die Vergangenheit, was indes grammatikalisch wie inhaltlich nicht überzeugt und auch der Segensformel ‘*br(w)k* + Personenname + *l* + Gottheit’ widerspricht (s. RENZ – RÖLLIG, *HAE* II/1, 29-32). (Doch selbst in diesem unwahrscheinlichen Fall bliebe der Fundkontext des Grabes zu beachten, der einen Bezug der geschilderten Ereignisse auf den Todesbereich nahelegt.)

<sup>(38)</sup> Vgl. nur FRETTLÖH, *Segens*, 43-88 (Lit.).

<sup>(39)</sup> Inhaltliche (nicht traditionsgeschichtliche) Übergänge hierzu könnten etwa das punktuelle (?) Eingreifen JHWHs Am 9,2 oder seine dauernde (?) Präsenz in Himmel und Scheol Ps 139,7-8 markieren; auch nach Spr 15,11 liegen Scheol und Unterwelt ständig (?) offen vor JHWH.



Todes zugeschrieben<sup>(40)</sup> — und zwar völlig unabhängig davon, ob es sich nun um eine Segenzuschreibung oder einen Segenswunsch handelt. Somit hat sich JHWHs Zuständigkeitsbereich — jedenfalls im Blick auf den Einzelnen — über das Diesseits hinaus ausgeweitet auch auf den jenseitigen Todesbereich, der nunmehr nicht mehr beziehungslos JHWH gegenübersteht, sondern zumindest auch JHWHs Einfluss unterliegt<sup>(41)</sup>.

(2) Auf zwei kleinen silbernen Segensamuletten aus einem Grab am Ketef Hinnom<sup>(42)</sup>, die bedeutend jünger sind (7./6. Jahrhundert v.Chr.)<sup>(43)</sup>, wird dieselbe Tendenz noch weitergeführt.

Das erste, schwer lesbare Amulett enthält zunächst vermutlich die Zusage JHWHs/Gottes, Bund und Gnade (*hbryt [w/h]hsd*, ZZ. 4-5) denen zu bewahren, die ihn lieben und seine Gebote (?) bewahren,

<sup>(40)</sup> Ohne hier die methodologische Frage nach dem angemessenen Interpretationsverhältnis von Text und Bild (resp. noch genereller: Fundkontext) erörtern zu können, passt dazu auch die abgebildete Hand, der die (um sie herum arrangierte) Inschrift zugeordnet ist; sie symbolisiert wohl am ehesten apotropäisch die göttliche Schutzfunktion (vgl. das Referat von LIESS, *Weg*, 305-307, die selber auf “die von oben herab rettend eingreifende rechte Hand Gottes” tippt [306]).

<sup>(41)</sup> Vgl. gegenüber der Zurückhaltung von SCHMIDT, *Dead*, 137-138 ähnlich LIESS, *Weg*, 302-307; sie geht sogar noch einen Schritt weiter, indem sie das Gewicht auf die Rettungsaussage legt, die vom Dies- aufs Jenseits extrapoliert werde. So vermutet sie “den Weg von einer erlebten Rettung aus dem ‘Tod mitten im Leben’ zu einer Hoffnung auf Errettung und göttlichen Schutz auch angesichts des endgültigen Todes”, womit “die Grabinschrift gleichsam eine Entwicklung wider[spiegelt], die sich auch innerhalb des Todes- und Lebensverständnisses der Individualpsalmen vollzog” (307).

<sup>(42)</sup> Zu Fundumständen und Rekonstruktion vgl. RENZ – RÖLLIG, *HAE I*, 447-456; KEEL – UEHLINGER, *Göttinnen*, 417-421; LIESS, *Weg*, 307-311.

<sup>(43)</sup> Die Amulette sind wohl ein gutes Jahrhundert jünger als die Inschrift aus Chirbet el-Qom, doch ist die genaue Datierung umstritten und schwankt zwischen spätvorexilischer Zeit (spätes 7./frühes 6. Jahrhundert v. Chr.) und (früh)nachexilischer Zeit. Dabei spielen neben der eisenzeitlichen Grabarchitektur und -keramik namentlich die (wiederum verschieden interpretierbaren) paläo- und orthographischen Texteigenheiten die entscheidende Rolle (vgl. einerseits G. BARKAY, “The Priestly Benediction on Silver Plaques from Ketef Hinnom in Jerusalem”, *Tel Aviv* 19 [1992] 139-192, 169-174; A. YARDENI, “Remarks on the Priestly Blessing on Two Ancient Amulets from Jerusalem”, *VT* 41 [1991] 176-185 und jüngst überzeugend G. BARKAY – A.G. VAUGHN – M.J. LUNDBERG – B. ZUCKERMAN, “The Amulets from Ketef Hinnom: A New Edition and Evaluation”, *BASOR* 334 [2004] 41-71 [inkl. zusätzlichen Photographien auf der beiliegenden CD-Edition], andererseits Renz [*HAE I*, 449-452]; K. Seybold [*Der Segen und andere liturgische Worte aus der hebräischen Bibel*, (Zürich 2004) 79]). Erneut stellt sich die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Text und Fundkontext ...

“denn bei ihm ist Erlösung (*g’l*), denn JHWH bringt uns zurück Licht/denn JHWH (ist) unser Wiederhersteller und Fels” (Z.11-14)<sup>(44)</sup>. Darauf folgen in ZZ. 14-18 und parallel dazu in ZZ. 5-12 des zweiten Amuletts Varianten des uns aus Num 6,24-26 bekannten Priestersegens<sup>(45)</sup>.

Wie in Chirbet el-Qom treten also Rettungs- und Segensaussagen, zusätzlich auch die Zusage von JHWHs/Gottes Bundestreue und evt. Lichtterminologie, im Kontext von Grab und Tod/Toten auf<sup>(46)</sup>. Wiederum ist JHWH im Rahmen privater Religion (oberer Bevölkerungsschichten), und nunmehr er allein<sup>(47)</sup>, zuständig für den Verstorbenen und sein Wohlergehen im Jenseits.

Zusammenfassend ist somit an den Segenstexten aus Chirbet el-Qom und Ketef Hinnom auf der Ebene ‘gehobener’ Privatreligion zu beobachten, wie JHWH seine Funktionen und Kompetenzen ausweitet: Anders als im eigentlich beziehungslosen Gegenüber von JHWH und Tod, wie es der klassischen Ausformung eigen war, tritt nun JHWH als der Spender von Segen und Leben grundsätzlich in ein Verhältnis zum Tod und seinem Reich. “Erst im Gefolge seiner Solarisierung (d.h. ab dem 8. Jh.) hätte dann Jahwe in Juda nach der Unterwelt gegriffen und

<sup>(44)</sup> Die Zeilen sind schwer zu entziffern (auch die neuen, auf verbesserter Technologie beruhenden Photographien bei BARKAY – VAUGHN – LUNDBERG – ZUCKERMAN, “Amulets”, 56-58 [sowie Fig. 5-6 auf der CD-Edition] und G. BARKAY – M.J. LUNDBERG – A.G. VAUGHN – B. ZUCKERMAN – K. ZUCKERMAN, “The Challenges of Ketef Hinnom. Using Advanced Technologies to Reclaim the Earliest Biblical Texts and their Context”, *NEA* 66 [2003] 162-171 lassen beide Deutungen offen; deutlich anders liest aber RENZ, *HAE* I, 452-453.

<sup>(45)</sup> Im Wesentlichen ohne VV. 25b-26a; eine Diskussion oder gar Klärung der hoch interessanten literarhistorischen Verhältnisse kann hier nicht geleistet werden (vgl. die Beobachtungen von H.N. RÖSEL, “Zur Formulierung des aaronitischen Segens auf den Amuletten von Ketef Hinnom”, *BN* 35 [1986] 30-36 und die knappe Übersicht bei KEEL – UEHLINGER, *Göttinnen*, 420 Anm. 395).

<sup>(46)</sup> Die sich in der Mitte befindende Öffnung lässt vermuten, dass die zusammengerollten Amulette an einem Faden um den Hals getragen wurden; dem Toten wurden sie als Grabbeigabe mitgegeben, wie die Fundstelle “unterhalb einer Bestattungsbank zusammen mit zahlreichen weiteren Einzelfunden” wahrscheinlich macht (RENZ – RÖLLIG, *HAE* I, 447; s.a. BARKAY, “Plaques”, 148-151).

<sup>(47)</sup> Dies ist bemerkenswert in Anbetracht des (etwas älteren) religionsgeschichtlichen Befundes, dass Segen gerne von ‘JHWH und seiner Aschera’ gespendet wird (vgl. KAg [9] 8,1-2; KAg [9] 9,4-6; s. KAg [9] 10,1-2; Qom [8] 3,3 [Rettung]; anders aber Qom [8] 3,2 [s.o.]), denn “Aschera scheint sich besonders für Segensaussagen empfohlen zu haben, da sich Segen und Fruchtbarkeit namentlich im Rekurs auf geschlechtliche Polarität plausibel verbalisieren ließen” (SCHMID, Differenzierungen, 24-25).

so die bestehende Beschränkung seines Kompetenzbereiches auf das Diesseits aufgehoben”<sup>(48)</sup>. Dabei gewinnt er — analog zur parallelen dtr. “JHWH-allein-Bewegung”<sup>(49)</sup> — auch im Todesbereich zunehmend an Einfluss (Chirbet el-Qom), bis sich mehr oder weniger deutlich seine exklusive Relevanz abzeichnet (Ketef Hinnom). Demnach bleibt auch für diese — noch in vorexilischer Zeit<sup>(50)</sup> — sich weiterentwickelnde Ausformung der Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation der Konnex von JHWH und Leben prägend, ja er intensiviert sich noch durch seine Ausdehnung bis an die Grenzen des Lebens und darüber hinaus in den Bereich des Todes. Dadurch verschiebt sich auch die Asymmetrie von Leben (bzw. JHWH) und Tod: Der Tod(esbereich) bleibt zwar Leben und JHWH entgegengesetzt, doch JHWH als Lebensspender greift in ihn ein bzw. umgreift ihn sogar und verlagert die Spannung gleichsam in die göttliche Machtsphäre hinein.

JHWHs Kompetenzausweitung innerhalb des Todesbereichs wird in nachexilischer und spätsraelitischer Zeit durch weisheitlich-apokalyptische Strömungen in dreifacher Form fortgeführt: Nachdem einerseits JHWH im Zuge der Durchsetzung des exklusiven Monotheismus als einziger und somit universal zuständiger Gott verblieben war und andererseits zunehmend nicht mehr ‘nur’ der unzeitige Tod

<sup>(48)</sup> BERLEJUNG, “Tod”, 490 (wobei die ‘Solarisierung’ JHWHs, zumal in Jerusalem, bereits ältere Elemente umfasst [s. nur KEEL – UEHLINGER, “Jahwe und die Sonnengottheit von Jerusalem”, *Ein Gott allein?* Jahweverehrung und biblischer Monotheismus im Kontext der israelitischen und altorientalischen Religionsgeschichte (Hrsg. W. DIETRICH – M.A. KLOPFENSTEIN) (OBO 139; Freiburg 1994) 269-306]; ob die Verhältnisse sich im stärker unter assyrischem Kulturdruck stehenden Norden wesentlich anders gestalten, wäre zu überprüfen); mit SEYBOLD, *Segen*, 81 gegen N. GILLMAN, “Death and Afterlife, Judaic Doctrines of”, *Encyclopedia of Judaism* (Leiden 2000) I, 196-212, 198 und M.A. KNIBB, “Life and Death in the Old Testament”, *The World of Ancient Israel. Sociological, Anthropological and Political Perspectives. Essays by Members of the Society for Old Testament Study* (ed. R.E. CLEMENTS) (Cambridge – New York, NY – New Rochelle – Melbourne – Sydney 1989) 395-415, 395, der meint: “Basic to the Old Testament is the belief that Yahweh has power over both life and death”; dies hat JHWH vielmehr erst allmählich errungen (s.o. Anm. 25-26), wie an den beiden Segenstexten zu ersehen ist.

<sup>(49)</sup> B. Lang; vgl. zuletzt seine vorläufige Bilanz: “Die Jahwe-allein-Bewegung. Neue Erwägungen über die Anfänge des biblischen Monotheismus”, *Der eine Gott und die Götter. Polytheismus und Monotheismus im antiken Israel* (Hrsg. M. OEMING – K. SCHMID) (AThANT 82; Zürich 2003) 97-110.

<sup>(50)</sup> Gegenüber der älteren Forschung differenzieren die archäologischen Quellen somit das Bild der (mittleren und) späteren Königszeit, wie LIESS, *Weg*, 301-302, 311-312 mit Recht herausstellt.

sondern “die Sterblichkeit des Menschen als solche zum Problem” geworden war<sup>(51)</sup>, stellten weitere Kompetenzsteigerungen ‘Lösungen’ in Aussicht. (1) Im vergleichsweise engsten Anschluss an altorientalische und alttestamentliche Vorstellungen einer verminderten Fortexistenz nach dem Tod konnte ein aus dem Todesreich rettendes Eingreifen JHWHs und eine Entrückung/Aufnahme in die himmlische Herrlichkeit erhofft werden (vgl. Ps 49,15-16; 73,24-28; 16,10; 22,30; zum Vorfeld s.u. III)<sup>(52)</sup>. (2) Demgegenüber setzt Jes 25,8 radikal bei der Wurzel des Problems an und erhofft für die Endzeit generell die Eliminierung des Todes, indem JHWH “den Tod für immer verschlingt” (s.a.o. Anm. 29 zum späteren hellenistisch geprägten Modell individueller Unsterblichkeit). (3) Daneben bedurfte aber auch das Problem des vorzeitigen Todes Gerechter bzw. des unvollständigen Ausgleichs von Tun und Ergehen (vgl. bes. Ijob; Jes 53) — im positiven wie negativen Sinn als Lohn und Strafe — einer jenseitigen Korrektur: Entgegen der im AT üblichen Auffassung, dass, wer tot ist, auch tot bleibt (vgl. Ijob 14,12 etc.), kam vermutlich erst in hellenistischer Zeit die Hoffnung auf eine — endzeitliche — einfache bzw. doppelte Auferweckung der Toten auf (vgl. Ez 37; Jes 26,19; Dan 12,2-3; 1ApcHen 22; 2Makk 7) — mit der bekannten Wirkungsgeschichte in Judentum, Apokalyptik und Christentum.

### 3. Eine Umformung: Die alles bestimmende Gottesrelation

Die klassische Ausformung der Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation wurde nicht nur bezüglich JHWHs Einfluss im Tod(esbereich) erweitert. In anderen Kontexten wurde sie auch hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses von JHWH und Leben und von da her dann auch hinsichtlich der inhaltlichen Füllung von Leben umgestaltet. Prägnant formuliert das Ps 63,4a:

<sup>(51)</sup> C. FORSTER, *Begrenztes Leben als Herausforderung*. Das Vergänglichkeitsmotiv in weisheitlichen Psalmen (Zürich 2000) 3.

<sup>(52)</sup> Zur Diskussion dieser umstrittenen Stellen vgl. seit BARTH, *Errettung*, 152-166 H. GESE, “Die Frage nach dem Lebenssinn: Hiob und die Folgen”, *ZThK* 79 (1982) 161-179, 172-179 (mit Blick von Ijob aus); U. KELLERMANN, “Überwindung des Todesgeschicks in der alttestamentlichen Frömmigkeit vor und neben dem Auferstehungsglauben”, *ZThK* 73 (1976) 259-282, 273-278; R. BAUCKHAM, “Life, Death, and the Afterlife in Second Temple Judaism”, *Life in the Face of Death. The Resurrection Message of the New Testament* (ed. R.N. LONGENECKER) (Grand Rapids, MI 1998) 80-95, 81, 85-86; JANOWSKI, “Toten”, 33-44; FORSTER, *Leben*, 122-130, 247-250 und jetzt LIESS, *Weg*, 3-30, 211-292, 313-322.

כִּי־טוֹב חַסְדְּךָ מִחַיִּים      Ja, deine Gnade ist besser als Leben.

Der Klage- und Dankpsalm 63, der zur Vertrauen auf Gott propagierenden Psalmengruppe 61–64 gehört<sup>(53)</sup>, beschreibt (in nicht recht durchsichtiger Abfolge) mit kräftigen Bildern, wie der verfolgte (am Heiligtum Asyl suchende?) Beter auf JHWH angewiesen ist wie auf elementare Lebensversorgung:

Seine Seele dürstet nach Gott (in der Wüste, wie V. 1 ergänzt), sein Leib schwächet (כָּמַד, hap.leg.) nach ihm wie dürres, wasserloses Land (V. 2). Gleichsam als Erfüllung hat er Gott und dessen Herrlichkeit im Heiligtum geschaut (Perfekt, V. 3a) und bekräftigt: ‘Ja<sup>(54)</sup>, deine Gnade ist besser als Leben’ (V. 4). Darauf ist Gotteslob die angemessene Reaktion (VV. 5-9), hat Gott doch den Beter (bzw. seine נַפְשׁ) gesättigt wie Fett und Mark (V. 6); er hat ihm geholfen (VV. 8-9), wogegen die Feinde umkommen werden (VV. 10-12).

Das intakte Gottesverhältnis, das sich in JHWHs חַסְדְּךָ konkretisiert, ist offenkundig der alles bestimmende Faktor, der auch die inhaltliche Füllung von Leben prägt.

(1) Er ist besser als Leben: JHWHs חַסְדְּךָ ist wichtiger als das geminderte Leben des lebensbedrohend Verfolgten, aber er ist auch generell wertvoller als das Leben überhaupt<sup>(55)</sup>. Das Leben — egal ob als gefülltes oder auf die bloße Existenz reduziertes — ist nicht mehr der Güter höchstes, wie es klassisch noch der Fall war (s.o. I) und wie es der Satan in Ijob 2,4 auf den Punkt bringt: “Haut für Haut, und alles, was der Mensch hat, gibt er für sein Leben” (עוֹר בְּעַד־עוֹר וְכָל אֲשֶׁר לְאִישׁ יִתֵּן בְּעַד נַפְשׁוֹ). Dagegen kann in Ps 63 im Extremfall die JHWH-Relation gegen das (irdische) Leben ausgespielt werden.

(2) Mit dieser absoluten Dominanz der JHWH-Bindung verändert sich nun auch die inhaltliche Füllung von Leben. Im Unterschied zur klassischen Ausformung, bei der umfassendes Wohlergehen das wichtigste Kennzeichen gelingenden Lebens bildet (Spr 3,2.16-17, s.o. 1.), rückt nun offenbar das vorrangige, sich im חַסְדְּךָ konkretisierende

<sup>(53)</sup> Vgl. dazu M. LEUENBERGER, *Konzeptionen des Königtums Gottes im Psalter*. Untersuchungen zu Komposition und Redaktion der theokratischen Bücher IV-V innerhalb des Psalters (ATHANT 83; Zürich 2004) 106-108; F.-L. HOSSFELD – E. ZENGER, *Psalmen 51–100* (HThK; Freiburg – Basel – Wien 2000) 28-33.

<sup>(54)</sup> Für hymnische Aussagen typisches deiktisches כִּי (vgl. H. GUNKEL, *Die Psalmen* [HK 2/2; Göttingen 1926] 268).

<sup>(55)</sup> So mit SEYBOLD, *Die Psalmen* (HAT 1/15; Tübingen 1996) 248-249.

Gottesverhältnis selber in den Status des das Leben ausmachenden Merkmals ein: Die Zweitrangigkeit des (irdischen) Lebens gegenüber JHWHs Gnade impliziert eine Wandlung und interne Differenzierung des Lebensbegriffs, die freilich nicht explizit gemacht wird. Der Vorzug von JHWHs יְהוָה besteht ja wohl doch nicht nur in einer besonderen (Lebens-)Qualität, sondern auch darin, dass er unverfügbar und damit den anklagenden Feinden entzogen ist — anders als das (irdische) Leben. Dabei bleibt zu fragen, ob dieser Vorzug auf das Diesseits beschränkt und rein qualitativ gedacht ist nach dem Motto ‘besser mit JHWH kurz leben als ohne ihn lang’<sup>(56)</sup>, oder ob diese gesteigerte Lebensqualität nicht über das Diesseits hinausweist und ein fortdauerndes Gottesverhältnis anvisiert<sup>(57)</sup>. Für Letzteres spricht m.E. — angesichts der wahrscheinlichsten Entstehung in exilischer und Redaktion in nachexilischer Zeit<sup>(58)</sup> — vorab die unter II beobachtete Ausweitung von JHWHs Einfluss und Zuständigkeit über die Todesgrenze hinaus, die auch hier im Hintergrund stehen dürfte; hinzu kommt, dass “der Tat- und Gemeinschaftscharakter sowie die Beständigkeit” von JHWHs יְהוָה<sup>(59)</sup> in diesem Horizont über den Tod hinaus weisen könnten. Dann aber hat sich der Lebensbegriff so differenziert, dass ein zweitrangiges (und entsprechend in einem relativierten Gegensatz zum Tod stehendes) diesseitiges Leben unterschieden wird von einem jenseitigen, konstitutiv auf JHWHs יְהוָה basierenden Leben. Derart steht JHWHs יְהוָה quer zur zeitlichen Grenze von Leben und Tod; er bestimmt den Beter auch nach dem Tod

<sup>(56)</sup> In diesem Sinn deutet B. DUHM, *Die Psalmen* (KHC 14; Tübingen 1922) 244. Vgl. dazu Spr 15,16: “Besser wenig in JHWH-Furcht als ein großer Schatz und Unruhe darin” (s. 15,17; 16,8 u.a.); umgekehrt urteilt Koh 9,4 (“Ein lebendiger Hund ist besser als ein toter Löwe”).

<sup>(57)</sup> Vgl. ähnlich etwa WOLFF, *Anthropologie*, 164.

<sup>(58)</sup> So aufgrund der Kontextbezüge überzeugend HOSSFELD – ZENGER, *Psalmen*, 194, 29-33, vgl. 201 zur Kombination von privater und offizieller Religion und die Beobachtungen zur Datierung von M. KRIEG, *Todesbilder im Alten Testament*. Oder: “Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet” (AThANT 73; Zürich 1988) 376; ähnlich vermutet S. Gillmayr-Bucher, “David, ich und der König. Fortschreibung und relecture in Psalm 63”, *Horizonte biblischer Texte*. FS für J.M. OESCH zum 60. Geburtstag (Hrsg. A. VONACH – G. FISCHER) (OBO 196; Freiburg – Göttingen 2003) 71-89, 86-87 eine exilische Entstehung oder Aktualisierung.

<sup>(59)</sup> So summarisch H.-J. ZOBEL, “יְהוָה”, *ThWAT* III, 48-71, 56. Im Vorstellungsumfeld von Ps 63,4 wäre der ähnlich ‘entgrenzte’ Gebrauch von יְהוָה in den von Zobel, *יְהוָה*, 62 aufgeführten Psalmenstellen zu vergleichen, bes. 36,11; 40,12; 103,17.



bleibend und steigert insofern dessen postmortale Existenz zu wahren, des Begriffs würdigem Leben. Auf diese Weise begann “das alte Israel Sterben und Tod als Begegnung mit seinem Gott JHWH und als Beginn einer gegenüber dem Leben intensiveren Form der Gottesgemeinschaft zu begreifen”<sup>(60)</sup>.

Die in Ps 63 zu erhebende Ausformung der Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation scheint sich demnach in die o. II skizzierte Entwicklungslinie einzufügen und auf einem Stand, wie ihn die Texte aus Chirbet el-Qom und Ketef Hinnom in etwa dokumentieren, eine prägnante Umgestaltung vorzunehmen. Sie hätte sich dann im Fortgang nach Ps 63 gemäß der umrissenen (Psalmen-)Linie eines aus dem Todesreich rettenden Eingreifens JHWHs und einer Aufnahme in die himmlische Herrlichkeit entwickelt (s.o. II bei Anm. 52).

Summieren wir unsere Überlegungen, so hat die Grundkonstellation von Leben und Tod eine massive Umgestaltung erfahren. Die vom  $\text{חַיִּים}$  repräsentierte JHWH-Relation wird zum alles bestimmenden Faktor und prägt auch inhaltlich das Verständnis von Leben. Dadurch relativiert sich der bislang fundamentale Gegensatz von (irdischem) Leben und Tod, weil der Tod als Begrenzung des Lebens von der Relativierung des (irdischen) Lebens betroffen ist. Zudem inauguriert der alles entscheidende  $\text{חַיִּים}$  JHWHs vermutlich eine Differenzierung des Lebensbegriffs, sodass nun ein ‘zweitrangiges’, dem Tod entgegengesetztes irdisches Leben und ein durch den fortdauernden  $\text{חַיִּים}$  JHWHs konstituiertes jenseitiges Leben unterschieden werden. In der Tat gilt mit G. v. Rad: “Der bündige Satz ... (Ps. 63,4) läßt erkennen, was für eine tiefgreifende Umordnung aller Lebenswerte sich hier vollzogen hat, denn das Leben und seine Steigerung durch Jahwes Segen war sonst für Israel zu allen Zeiten der Güter höchstes”<sup>(61)</sup>.

#### 4. Eine Rückbesinnung: Die kritische Anfrage Kohelets und das gelingende Leben im Diesseits

Die verschiedenen Aus- und Umformungen der klassischen Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation, die wir im AT (mit Ausläufern bis in die nachatl. Zeit hinein) nachgezeichnet haben, wurden nicht überall gleichsam unisono mitvollzogen. Am bekanntesten ist wohl die

<sup>(60)</sup> JANOWSKI, “Toten”, 29; s. 41-44, wo er eine theologiegeschichtliche Linie Ps 88 Ps 16 Ps 73 skizziert.

<sup>(61)</sup> *Theologie I*, 416 — indes ohne dass wir dabei Geistliches und Körperliches einander entgegensetzen und einen “schon fast mystischen Spiritualismus” vermuten (ähnlich etwa GUNKEL, *Psalmen*, 268).



kritische Anfrage, welche Kohelet stellt, wenn er in Koh 3,19.21 ausgehend von seiner Erfahrung überlegt:

כִּי מִקְרָה בְּנֵי־הָאָדָם	Denn (es gibt) das Geschick der Menschen(kinder) <sup>(62)</sup>
וּמִקְרָה הַבְּהֵמָה	und das Geschick der Tiere,
וּמִקְרָה אֶחָד לָהֶם	und (es ist) ein Geschick für alle:
כְּמוֹת זֶה כֵּן מוֹת זֶה	wie deren Tod, so deren Tod;
וְרוּחַ אֶחָד לְכָל	und (es ist) ein Geist für alle,
וּמוֹתֵר הָאָדָם מִן־הַבְּהֵמָה אֵין	und einen Vorteil des Menschen vor dem Tier (gibt es)
כִּי הֵכָל הָבֵל: (...)	nicht; denn die beiden (sind) Windhauch. (...)
מִי יוֹדֵעַ	Wer weiß:
רוּחַ בְּנֵי־הָאָדָם	der Geist der Menschen –
הַעֲלֶה הִיא לְמַעְלָה	steigt er nach oben,
וְרוּחַ הַבְּהֵמָה	aber der Geist der Tiere –
הַיִּקְרֶת הִיא לְמַשָּׁה לָאָרֶץ:	steigt er hinab nach unten zur Erde?

Koh eröffnet seine Überlegungen zum von Gott bestimmten Geschick von Mensch und Tier 3,16-22 mit der empirischen Einsicht (רְאִיָּה), dass unter der Sonne das Unrecht jedenfalls zuzeiten überhand nimmt und an die Stelle von Recht und Gerechtigkeit tritt (V. 16); dennoch hält er — oder angesichts der recht ‘erfahrungsfernen’, spekulativen Deutung vielleicht doch eher ein ‘orthodoxer’ Redaktor <sup>(63)</sup> — am göttlichen Gericht zur bestimmten Zeit fest (V. 17).

<sup>(62)</sup> Die Übersetzung setzt im hebräischen Text in V. 19 zweimal den Constructus מִקְרָה und v.a. in V. 21 nach breitem Konsens zweimal die Frageform הַיִּקְרֶת/הַעֲלֶה voraus (vgl. BHS und KRÜGER, *Kohelet* [Prediger] [BK 19; Neukirchen-Vluyn 2000] 164-168; L. SCHWIENHORST-SCHÖNBERGER, *Kohelet*. Übersetzt und ausgelegt [HThK; Freiburg – Basel – Wien 2004] 278; die Vokalisierung des MT mit Artikeln verkehrt die Aussage ins glatte, inhaltlich ‘orthodoxe’ Gegenteil).

<sup>(63)</sup> Denn es erfolgt weder eine Zitierung noch eine ablehnende oder kritische Stellungnahme. Ein Nachtrag könnte jedenfalls — ähnlich wie in V. 21 — sachlich dann nahe liegen, wenn bei Koh nur “die eigene Erfahrung positiv beurteilt und als einzig zuverlässige Erkenntnisquelle wertend von Tradition und unmittelbarer Offenbarung unterschieden wird” (A. SCHELLENBERG, *Erkenntnis als Problem*. Kohelet und die alttestamentliche Diskussion um das menschliche Erkennen [OBO 188; Freiburg – Göttingen 2002] 296; s. aber zur Tradition auch im Folgenden). Vgl. zur literarkritischen Einschätzung von V. 17 die Übersichten bei SCHWIENHORST-SCHÖNBERGER, *Kohelet*, 279 und KRÜGER, *Kohelet*, 180 mit Anm. 37, der selber an der Originalität festhält und in hegelschem Sinn “im Wechsel der Zeiten zugleich auch so etwas wie ein ‘Gericht Gottes’” erkennt (180; ebenso SCHWIENHORST-SCHÖNBERGER, *Kohelet*, 279); sekundär ist V. 17 etwa nach D. MICHEL, *Qohelet* (EdF 258; Darmstadt 1988) 139; A.A. FISCHER, “Kohelet und die frühe Apokalyptik. Eine Auslegung von Koh 3,16-21”, *Qohelet*

V. 18 setzt nun mit Bezug auf die atl. Schrifttradition der Urgeschichte neu ein und rekapituliert die von Gott beabsichtigte Sonderstellung (ברר) des Menschen und ihr Scheitern<sup>(64)</sup>, sodass “sie selbst Tiere sind füreinander (שֵׁנִים בְּהֵמָה הֵמָּה לָהֶם)”, womit der Zustand von V. 16 auch ‘biblisch-theologisch’ eingeholt wird. V. 19 begründet dies nun, auf Erfahrung und Schrift basierend, mit dem Mensch und Tier gemeinsamen Geschick: Tod und Sterblichkeit begrenzen beide und beider Leben verdankt sich demselben Geist<sup>(65)</sup>. Insofern<sup>(66)</sup>, bilanziert Koh vorläufig, hat der Mensch keinen Vorteil gegenüber dem Tier: Beide sind vergänglich wie ein Windhauch und kehren als Staub an denselben Ort zurück (VV. 19-20).

Ausgehend von diesen erfahrungsgedeckten Erkenntnissen, die gleichfalls durch atl. (Schrift-)Tradition gestützt werden, ist es deshalb nach V. 21 für Koh und seinen die Grenzen der Erkenntnis<sup>(67)</sup> konsequent beachtenden ‘agnostizistischen’ Standpunkt<sup>(68)</sup> höchst fragwürdig, eine jenseitige Differenzierung des einen Lebensgeistes vorzunehmen: Das lässt sich weder aus der Erfahrung extrapolieren (VV. 16.19) noch mit atl. Schrifttradition begründen (VV. 18-19). Dabei kritisiert Koh mit seiner von niemandem beantwortbaren Frage

*in the Context of Wisdom* (ed. A. SCHOORS) (BETHL 136; Leuven 1998) 339-356; M. ROSE, *Rien de nouveau. Nouvelles approches du livre de Qohéleth. Avec une bibliographie* (1988-1998) élaborée par B.P. ALLISSON (OBO 168; Freiburg 1999) 204-205.

<sup>(64)</sup> Vgl. dazu Gen 1,26-30; 6-9; 6,3.12-13; 9,8-17 und KRÜGER, “Die Rezeption der Tora im Buch Kohelet”, *Das Buch Kohelet. Studien zur Struktur, Geschichte, Rezeption und Theologie* (Hrsg. L. SCHWIENHORST-SCHÖNBERGER) (BZAW 254; Berlin – New York, NY 1997) 303-325, 316-317.

<sup>(65)</sup> S. die Belege o. Anm. 19, bes. Gen 6,17; 7,15.22 (רִיחַ תַּיִת); Ps 104,29-30; Ijob 34,14-15.

<sup>(66)</sup> Andere Aspekte neben der Sterblichkeit werden nicht thematisch, etwa das Wissen des Menschen um seine Sterblichkeit, das durchaus als Vorteil (gegenüber den Toten) gilt (9,4-5).

<sup>(67)</sup> Sie werden vorab durch den Tod, die Zukunft und das Tun Gottes markiert, vgl. dazu SCHELLENBERG, *Erkenntnis*, 75-161.

<sup>(68)</sup> Er betrifft Bereiche jenseits der Erkenntnisgrenzen, so unter anderem Aussagen über das Jenseits, schließt aber keineswegs pointierte Positionen bezüglich der Erfahrungswelt aus. Kohelets ‘Agnostizismus’ ist auch nicht mit einem spekulativen Nihilismus gleichzusetzen, denn Koh bestreitet ‘dogmatische’ Aussagen nicht dadurch, dass er das Gegenteil behauptet, sondern er enthält sich eines Urteils — bestreitet freilich sehr wohl die Zuständigkeit menschlicher Erkenntnis. Entsprechend lautet im vorliegenden Fall auf die Frage ‘wer weiß?’ die Antwort offenkundig ‘niemand’ (vgl. SCHELLENBERG, *Erkenntnis*, 86 mit Anm. 244; 102)

‘wer weiß denn, ob ...?’<sup>(69)</sup> an unserer Stelle gar nicht, jedenfalls nicht explizit, die Verlässlichkeit von Jenseitsaussagen überhaupt — wiewohl diese seiner Position höchst fraglich, ja im Grunde völlig spekulativ und beliebig erscheinen<sup>(70)</sup>. Vielmehr bestreitet er, im Einklang mit atl. Schrifttradition (s.o. Anm. 65), eine postmortale Differenzierung zwischen Mensch und Tier. Fragt man, was ihn dazu herausfordert, so liegt es nahe, an Psalmaussagen wie 49,13-16 und 73,21-28 zu denken; sie betonen — im spätsisraelitischen Horizont allein auf weiter Flur — exakt diesen postmortalen Gegensatz von Mensch und Tier. Dezidiert behauptet das Ps 49,13b.15a\*.16:

נִמְשָׁל כְּבְּהֵמֹת נָדְמוּ: (...)	Er [der Mensch] gleicht den Tieren, die abgetan werden. (...)
כִּצְאֵן לְשֹׂאֵל שְׁחָו מִן הַיָּדָעַם (...)	Wie die Schafe sinken sie zur Unterwelt, der Tod weidet sie. (...)
אֲדֹ-אֱלֹהִים יַפְדֵּה נַפְשִׁי מִיַּד-שְׂאוֹל כִּי יִקְחֵנִי סֶלָה:	Doch Gott wird mein Leben loskaufen aus der Hand der Unterwelt denn er wird mich aufnehmen. Sela.

Angesichts solcher Formulierungen dürfte hier die Position zu greifen sein, gegen die Koh argumentiert<sup>(71)</sup>. Damit vollzieht er eine eigene Ausformung der Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation, die sogleich etwas ausführlicher umrissen sei.

<sup>(69)</sup> S.o. Anm. 62.68.

<sup>(70)</sup> Anders die vielfach und m.E. aus sachlichen Gründen zu Recht (vgl. SCHELLENBERG, *Erkenntnis*, 103 Anm. 334; s.a.u. Anm. 73) als sekundär beurteilte Aussage 12,7 (so z.B. MICHEL, *Untersuchungen zur Eigenart des Buches Qohelet*. Mit einem Anhang Bibliographie zu Qohelet von R.G. LEHMANN [BZAW 183; Berlin – New York, NY 1989] 117; ROSE, *Qohéleth*, 490-491; anders KRÜGER, *Kohelet*, 356; SCHWIENHORST-SCHÖNBERGER, *Kohelet*, 537): Nach ihr kehrt beim Tod der Staub zur Erde, der Geist zu Gott zurück (ähnlich Sir 40,11). Sollte 12,7 doch auf Koh zurückgehen und dieser konsistent argumentieren, so käme in 3,21 der Akzent exklusiv auf der explizit bestrittenen Differenzierung zu liegen.

<sup>(71)</sup> So etwa KRÜGER, *Kohelet*, 183-185; DERS., “Le livre de Qohéleth dans le contexte de la littérature juive des III<sup>e</sup> et II<sup>e</sup> siècles avant Jésus-Christ”, *RThPh* 131 (1999) 135-162, 160-161; dabei gibt es auch hellenistische Äquivalente zum postmortalen Aufstieg der menschlichen Seele (vgl. KRÜGER, *Kohelet*, 184). Hingegen bildet die Unsterblichkeitshoffnung generell (s.a.o. Anm. 29) kaum die von Koh kritisierte Position (so aber z.B. KELLERMANN, “Überwindung”, 279-280; dagegen SCHELLENBERG, *Erkenntnis*, 102-103). Eine rhetorische Frage vermutet FISCHER, “Apokalypitik”, 351-352.

Zunächst aber zieht Kohelet in V. 22 sein persönliches Fazit: Die Freude ist der ‘Anteil’ (חֵלֶק) des Menschen (vgl. Gottesgeschenk [מַתָּת אֱלֹהִים] V. 13), den ihm Gott gegeben hat. In welche Zukunft auch immer “nach ihm (אַחֲרָיו)”<sup>(72)</sup> — zumal eine jenseits der Todesgrenze — zu blicken, überfordert den Menschen schlichtweg und ist seine Sache nicht<sup>(73)</sup>.

Somit formuliert Koh hier und mehrfach ähnlich<sup>(74)</sup> auf der Basis seiner Erfahrung — wodurch “das ‘Ich’ in eine kriteriale Rolle gegenüber dem tradierten weisheitlichen Bildungsgut gerät”<sup>(75)</sup> — eine kritische Anfrage an die genannten späatl. Ausweitungen der Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation. Indem er die Akzentverschiebung ins Jenseits, die auf der Schiene von Ps 63, Ps 49 und Ps 73 stattfindet (und sich als die Gegenwart abwertende Vertröstung aufs Jenseits missdeuten lässt), kritisch hinterfragt, vollzieht er in gewisser Weise eine Rückbesinnung auf die klassische Form des Lebensverständnisses: Das Leben wird wiederum konsequent auf das Diesseits konzentriert und ist dem es begrenzenden Tod diametral entgegengesetzt. Die damit vollzogene Aufwertung der Gegenwart läuft auf so etwas wie die Maxime ‘carpe diem’ heraus. Dabei ist sich Koh der Unverfügbarkeit des sich jetzt ereignenden Lebens bewusst: Dass ein Mensch Essen, Trinken und Freude hat im Leben, ist eine Gottesgabe (vgl. 3,13 u.ö.). Denn, so 3,22, es gibt nichts Besseres, als sich zu freuen: “Die Freude ist das ‘höchste Gut’ und der ‘Anteil’, den der Mensch ... erreichen kann”<sup>(76)</sup>. Wie in der klassischen Sicht ist bei Koh also wiederum das von Gott gegebene Leben — in Opposition zum Tod — das höchste Gut. Inhaltlich hat es sich hingegen verschoben auf die elementaren Vorgänge von Essen, Trinken und

<sup>(72)</sup> Dabei schillert m.E. der Zukunftsbegriff und ist im Kontext durchaus auch auf die postmortale Zukunft hin offen (so A. VONACH, *Nähere dich um zu hören*. Gottesvorstellungen und Glaubensvermittlung im Koheletbuch [BBB 125; Berlin – Bodenheim 1999] 123; anders SCHELLENBERG, *Erkenntnis*, 103-104).

<sup>(73)</sup> Denn im “streng an empirisch beobachtbare Tatsachen gebunden(en)”, “innerweltlichen Rahmen allein kann man nach Qohelet über den Tod sprechen; wer meint, diesen irdischen Bereich überschreiten zu können ..., überschreitet die dem menschlichen Erkennen gesetzte Grenze” (SCHELLENBERG, *Erkenntnis*, 103).

<sup>(74)</sup> Vgl. zu den übrigen ‘Todestexten’ T. ZIMMER, *Zwischen Tod und Lebensglück*. Eine Untersuchung zur Anthropologie Kohelets (BZAW 286; Berlin – New York, NY 1999) 45-50; SCHELLENBERG, *Erkenntnis*, 75-100.

<sup>(75)</sup> P. HÖFFKEN, “Das EGO des Weisen. Subjektivierungsprozesse in der Weisheitsliteratur”, *ThZ* 41 (1985) 121-134, 125, vgl. 125-126 zu 3,16-22.

<sup>(76)</sup> KRÜGER, *Kohelet*, 170.

Freude; und als wesentliches Kennzeichen gehört zum Leben nun auch das — begrenzte — Erkenntnisvermögen<sup>(77)</sup>. So wird bei Koh im Horizont des Hellenismus, ähnlich wie in der kritischen Weisheit sonst, die Debatte um das menschliche Erkenntnisvermögen virulent, während in diesem religions- und theologiegeschichtlichen Kontext etwa die umfassende Ausweitung von JHWHs Zuständigkeit längst vorausgesetzt ist und nicht mehr eigens diskutiert wird.

Derart präsentiert Koh an einem der Eckpunkte und 'Ränder' des AT eine Ausformung der Leben-Tod-Grundkonstellation, die sich — in stark veränderter Situation — in einem erstaunlichen Maß zurück besinnt auf die klassische Form eisenzeitlicher Religion, die an anderen 'Rändern' des AT zutage trat. Damit rückt Koh — jedenfalls im Blick auf unser Thema — fraglos in die sachlichen Zentren des AT vor<sup>(78)</sup>.

\*  
\* \* \*

Überblicken wir die erörterten Ausformungen der Grundkonstellation von Leben und Tod im alten Israel, ist ein Doppeltes festzuhalten: Einerseits halten sich die drei unter 1. skizzierten Gemeinsamkeiten der JHWH-Bindung des Lebens, der Asymmetrie von Leben und Tod und der inhaltlichen Bestimmtheit des Lebens, das mehr ist als nackte Existenz, recht konstant durch. Andererseits spielen sich auf diesen drei Feldern sowohl kleinere Modifikationen als auch massive Verschiebungen ab:

(1) Die konstitutive Bindung des Lebens an JHWH prägt alle Ausformungen grundlegend, wird aber ausgehend von der klassischen Sicht in den jüngeren Aus-, Um- und Rückformungen im Blick auf die beiden anderen Bereiche weitergedacht und je nach Situation unterschiedlich konkretisiert.

(2) Die Asymmetrie von Leben und Tod besteht klassisch (nach

<sup>(77)</sup> Denn auch "in seiner Unvollkommenheit erweist sich dieses den Toten völlig fehlende Erkenntnisvermögen dadurch als eines der wesentlichen Merkmale der Lebenden und wird damit zu einem entscheidenden Unterscheidungskriterium von Tod und Leben" (SCHELLENBERG, *Erkenntnis*, 100).

<sup>(78)</sup> Ohne diese profilierte These weiterverfolgen zu können vgl. zum Todesthema L. SCHWIENHORST-SCHÖNBERGER, "Vertritt Kohelet die Lehre vom absoluten Tod? Zum Argumentationsgang von Koh 9,1-6", *Auf den Spuren der schriftgelehrten Weisen*. FS für J. MARBÖCK anlässlich seiner Emeritierung (Hrsg. I. FISCHER – U. RAPP – J. SCHILLER) (BZAW 331; Berlin – New York, NY 2003) 207-219, 217-218.

Spr 3 und Primärquellen) in der Kombination von JHWH und diesseitigem Leben, die dem Tod(esbereich) diametral gegenüberstehen. Angesichts eng miteinander gekoppelter neuer Erfahrungen, Einsichten sowie Veränderungen in der Götterwelt weitet JHWH seinen Einfluss aus, indem er auch an der Lebensgrenze und in der jenseitigen Zone und Machtsphäre des Todes bestimmend wird: Zwar bleibt der asymmetrische Gegensatz von Leben (bzw. JHWH) und Tod bestehen, doch wird der Tod — zuerst greifbar in Chirbet el-Qom und Ketef Hinnom — zunehmend entmachtet und in JHWHs Einflussbereich integriert, ja schließlich (in späten Psalmen, der späten Prophetie und der Apokalyptik) z.T. sogar endzeitlich überwunden und vernichtet. Oder aber die JHWH-Relation führt — so in Ps 63 — zu einer Differenzierung des Lebensbegriffs und stellt ein ‘zweitrangiges’, dem Tod entgegengesetztes irdisches Leben einem durch den fortdauernden יהוה JHWHs konstituierten jenseitigen Leben gegenüber. Dabei bildet die Kompetenzausweitung JHWHs eine langzeitige religionsgeschichtliche Grundtendenz, die nicht umgekehrt wird, wenngleich die Zuverlässigkeit menschlicher Aussagen darüber von Koh bestritten wird.

(3) Inhaltlich ist Leben immer mehr als bloße Existenz, wird aber unterschiedlich bestimmt: Die qualitative Füllung des Lebens verlagert sich vom klassischen vitalen Wohlergehen im Diesseits hin zum ‘gesegneten’ Leben an der Todesgrenze und darüber hinaus (Segenstexte aus Chirbet el-Qom und Ketef Hinnom; späte Texte aus Psalter, Prophetie und Apokalyptik mit einer drohenden Verlagerung ganz ins Jenseits). In Ps 63 emanzipiert sich die JHWH-Bindung (im Dies- wie Jenseits) von der inhaltlichen Füllung von ‘Leben’ und wird selber zum wesentlichen Inhalt, während Koh das Leben — wieder ganz im Diesseits — durch die elementaren Vorgänge von Essen, Trinken und Freude bestimmt sieht und sich damit auf die klassische Ausformung zurückbesinnt.

Die untersuchten profilierten Ausformungen der asymmetrischen Grundkonstellation von Leben und Tod im Kontext ihres jeweiligen religiösen Symbolsystems haben Konstanz und Varianz des Themas im atl. Horizont (von der Eisen II-Zeit bis in die hellenistische Ära) verdeutlicht. Die z.T. erheblichen Transferleistungen sind aus einer gewissen Distanz schärfer sichtbar geworden und haben exemplarisch einen Einblick vermittelt, wie eine theologiegeschichtlich im AT durchgehend relevante Grundkonstellation in verschiedenen religions- und theologiegeschichtlichen Kontexten Gestalt gewinnt. Konstanz

und Varianz des Themas spielen zusammen und führen je zu unverwechselbaren Ausformungen der Grundkonstellation von Leben und Tod.

Moussonstr. 17  
CH-8044 Zürich

Martin LEUENBERGER

#### SUMMARY

The present article investigates the basic constellation of life and death in Ancient Israel. Significant concepts are found in Prov 3, the blessing texts from Chirbet el-Qom and Ketef Hinnom, Ps 63 and Qoh 3,16-22. The basic constellation of life and death is characterized by (1) the connection of life to YHWH, (2) the asymmetry of life and death, (3) thematic aspects of life, which contain (a) the vital well-being during this life, (b) the blessed life at the border to death, and beyond that, (c) the connection to YHWH, (d) the elementary dimensions of eating, drinking and joy.



# ANIMADVERSIONES

## Defilement of Virgins in Biblical Law and the Case of Dinah (Genesis 34)<sup>(1)</sup>

A study of defilement in Biblical law and Biblical legal practice results in the surprising conclusion that a virgin or, for that matter, any woman who is not married or betrothed, cannot be defiled by illicit sexual intercourse. Biblical Israel, in fact, apparently shared the values of the ancient Near East — Sumerians, Babylonians, Hittites and Assyrians in this matter<sup>(2)</sup>.

Let me recall the consequences of illicit sexual intercourse with an unmarried or unengaged girl, a virgin, in Biblical law. If a man seduced a girl, he must now 'seduce' her father and gain his permission to marry her (Exod 22,15-16). If a man raped a girl — since he took her by force, he is forced to keep her as a wife and is not permitted to divorce her (Deut 22,28-29). In both cases, of course, the bride-price, the *mōhar*, must be paid. Both of these cases are characterized by a kind of 'mirror punishment' which results in humorous retaliation: you convinced the girl, now convince the father; you forced the girl, now you will be forced to keep her as a wife. The feelings of the girl are given little consideration. However, the point that interests us here is the gravity of the offence: it is not a capital crime; reparation can be made.

The case of married or engaged women is very different. Illicit intercourse under these circumstances is a capital offence, as is made clear by the Deuteronomic laws (Deut 22,22-27). This alone is defined as adultery (זִנָּה) in Biblical law and Biblical milieu at large (Lev 20,10; Hos 4, 14; Prov 6,24-35), and this is maintained by Jewish law<sup>(3)</sup>. In this context, in some sources, we find the term 'to defile' (לְטַמֵּא: *vide infra*) or 'to become defiled' (לְטִמְאָה: Lev 18, 20). The term טָמֵא with reference to illicit intercourse positively belongs to Priestly diction. In the Priestly law about the suspected wife (אִשָּׁה סוּפָה: Num 5,11-31) it is used no less than seven times (vv.

<sup>(1)</sup> Paper read at the congress of the IOSOT in Leiden, on August 2, 2004. I would like to thank Mr. Ronnie Goldstein (Hebrew University) for his advice concerning scholarly matters and Ms. Danielle Marx for taking care of the English style.

<sup>(2)</sup> Cf. my "Family and Sex Laws in Deuteronomy and the Book of the Covenant", *Henoch* 9 (1987) 131-158, reprinted in A. ROFÉ, *Deuteronomy. Issues and Interpretation* (London 2002) 169-192. Of the literature cited there, I would privilege: J.J. FINKELSTEIN, "Sex Offences in Sumerian Laws", *JAOS* 86 (1966) 355-372. For more recent discussions see: R. WESTBROOK, *Old Babylonian Marriage Law* (ArfOF, Beiheft 23, Horn 1988); S. GREENGUS, "Redefining 'Inchoate Marriage' in Old Babylonian Contexts", *Riches Hidden in Secret Places*. ANE Studies in Memory of Th. Jacobsen (ed. Tz. ABUSH) (Winona Lake, IN 2002) 123-139.

<sup>(3)</sup> The case of the unchaste bride to be stoned at the gate of her father's house (Deut 22, 20-21) is, on the face of it, an exception. I have argued elsewhere (see preceding note) that those verses do not represent Biblical legal practice, but the unrealistic demands of a fanatical Deuteronomic reformer.

13.14.14.19.20.27.28). As one might expect, it is also found in Ezekiel (18,6.11.15; 22,11; 33,26). In both sources, Ezekiel and the Priestly Document, נָחַשׁ is applied to married women only. The metaphor of Aholah and Aholibah in Ezekiel 23 is most instructive in this regard. Again and again, the prophet recounts that the two women have been defiled by intercourse with Assyrians and Babylonians (vv. 7.13.17). However, he maintains that they had already fornicated in Egypt (נָחַשׁ: v. 3). Here the root נָחַשׁ does not feature. A plausible explanation for this is that the fornication in Egypt preceded the “marriage” to the Lord, and the girls did not, therefore, incur defilement; the intercourse with Assyrians and Babylonians occurred after the “marriage” and, therefore, involved defilement. It is remarkable that Ezekiel, despite his strong vehemence towards the sisters and his obscene language, nevertheless remains faithful to the proper terminology<sup>(4)</sup>.

The conclusion of this observation is that the defilement of a woman by sexual intercourse is not a primitive, instinctive concept, but rather a sophisticated, legalistic one. The legal status, not the alleged chastity of a woman, determines the possibility of her being defiled by sexual contact.

This conclusion is confirmed by the law in Deut 24, 1-4. The woman who returns to her former husband after a second marriage is declared as being defiled: נָחַשׁהּ. For what reason? She has not been defiled by the second marriage. It is her return to the first husband that *a posteriori* causes the second marriage to be considered an act of defilement<sup>(5)</sup>. This is an outstanding instance of the extent to which the concept of נָחַשׁ has been manipulated!

In the story of Dinah in Genesis 34, we realize at once the extent to which it contradicts the Biblical legal notions and practice. It is stated no less than three times (vv. 5.13.27) that Dinah was defiled by Shechem or the Shechemites — indeed a quite exceptional change from the Biblical milieu as assessed above<sup>(6)</sup>. Furthermore, the punishment inflicted upon Shechem and his kinsmen — execution by sword — conforms with the alleged gravity of the offense, that here would not allow atonement by compensation. How can we account for this discrepancy?

Genesis 34 itself, however, harbors an internal inconsistency. Simeon and Levi perpetrated the murder of the Shechemites and were accordingly scolded by Jacob (vv. 25-26. 30-31). But what was the attitude of the other brothers? According to vv. 27-28 they took part in the massacre, a fact that concurs with their indignation upon hearing of Dinah's rape (vv. 5. 7)<sup>(7)</sup> and with the

<sup>(4)</sup> On the other hand, I have found no explanation for the fact that the verb נָחַשׁ is not used in the description of the sinful woman Jerusalem in Ezekiel 16.

<sup>(5)</sup> Cf. R.D. NELSON, *Deuteronomy*. A Commentary (OTL; Louisville, KY 2002) 289: “Would a return to her first marriage retroactively convert her second one into an adulterous relationship?” Further opinions on this matter are quoted by Nelson, *ibid*. Further instances in which the verb נָחַשׁ is used in a secondary artificial sense ‘to declare impure’ are in Leviticus 13 (v. 44 and *passim*) and Isa 30, 22.

<sup>(6)</sup> This point has apparently been overlooked by Klawans and Hayes; cf. J. KLAWANS, *Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism* (New York 2000) 23; Ch.E. HAYES, *Gentile Impurities and Jewish Identities* (New York 2002) 24.

<sup>(7)</sup> But was there really a rape? This has recently been contested by Bechtel and Gruber; cf. L.M. BECHTEL, “What if Dinah is not Raped? (Genesis 34)”, *JSOT* 62 (1994) 19-36; M.I. GRUBER, “A Re-examination of the Charges against Shechem Son of Hamor”, *Beit Mikra* 44 (1998/9) 119-127 (Hebrew). Acceptedly, the root ‘nh. in *pi’el*, when applied

description of their reply to Hamor's proposal as a deceit (מִרְמָה v. 13)<sup>(8)</sup>. Why, then, did they go scot free? This tension within the story has been resolved about 125 years ago by Abraham Kuenen, by distinguishing between two layers of narrative: the older one attributed the vengeance on Shechem to Simeon and Levi alone, while the recent layer considered the offence to be a dreadful act and therefore summoned as castigators the entire clan of Jacob<sup>(9)</sup>. It goes without saying that this later writer is the one who concocted the term 'defilement' for Shechem's abduction of Dinah.

The rationale of the second writer has been detected by A. Kuenen in his aforementioned article of 1880. I will restate it here, complementing it with the observations concerning ancient Israelite family law which opened the present essay. The notion of the defilement of Dinah did not originate in Israelite family law. It came, rather, from a different sphere and rests upon the idea of טְמֵאָה גוֹיִם הָאֶרֶץ — impurity of the nations of the land (Ezra 9, 21). This is a concept that came to the fore in the Restoration Community of the Fifth century BCE when intermarriage was forbidden because 'the nations of the lands have made the land of Israel impure (נִדָּה) with their abominations (בְּתוֹעֵבוֹתֵיהֶם) which they, in their impurity (בְּטִמְאֻתָּם), filled it from one end to the other' (Ezra 9, 11-12)<sup>(10)</sup>.

As far as I can see, this is the beginning of the concept of the impurity of the Gentiles (טְמֵאָה הַגֵּוִיִּם) which became dominant in the Jewish Second Commonwealth<sup>(11)</sup>. If we pay close attention to the diction, noting the affinity of Ezra 9, 11 with Ezek 36, 16-18, it seems that this is rooted in the concept of impurity of idolatry which contaminated its worshippers<sup>(12)</sup>. In any case, it

---

to intercourse, does not necessarily mean 'to ravish'; cf. Deut 22, 24. The meaning 'to subdue', well attested in the political sphere (cf. 2 Sam 7, 10 and the Mesha Stone lines 5.6), if applied to sex, would describe the act in a male chauvinistic manner. The story of Dinah is (intentionally?) vague about what actually happened in Shechem's chamber. The view that Dinah was not raped has been accepted by Joseph Fleishman who made it a starting point for his hypothesis (implausible in my view) that Genesis 34 reflects the custom of 'abduction marriage'; cf. J. FLEISHMAN, "Socio-Legal Aspects of Genesis 34", *Shnaton* 12 (2002) 141-155 (Hebrew).

<sup>(8)</sup> The ingenious proposal of Ramban (Rabbinic Bible, *HakKeter*, Ramat Gan 1993) *ad loc* followed by S.D. LUZZATTO (*Il Pentateuco, volgarizzato e commentato*, op. post., Padova 1871) *ad loc* that reduced the 'deceit' to their demanding from the Shechemites unacceptable terms (circumcision) does not do full justice to the final motivation clause, "who (or: because they) had defiled their sister Dinah".

<sup>(9)</sup> A. KUENEN, "Beitraege zur Hexateuchkritik: VI. Dina und Sichem (Gen. 34)" (1880), in his: *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Biblischen Wissenschaft* (Freiburg i.B. – Leipzig 1894) 255-276. The gist of his conclusions has been unintentionally repeated by J. VAN SETERS, "The Silence of Dinah (Genesis 34)", *Jacob. Commentaire à plusieurs voix de Gen 25–36. Mélanges offerts à A. de Pury* (Genève 2001) 239-247.

<sup>(10)</sup> The impurity of gentiles is already expressed in Isa 52, 1.11. If the verses belong to Deutero-Isaiah, would they attest to the origin of the concept in the Babylonian exile? Mary Douglas noted how far Ezra's ideology differs from the priestly notions of impurity. However, she considered the priestly legislation in the matter as a reaction to Ezra's tentative reforms; see her: "Responding to Ezra: the Priests and the Foreign Wives", *Biblical Interpretation* 10 (2002) 1-23.

<sup>(11)</sup> Cf. G. ALON, "Gentile Impurity", *Tarbiz* 8 (1937) 137-161 (Hebrew); Engl. Transl. by I. Abrahams: "The Levitical Uncleaness of Gentiles", in: G. ALON, *Jews, Judaism and the Classical World* (Jerusalem 1977) 146-189.

<sup>(12)</sup> Cf. further Lev 19, 31, Jer 2, 7-8; Ezek 5, 11; 22, 3-4; 23, 30.

stands to reason that the idea of the defilement of Dinah owes its origin to the Jewish concept of impurity of the nations which became an accepted tenet at the beginning of the Second Commonwealth<sup>(13)</sup>.

These observations can assist the critic in tracing the literary history of Genesis 34. It is possible to discern two phases, perhaps even layers, in the formation of this story<sup>(14)</sup>.

The first phase belongs to the genre of clan-saga that extols the deeds of ancient clan leaders in the conquest of the land<sup>(15)</sup>. To this genre belong sparse notes in various books of the Hebrew Bible: Jacob who conquered Shechem (Gen 48,22), Machir, Yair and Nobah in Northern Transjordan (Num 32,39.41.42), Caleb and the region of Hebron (Josh 15,13-19) and Ephraim in the southern ridge of his mountains (1 Chr 7,20-24). By the same token, Simeon and Levi conquer Shechem. In the clan saga, the conquest is intertwined with family circumstances, such as marriage, bride-prize and dowry, progeny, birthright, inheritance and wills, bereavement of children, mourning and consolation. The Dinah episode presents an additional family event: the abduction and rescue of a sister. A common trait of the clan-sagas is their 'secular' outlook: human valor, not God, determines the course of events. This feature, again, appears in Genesis 34; in fact, it singles out this story from most patriarchal narratives.

The second phase is represented by the story of Dinah in its present form. Written, as we have seen, in postexilic times, the story reflects the outlook dominant in that period<sup>(16)</sup>. There is a profound antagonism between Jews and Gentiles which is cast back to the Patriarchal age. This pattern occurs in the *Book of Jubilees* and the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*<sup>(17)</sup>. The wars, however, merely reflect that embedded enmity; they do not lead to the occupation of the land and settlement therein.

The postexilic date of composition of Genesis 34 is corroborated by its

<sup>(13)</sup> Cf. R. David Qimhi (in the Rabbinical Bible) on v. 5: "She (scil. Dinah, A.R.) was polluted, because she had intercourse with an uncircumcised". The same explanation has time and again been offered in modern times; cf. B. JACOB, *Das erste Buch der Tora, Genesis, übersetzt und erklärt* (Berlin 1934) 655; S.M. OLYAN, *Rites and Rank. Hierarchy in Biblical Representations of Cult* (Princeton 2000) 49, 65; BECHTEL, "Dinah" and GRUBER, "Changes". Defilement by sexual intercourse with gentiles is the main idea of the restatement of the Dinah episode in the Book of Jubilees; cf. C. WERMAN, "Jubilees 30: Building a Paradigm for the Ban on Intermarriage", *HTR* 90 (1997) 1-22.

<sup>(14)</sup> Here, too, in the wake of KUENEN, "Dina". The determination of layers with alternative solutions can be found by E. BLUM, *Die Komposition der Vätergeschichte* (WMANT 57; Neukirchen 1984) 210-223; Y. ZAKOVITCH, "Assimilation in Biblical Narrative", *Empirical Models for Biblical Criticism* (ed. J.H. TIGAY) (Philadelphia 1985) 176-196, ad pp. 185-192, Ch. LEVIN, "Dina: Wenn die Schrift wider sich selbst lautet", in his: *Fortschreibungen* (BZAW 316; Berlin 2003) 49-59.

<sup>(15)</sup> Cf. A. ROFÉ, "Clan Sagas As a Source in Settlement Traditions", "A Wise and Discerning Mind". Essays in Honor of B.O. Long (eds. S.M. OLYAN – R.C. CULLEY) (Brown Judaic Studies 325; Providence, RI 2000) 391-203.

<sup>(16)</sup> Cf. also Y. AMIT, "Implicit Redaction and Latent Polemic in the Story of the Rape of Dinah" (Hebrew), *Texts, Temples and Traditions. A Tribute to M. Haran* (Winona Lake, IN 1996) 11\*-28\*; W.TH. IN DER SMITTEN, "Genesis 34 – Ausdruck der Volksmeinung", *BiOr* 30 (1973) 7-9; N. WYATT, "The Story of Dinah and Shechem", *UF* 22 (1990) 433-458.

<sup>(17)</sup> Cf. J. KUGEL, "The Story of Dinah in the Testament of Levi", *HTR* 85 (1992) 1-34.

peculiar diction. In the first place, let us recall the marks of priestly style. Kuenen, again, pointed out the following items<sup>(18)</sup>: נָשִׂיא (v. 2), נִיפ. (v. 10), חָמוֹל כָּל זָכָר (v. 15.22), שָׁמַע אֵל (v. 17.24), גְּמֻלִים (v. 22), בְּהִמּוּדָה, קִנְיָן, מִקְנֵה, קִנְיָן, בְּהִמּוּדָה (v. 23), בִּזּוּ (v. 27); typical of P, moreover, is the fondness for detailing which sounds superfluous — “Dinah the daughter of Leah whom she bore to Jacob” (v. 1), see also the itemizing in vv. 28-29. Even the scholars that deny the recent composition of P must recognize that its impact on other works makes its first appearance in rather late compositions.

In addition, there are some clues as to late Biblical Hebrew. Dinah is repeatedly designated as a נַעֲרָה (vv. 3, twice. 12), but once she is called הַיְלִידָה (v. 4). This seems to be a semantic blunder from the pen of an author that aimed at writing classical Hebrew: יָלֵד means ‘a child’ in classical Biblical Hebrew, but in the late books it can mean ‘young man’; so in Qoh 4,13 and Dan 1,4.10.13.15.17<sup>(19)</sup>. The same semantic shift occurred with a kindred noun: תִּינוּקָה in Rabbinical Hebrew ‘a suckling’, but in time it acquired the meaning of ‘boy’, ‘girl’; even a married young woman could be called תִּינוּקָה in Hebrew, as well as נִיּוּקָה in Aramaic<sup>(20)</sup>.

The verb נִיפ. (nif.), ‘to agree’, appears three times in our chapter (vv. 15.22.23). In the Bible, it appears only once more (2 Kgs 12,9). On the other hand, this verb is common in post-biblical literature: the Damascus Document (20,7) and the Mishnah (passim)<sup>(21)</sup>. These sparse indicia would not alone be enough to date the Dinah story in the postexilic age, but they conveniently join the argument from the history of Biblical law that submits evidence to the same effect.

The Dinah episode, a clan saga at first, was transformed into a paradigmatic narrative that conveys a message about intermarriage between the sons of Jacob and their neighbours<sup>(22)</sup>. This paradigm has two poles, a positive one and a negative one. At the positive pole, stand the children of Jacob who avenge the offence inflicted upon them. They foreshadow the Israelites of future generations, even those of the writer’s times. Shechem and the Hivvites, the inhabitants of the land, belong to the negative pole. They want to convert, accepting Jacob’s law, but for improper reasons: for sheer utility, as they covet the comely Dinah, and in addition, the belongings of the

<sup>(18)</sup> Cf. KUENEN, “Dina”, 269-270.

<sup>(19)</sup> *Yēladim* appear in the story of Rēhab’am consultations, 1 Kgs 12,1.3b-16. In my opinion, this is a late exemplum, aiming at defending the wisdom of elderly people; cf. for the time being: A. ROFÉ, ‘Revealed Wisdom: From the Bible to Qumran’, *Sapiential Perspectives. Wisdom Literature in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (eds. J.J. COLLINS ET AL.) (STDJ 51; Leiden 2004) 1-11, at pp. 7-8.

<sup>(20)</sup> Thus in b.BB 3b a Rabbinical legend makes use of this term in defining Miriam the Hasmonean, Herod’s wife.

<sup>(21)</sup> The verb is cognate to the Arabic ‘ata ‘to agree’; cf. W. GESENIUS, *Hebräisches und chaldäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament* (Leipzig 1828) s.v. אָהַר; P. WECHTER, *Ibn Barun’s Arabic Works on Hebrew Grammar and Lexicography* (Philadelphia 1964) 94; L. KOEHLER – W. BAUMGARTNER, *The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the OT* (Leiden 1994) I, 26.

<sup>(22)</sup> For a similar message in a paradigmatic narrative, cf. A. ROFÉ, “An Enquiry into the Betrothal of Rebekah, *Die Hebräische Bibel und ihre zweifache Nachgeschichte*. Fs. für R. Rendtorff (Neukirchen 1990) 27-39; ID., “The Vineyard of Naboth: The Origin and Message of the Story”, *VT* 38 (1988) 89-104.

Jacobites (v. 23). Whom do they represent? Most plausibly — the inhabitants of Shechem in the writer's time. If he could, he would have brought upon them the destiny of Shechem ben Hamor! Fortunately for them (and for him) he had not the power to do so, and besides, the Persian authorities would not have permitted it.

Questions remain unsolved and new ones arise. If this presentation is correct, how can it be that Genesis 34 has been included in the Samaritan Pentateuch and faithfully translated in their Targum<sup>(23)</sup>? How could these sources have accepted such a piece of anti-Samaritan polemic<sup>(24)</sup>? Two concomitant explanations may answer this query. First, one has to take into account the attribution of the Torah to Moses, a concept already dominant by the end of Persian period. This idea not only lent an aureole of sanctity to the entire Pentateuch, but also hindered the easy identification of personalities from ancient times with present ones; Shechem the Hivvite is a contemporary of Jacob, nothing more and nothing less. In addition, the perception that the Hivvites of Shechem are but an allonym for the Samaritans rests on the acceptance of the story about their foreign extraction as told in 2 Kgs 17,24-33 (cf Ezra 4,2). The Samaritans, however, denied the veracity of those stories and traced their origin to the Josephite tribes and to Levi. They could not, therefore, see the relevance of the Dinah story to their own situation.

The story of Dinah, a clan saga from ancient (pre-monarchic?) times, was reshaped as a paradigmatic narrative which conveyed an up-to-date message to the people of the post-exilic stage. In this, it joins a number of other stories, embedded in the Pentateuch and the Former Prophets, whose time of composition and ideas have, for too long, remained unrecognized<sup>(25)</sup>. The present essay, I hope, has contributed to the understanding of this class of narratives.

Department of Bible, Humanities  
The Hebrew University  
91905 Jerusalem

Alexander ROFÉ

<sup>(23)</sup> Cf. A. TAL, *The Samaritan Targum of the Pentateuch. A Critical Edition, Part I: Genesis and Exodus* (Tel Aviv 1980) 138-142.

<sup>(24)</sup> The question has been discussed by M. MOR, "Theodotos, the Epos of Shechem and the Samaritans: A New Interpretation" (Hebrew), *The Jews in the Hellenistic-Roman World. Studies in Memory of M. Stern* (ed. I.M. GAFNI ET AL.) (Jerusalem 1996) 345-359.

<sup>(25)</sup> In addition to the references in n. 22, cf. A. ROFÉ, "The Battle of David and Goliath: Folklore, Theology, Eschatology", *Judaic Perspectives on Ancient Israel* (ed. J. NEUSNER ET AL.) (Philadelphia 1987) 117-151; R. GOLDSTEIN, "Joshua 22:9-34: A Priestly Narrative from the Second Temple Period", *Shnaton* 13 (2002) 43-81 (Hebrew), viii-ix (English Abstract).

## SUMMARY

Seduction or rape of a virgin in the Biblical milieu did not signify her being defiled. The Hebrew verb *ʔimmeʾ* (to defile) applied to married or betrothed women only. The case of Dinah is an exception. In Genesis 34, it is stated three times that Jacob's daughter was defiled by Shechem (vv. 5.13.27). A plausible explanation of this state of affairs is that Genesis 34 reflects the late, postexilic notion that the idolatrous gentiles are impure which implies the prohibition of intermarriage and intercourse with them (Ezra 9, 11-12). The concept of the impurity of idolaters persisted in post-biblical literature. Thus, the assertion that Dinah was defiled by Shechem betrays a late date of composition in respect of this story. This confirms Kuenen's hypothesis that Genesis 34 in its present form is a late chapter, containing an anti-Samaritan polemic which originated in the Restoration Community of the Fifth-Fourth centuries BCE.



## On the Meaning of משי in Habakkuk 3,14a

Many commentators considered Hab 3,14

נקבת במשיו ראש פרוו יסערו להפיצני / עליצתם כמו לאכל עני במסתר  
incomprehensible. Some provided an interpretation for the first colon but found the following three lines impossibly corrupt. For instance Albright says, "I do not venture to translate this line, whose obvious meaning can scarcely be correct" <sup>(1)</sup>. Each word in the three lines is reasonably known, yet a literal rendering of the MT did not appear to yield an acceptable meaning in the context of the theophany. Hiebert summarized the situation thus, "The remainder of v. 14 [following the first three words] is the lengthiest textual puzzle of the chapter. The next four words of the MT are understood very differently by the Old Greek, and differently still by Barberini. And the final four words of the MT, though confirmed by the Old Greek and Barberini, are hard to understand in the context. The disparity among the versions at this point in the poem indicates an ancient disruption in the text, which may no longer be possible to correct. All that can be done until more information comes to light is to point out the nature of the difficulties and make some suggestions about avenues along which a solution might lie" <sup>(2)</sup>. Recently Andersen observed, "This verse is largely unintelligible, and the second part is best left untranslated" <sup>(3)</sup>.

Hiebert's assessment implies that the meaning of the first three words, and the first colon that they form, are known. The following sample of interpretations illustrates how far is Hiebert's statement from being true. We find for נקבת במשיו ראש פרוו

- Septuagint: διέκοψας ἐν ἐκστάσει κεφαλὰς δυναστῶν  
(Thou didst cut asunder the heads of princes with amazement)
- Targum: בועתא ימא בחוטריה דמשה וגבריה רישי משרית פרעה  
(You cleft the sea by Moses' rod, and the mighty men, the captains of Pharaoh's army)
- Peshitta: Thou didst break with his own staves the heads of his princes
- Vulgate: maledixisti sceptris eius capiti bellatorum  
(Thou hast cursed his sceptres, the head of his warriors)
- Haak: You pierce by his shafts the head of his warriors <sup>(4)</sup>.
- Albright: Thou didst pierce <his> head in the fight, while his followers (?) <sup>(5)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> W.F. ALBRIGHT, "The Psalm of Habakkuk", *Studies in Old Testament Prophecy* (ed. H.H. ROWLEY) (Edinburgh 1950) 17.

<sup>(2)</sup> T. HIEBERT, *God of My Victory*. The Ancient Hymn in Habakkuk 3 (HSM 38; Atlanta 1986) 43.

<sup>(3)</sup> F.I. ANDERSEN, *Habakkuk* (AB 25; New York 2001) 338.

<sup>(4)</sup> R.D. HAAK, *Habakkuk* (VT.S 44; Leiden 1992) 93.

<sup>(5)</sup> ALBRIGHT, "The Psalm of Habakkuk", 13.

- Hiebert: You pierced with your shafts his head (?)<sup>(6)</sup>.  
 Irwin: His carcass the north (wind) swept away<sup>(7)</sup>.  
 Margulis: Thou didst pierce head(s) with Thy (spear-)shafts Thy weapons (?)<sup>(8)</sup>.  
 Roberts: You pierced his head with your shafts. [His followers ...]<sup>(9)</sup>.

This sample of interpretations shows some agreement with respect to the first three words נִקְבַּת בַּמַּשִּׁי רֹאשׁ in the sense that something harmful is done to the head of an enemy, though there is considerable difference regarding the specifics. The purpose of this note is to suggest a minor emendation of בַּמַּשִּׁי that might, perhaps, provide a rational setting for interpreting this verse. To this end I will discuss each of the four words seriatim and then combine the likely individual meanings.

\*  
\* \*

נִקְבַּת, the Qal perfect 2nd masculine of נִקַּב, is usually understood as “you perforated, pierced, separated, cursed”. The Septuagint translates נִקְבַּת as “you cut”, Targum as “you split or cleft”, Peshitta as “you didst break”, and Vulgate as “cursed”. Barberini’s translation “you avenged”, apparently reflects the reading נִקְמַת, stemming from a confusion between ב and מ in his *Vorlage*. Ibn Ezra understands נִקַּב as “the opposite of salvation”, in a sense akin to Barberini’s translation. Japheth takes נִקְבַּת as meaning “specified”; i.e., in the process of casting lots God has specified each tribe’s portion<sup>(10)</sup>. However, it is very doubtful that the verse refers to this historical event. It is quite clear from the context that God’s battling with His enemies is the theme rather than the division of the land to the Israelites. Metzudot says that נִקְבַּת is מִלְשׁוֹן נִקַּב וְחֹרֶר, “of the sense of ‘perforation’ and ‘hole’”. Similarly, Hiebert feels that “The action of Yahweh piercing his enemy is appropriate in this context. In a number of other descriptions of the vanquishing of the dragon, it is pierced (חָלַל) by Yahweh (Ps 89,11; Job 26,13; Isa 51,9). In Job 40 נִקַּב itself is used of the piercing of Behemoth’s nose (v. 24) and Leviathan’s jaw (v. 26)”<sup>(11)</sup>. Most commentators understand Hab 3,14a as depicting a battle scene. In such context נִקְבַּת would reasonably describe the action of the attacker or the consequence of his aggressive act. It seems reasonable to assume that here נִקְבַּת means “you pierced”<sup>(12)</sup>.

בַּמַּשִּׁי is usually understood as “his מַשִּׁי”. The masculine noun (plural) מַשִּׁי, occurring also in Hab 3,9, means “branches, rods, staffs, scepters, spears,

<sup>(6)</sup> HIEBERT, *God of My Victory*, 9.

<sup>(7)</sup> W.I. IRWIN, “The Psalm of Habakkuk”, *JNES* 1 (1942) 30, 32. Irwin makes the emendations: עֲלֵיתָהּ => עֲלֵיתָם, הַצִּפּוֹן => לְהַפְיֵנִי, דָּמוּ => כְּמוֹ, פָּנֵרוֹ => פָּרֵזוֹ.

<sup>(8)</sup> B. MARGULIS, “The Psalm of Habakkuk: A Reconstruction and Interpretation”, *ZAW* 82 (1970) 427.

<sup>(9)</sup> J.J.M. ROBERTS, *Nahum, Habakkuk, and Zephaniah* (Louisville 1991) 145.

<sup>(10)</sup> O. LIVNEH-KAFRI, “Sepher Habakkuk (Prakim 1, 3) Beperusho shel Ha-Parshan Ha-Karai Japheth Ben ‘Ali Ha-Levi Ha-Bazri”, *Sfimoth* 6 (1993) 110.

<sup>(11)</sup> HIEBERT, *God of My Victory*, 41.

<sup>(12)</sup> S. MANDELKERN, *Veteris Testamenti Concordantiae Hebraicae atque Chaldaicae* (Lipsiae 1896) 1061. Mandelkern’s quote for Hab 3,14 רֹאשׁ בַּמַּשִּׁי פָּרֵזוֹ seems to be an error.

tribes". Gesenius suggests that here (and in Hab 3,9) מִשֶּׁה is a soldier's spear<sup>(13)</sup>. The meaning "scepter or staff" for מִשֶּׁה is supported by the customary usage of the term in Akkadian, Ugaritic, and Hebrew, where the term occurs usually in the singular and must be understood as "a mace or scepter"<sup>(14)</sup>.

The Septuagint translates בְּמִשְׁתִּי as "with amazement"<sup>(15)</sup>. The Targum understands בְּמִשְׁתִּי as referring specifically to Moses' rod, with which he split the sea. Since Moses used a single rod, the Targum probably reads בְּמִשְׁתִּי, as the poetic equivalent of בְּמִשְׁתִּי, "his rod". The Peshitta takes בְּמִשְׁתִּי as "with his own staves". Thus, in its view, multiple rods are inferred and they belong to the enemy, not God. Barberini translates "with your power", probably paraphrasing the MT.

Mowinckel believed that the meaning "arrow" for מִשֶּׁה was (semasiologically) entirely possible<sup>(16)</sup>. Hiebert finds support for such a sense in Ugaritic where מִשֶּׁה meaning "arrow" occurs twice. Once מִשֶּׁה is used by 'El to shoot down a bird (CTA 23|52|.37.40.44.47) and another time it occurs in the plural, *mṣm* as part of 'Anat's weaponry (CTA 3|nt|.2.15-16)"<sup>(17)</sup>. Yet, the meaning "arrow" for מִשֶּׁה is not attested in the Hebrew Bible. Moreover, in verse 12 God is described treading the earth. This means that He descended from the chariot, and that was usually done to engage in hand-to-hand combat. In these circumstances, the standard military *modus operandi* of that time excluded use of arrows. A more reasonable weapon would be a spear/lance, the standard weapon of the chariot's driver.

Albright says, "I am convinced that the word *maṭu* (or the like) here [Hab 3,9] and v. 14 [Hab 3,14] has nothing to do with *maṭṭeh*, 'rod, staff' (never 'shaft') but is identical with South-Arabic *mṭw*, 'war, campaign, fight', or the like, used synonymously with words derived from the stem *ṣb*, 'to fight', *hrb*, (Arabic 'fight' and Hebrew 'sword'), and *ḏb*, (Ethiopian *ḏb*, 'to fight', Hebrew *ṣābā*, 'army', and Akkadian *ṣābū*, 'warrior, man')"<sup>(18)</sup>. This sense for מִשֶּׁה is not attested in the Hebrew Bible nor was it adopted by biblical scholarship.

There is wide disagreement about the suffix attached to מִשְׁתִּי. MT has a ך making it mean "his מִשֶּׁה", a reading that is supported by the Vulgate, Peshitta and Targum. MT would imply that God turned back the enemy's weapons

<sup>(13)</sup> H.W.F. GESENIUS, *Gesenius' Hebrew-Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament* (Grand Rapids 1996) 467.

<sup>(14)</sup> Y. YADIN, *The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, in light of archeological discovery* (London 1963) 11. The ancient warrior used the mace for smashing heads in hand-to-hand combat. The mace consisted of a short wooden handle at the end of which was fastened a stone or a shaped lump of metal. Development of personal armor and helmets obviated the utility of this weapon and it disappeared from the battlefield.

<sup>(15)</sup> HIEBERT, *God of My Victory*, 41. In his attempt to understand the Septuagint's translation, Hiebert suggests the following possibilities: 1) בְּמִשְׁתִּי, "in stretching out", taking מִשֶּׁה as the Hiphil participle of מִשָּׁה, "to stretch out", and considering ἐκστᾶσαι to be an inner Greek corruption of ἐκτάσαι, "extension"; or, 2) בְּמִשְׁתִּי / בְּמִשְׁתִּי, taking מִשֶּׁה as the Qal participle of מִשָּׁה, "totter", or מִשָּׁה as the noun "shaking". He concludes that none of these possibilities is preferable to the MT.

<sup>(16)</sup> S. MOWINCKEL, "Zum Psalm des Habakuk", *ThZ* 9 (1953) 15f.

<sup>(17)</sup> HIEBERT, *God of My Victory*, 28. Anath is described as chasing away marauders with *mṣm* and the back of the bow: *mṣm tgrš šbm bksl qšth mdnt*.

<sup>(18)</sup> ALBRIGHT, "The Psalm of Habakkuk", 11, 15.

against themselves; a reversal not attested in other passages where God conquers the sea monster (Isa 27,1; Job 26,12-13; Ps 74,13). The major difficulty with the MT מַטֵּי is its 3<sup>rd</sup> person, which is out of place in a strophe that is otherwise in 2<sup>nd</sup> person. Many commentators opt to read with Barberini “your shafts”. The BHS suggests the reading בַּמַּטֵּיךָ<sup>(19)</sup> or בַּמַּטֵּיךָ and mentions that the reading בַּמַּטֵּי has been proposed. Of these emendations, based on the evolution of the Hebrew script, the reading בַּמַּטֵּי appears to be the more attractive. This emendation is also in agreement with the singular ראש and God’s use of His own weapons. However, it must be noted that in the preceding verse the weapon used to smash the head has not been indicated, and that a shaft or rod would be an overly primitive weapon for use by God when He has in His possession a חֲנִית<sup>(20)</sup>. Further, a shaft can not be used for piercing heads. Marduk used a similar weapon (*miṭtu*) in *Enuma elish* to crush Tiamat’s head. I therefore tend to consider מַטֵּי a scribal error, in which the letters יו were transposed giving an original מַטֵּי “spun(s) of”. This emendation will be discussed later in detail.

ראש means “head, top, commencement”. Most commentators take the term ראש literally, “human head”. However, Ibn Ezra takes ראש as the singular “the leader”, and more recently O’Connor suggested that it might be preferable to understand it here and in the preceding verse as “chief, leader”<sup>(21)</sup>. It seems to me that understanding ראש in such a sense would diminish the magnitude of God’s destructive power in the theophany, since usually the number of chiefs or leaders is relatively small.

The versions differ on whether ראש should be understood as singular or plural. The MT and Vulgate read it as singular, but the Septuagint, Targum, Peshitta and Barberini as plural. If the singular is assumed, then to make the plural מַטֵּי plausible it must be something light as “arrows”, which has already been deemed unlikely. Many commentators who accept the singular feel that the context requires emending ראש to ראשו or ראשי<sup>(22)</sup>. Kimchi, Abarbanel and Metzudot, understand ראש as the plural “heads”. Rashi apparently takes the same position, identifying the defeated enemy in this verse as Sennacherib and his cohorts. I do not see any problem with understanding ראש as the plural “heads”. It can be justified as a case of *pars pro toto*, or that it stems from an understanding ראש as being in construct with a plural noun פְּרָו. The context of close-quarters combat suggests taking ראש as referring to the “head” of a human body.

With respect to aggressive acts aimed at a human head the HB uses the following verbs: כרת (2 Sam 20,22; 1 Sam 17,51; 31,9), נכה (Jonah 4,8), מִחַץ (Hab 3,13; Ps 68,22; 110,6; Jud 5,26), מָחַק (Jud 5,26), נָשָׂא (Gen 40,13.19), סֹרַר (1 Sam 17,46; 2 Sam 1,10; 16,9), and נָקַב (Hab 3,14). If decapitation is excluded then מִחַץ appears as the most frequent verb associated with assault

<sup>(19)</sup> A.M. HABERMAN, “פרק ג’ של ספר חבקוק לפי נוסח ה’ גניזה”, *Beth Mikra* 26 (1981) 107. The Genizah text supports this reading.

<sup>(20)</sup> Note that in 1 Sam 14,27 the קֶצֶה הַמַּטֵּה is the wooden shaft of the חֲנִית. Jonathan used it because the sharp metallic part was soiled by use in battle.

<sup>(21)</sup> M. O’CONNOR, *Hebrew Verse Structure* (Winona Lake 1980) 238. Tanhum also reads פְּרָו and translates “the leaders in charge of the cities”. See H. SHY, *Tanhum Ha-Yerushalmi’s Commentary on the Minor Prophets* (Jerusalem 1991) 236.

<sup>(22)</sup> HABERMAN, “פרק ג’ של ספר חבקוק לפי נוסח ה’ גניזה”, 107. The Genizah text has ראשו.

on the head. Indeed, this verb aptly describes the employment of the mace or battle-axe in frontal clashes, as Habakkuk does in the preceding verse. Use of נִקֵּב in our verse points to a new unique battle situation in which God comes so close to the back of the retreating/fleeing enemy that He can thrust a lance or spear accurately at his nape.

פָּרוּ appears as derived from the unused root פָּרַו, which means “to separate”. פָּרוֹן occurs in the sense of “rule, dominion” (Jud 5,7.11), פָּרוֹת in the sense of “country, villages” (Ezek 38,11; Es 9,19; Zech 2,8), and פָּרוּ in the sense of “villager” (Deut 3,5; 1 Sam 6,18). The meaning of פָּרוּ in the context of the verse here continues to be problematic. Most versions and many manuscripts read פָּרוּ as a plural noun. However, the MT kethib allows also entertaining the singular sense. Nogalski considers the MT a *hapax legomenon* from an uncertain root<sup>(23)</sup>.

The Septuagint translates פָּרוּ as “princes” and so does the Peshitta. This reading has support in the Arabic cognate *farz*, “distinguished”. However, the Septuagint translates the root פָּרוּ differently each time it occurs in the MT. This could mean that the root פָּרוּ has multiple meanings, or that the Septuagint is relying on the context rather than an understanding of the word. It is also possible that the Septuagint translated from a text that differed from the MT and had רֹנִים instead of פָּרוּ. Barberini’s ἀμαρτωλῶν, “the sinners”, may either represent a different *Vorlage*, or it may be a guess at פָּרוּ influenced by the רָשָׁע in the preceding verse. Margolis noted Aquila’s rendering of פָּרוּ by ἀμαρτωλός in Ezek 18,10 and suggested that the text here was originally פָּרוּ<sup>(24)</sup>. This interpretation (and Barberini’s) would simply repeat the first colon of 3,13b.

The Targumist, continuing his allusion to Exodus, understands פָּרוּ as “Pharaoh’s soldiers or warriors” and similarly the Vulgate takes it as “his warriors”. The evidence from the versions and Arabic parallels has led Gruenthaner<sup>(25)</sup> and later Driver<sup>(26)</sup> (apparently independently) to conclude that פָּרוּ refers to some kind of “warrior”. This interpretation of פָּרוּ has been followed by many. Haak notes that most commentators distinguish between the meaning “warrior” and the meaning “villager”. In his view, “It is not clear, however, that these terms must be separated since villagers commonly were used as warriors in the ancient Near East”<sup>(27)</sup>.

Albright translates פָּרוּ as “his followers”. He says, “The meaning of the word is doubtful, but in the light of the expressions פָּרוֹנוֹ, פָּרוֹי, etc., it would seem most reasonable to render it as ‘country folk, serfs’, hence ‘retainers’”<sup>(28)</sup>. Margulis emends פָּרוּ into פָּרוּיָד, similarly to the emendation of

<sup>(23)</sup> J. NOGALSKI, *Redactional Processes in the Book of the Twelve* (BZAW 218; Berlin 1993) 44.

<sup>(24)</sup> M.L. MARGOLIS, “The Character of the Anonymous Greek Version of Habakkuk, Chapter 3”, *Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper* (eds. R.F. HARPER – F. BROWN – G.F. MOORE) (Chicago 1908) 142.

<sup>(25)</sup> M.J. GRUENTHANER, “Chaldeans or Macedonians? A Recent Theory on the Prophecy of Habakkuk”, *Bib* 8 (1927) 278.

<sup>(26)</sup> G.R. DRIVER, “Linguistic and Textual Problems: Minor Prophets. III”, *JThS* 39 (1938) 397.

<sup>(27)</sup> HAAK, *Habakkuk*, 100.

<sup>(28)</sup> ALBRIGHT, “The Psalm of Habakkuk”, 17.

into במַרְוֹ, which has been adopted by most modern commentators. He suggests an etymological connection between מַרְוֹ, מַרְוֹל, and מַרְוֹן, concluding that מַרְוֹ may mean “weapons (?)”<sup>(29)</sup>. This etymology is questionable and the derived meaning for מַרְוֹ contextually untenable. Japheth, interprets the phrase מַרְוֹ “fortified cities with walls”<sup>(30)</sup>. Hiebert accepts מַרְוֹ in its usual Hebrew sense, “villages/out of the way places”, or a form of the verb מַרְוֹ “to scatter” in place of מַרְוֹ, a reading which could have been lost from simple metathesis. He adds, “In any event, this term should not be taken in construct with ראש as all of the versions do. V. 14a represents a complete poetic line concluding with ראש. The addition of another word would overload the line”<sup>(31)</sup>. Such metrical arguments do not have much weight in a verse that is so metrically unbalanced. Ward translates מַרְוֹ as “the oppressor”, but does not provide a rationale<sup>(32)</sup>.

Most commentators understand מַרְוֹ as referring to some kind of “warrior”. Other Biblical derivatives of the root מַרְוֹ contain the sense “spreading”<sup>(33)</sup>. This would indicate that the warriors considered are those that tend to spread out. Spreading out is also typical of the operation of light cavalry in antiquity. Once the main body of the enemy’s army was shattered and small elements started to flee, it was the responsibility of the light cavalry to chase and eliminate them. Could מַרְוֹ mean “his horsemen”? Mandelkern notes the possibility that מַרְוֹ indeed means “his horsemen”<sup>(34)</sup>. Both מַרְוֹ and מַרְשֵׁ have a sense of spreading, are to a significant degree homophones, and have even been combined into one word מַרְשֵׁ (Job 26,9)<sup>(35)</sup>. It appears that the Septuagint has sensed a nuance of “horsemen” in מַרְוֹ translating מַרְוֹ as “they shall tremble in it; they shall burst their bridles” (σείσθησιν ἐν αὐτῇ διανοίξουσιν χαλινούς αὐτῶν). Furthermore, God’s horses tread Babylon in the following verse, lending credibility to an image of pursuit in this verse. Moreover, by taking the meaning “horsemen” a thematic link is formed with the attack by Chaldean horsemen, described in 1,7-9 as a frightening and devastating event. The Chaldean horsemen that led the attack on Judah are now, in the theophany, subject to a chase by God. A just tit-for-tat is meted out. It seems therefore that מַרְוֹ should be understood as the unit of cavalry used for dispersal of enemy’s infantry, and subsequent chase and elimination of fugitives.

<sup>(29)</sup> B. MARGULIS, “The Psalm of Habakkuk: A Reconstruction and Interpretation”, ZAW 82 (1970) 427.

<sup>(30)</sup> LIVNEH-KAFRI, “Sepher Habakkuk”, 111.

<sup>(31)</sup> HIEBERT, *God of My Victory*, 44.

<sup>(32)</sup> J.M. SMITH – W.H. WARD – J.A. BEWER, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Micah, Zephaniah, Nahum, Habakuk, Obadiah and Joel* (Edinburgh 1985) 27.

<sup>(33)</sup> HIEBERT, *God of My Victory*, 44.

<sup>(34)</sup> MANDELKERN, *Veteris Testamenti Concordantiae*, 970. Mowinckel says that for מַרְשֵׁ “the meaning ‘horse’ [horsespan] is the right one in the overwhelming number of passages and probably in all of them” (S. MOWINCKEL, “Drive and/or Ride in O.T.”, VT 12 [1962] 290). Perhaps, this is the reason for using מַרְוֹ for cavalry.

<sup>(35)</sup> Indeed, all the roots obtained from the bi-radical מַרְ by addition of another letter contain the sense of “spreading”: מַרְא, מַרְב, מַרְח, מַרְש, מַרְך, מַרְע, מַרְס, מַרְפ, מַרְץ, מַרְק, מַרְר.



\*  
\* \*

This synopsis of some of the scholarship associated with Hab 3,14a illustrate the difficulties that the 'easy' part of the verse posed. I tentatively understand Hab 3,14 as describing the retribution to the Chaldeans who have overwhelmed Judah in a cavalry attack, enjoying the chase and the loot, a scene so vividly described in 1,8-17<sup>(36)</sup>. Consequently, I prefer here for פרוו "horsemen". I suggest emending במטוי into במטוי (construct state), "into the spun", referring to the locks and braids at the back of the head or to the scaled extension of the hat at the back<sup>(37)</sup>. An association between God's attack on His enemies and the hair of the head is indicated in Ps 68,22 אֶךְ-אֱלֹהִים יִמְחֶץ רֹאשׁ אֹיְבָיו קִדְקֵד שֶׁעַר מִתְהַלֵּךְ בְּאֲשָׁמוֹ ("God will smash the head of His enemies, the hairy crown of him that walks about in his guilt"). Similarly, in Deut 32,42 God seems to hit at the long hair at the back of an enemy, אֲשַׁכִּיר חֲצֵי מַדְם וְחֲרָבִי תֹאכַל בָּשָׂר מַדְם חֲלָל וְשִׁבְיָה מִרֹאשׁ פְּרָעוֹת אֹיִב ("I will make My arrows drunk with blood, As My sword devours flesh, blood of the slain and the captive, from the long-haired enemy chiefs"). The goddess Anath threatens her father El with grabbing his locks with her hands and pulling out the hair of his head<sup>(38)</sup>.

Babylonian and Assyrian men curled their hair with irons. A drawing of an Assyrian cavalryman in a relief from the palace of Sargon (721-705 BCE), depicts what was apparently the typical hairstyle of such warriors<sup>(39)</sup>. Since Babylon was for a long time part of the Assyrian Empire it can be assumed that similar hair-dos were practiced by its military. The incident in which Absalom's hair got caught by the tangled branches of a terebinth (2 Sam 18,9) indicates that the long hairstyle was fashionable among the nations of the Near-East, though not the Isarelite. Fishbane observes that the kings of Assyria used to heavily oil their hair, letting their hair grow well over their shoulders, and making their ends very curly<sup>(40)</sup>.

It seems that hair had some magical meaning for the Assyrian. Some Assyrian documents mention a person complaining that he was bewitched by a magician who stole his hair<sup>(41)</sup>. Samson's head full of hair was not only a

<sup>(36)</sup> D. MARKL, "Hab 3 in intertextueller und kontextueller Sicht", *Bib* 85 (2004) 106, n. 44. Intertextuality leads Markl to the observation, "The links of catchwords from Hab 3,14 to Hab 1,8.15-16 allow to conclude, that here in the first line an external enemy is meant (contra Huwylér)". Cf. B. HUWYLER, "Habakuk und seine Psalmen", *Prophetie und Psalmen* (FS K. Seybold) (eds. B. HUWYLER – H.-P. MATHYS – B. WEBER) (AOAT 280; Münster 2001) 256.

<sup>(37)</sup> This interpretation fits well with reconstructions of the previous verse that read עֲרוֹת קִדְקֵד עַד צִוָּאֵךְ "you revealed the back of the head to the neck" (MARGOLIS, "The Character of the Anonymous Greek Version of Habakkuk, Chapter 3", 426). See also Y. KAUFMANN, *Toldot Ha-emunah Ha-Israelit* (Jerusalem 1969) VI-VII, 307. He suggests that עֲרוֹת refers to smashing and revealing the head which was covered with a hat made of metal (helmet).

<sup>(38)</sup> U. CASSUTO, *The Goddess Anath* (Jerusalem 1965) 71-72. Anath says: "I will hold your curls in my right hand, your locks with great strength of my hand, I will pull the hair from the crown of your head".

<sup>(39)</sup> YADIN, *The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands*, 457. Picture of the original relief is on page 416. Note that in the figure the hair of the horse's tail are controlled.

<sup>(40)</sup> M. FISHBANE, "שֶׁעַר", *Encyclopaedia Biblica* (Jerusalem 1982) VIII, 329.

<sup>(41)</sup> Ibid.



symbol but also the actual source of his power and strength, which he lost when it was cut off by the Philistines. Biblical evidence regarding the **נזיר** (“Nazirite, or consecrated”) seems to indicate that some ‘holiness’ was attached to long hair (Num 6,18). Some commentators found in this an explanation for the tendency among warriors to grow their hair long (Deut 32,42; Jud 5,2). Hair symbolized not only strength (Jud 6, 17. 22) and virility but also devotion to a goal. Fishbane raises the possibility of people believing that pleated or bound hair in some magic way tie a person to his vow<sup>(42)</sup>.

With regard to the hair-do itself it should be noted that the long hair in the back must have been controlled in some way. Freely flowing long hair could obviously impede a cavalryman’s fast movement and handicap a warrior’s orientation. The stylized hair-do, in the various reliefs that have been unearthed, indeed suggests that the mane of hair in the back of the head was braided or curled into locks, or woven into one. A closely knitted mass of hair would obviously provide for the neck some protection from the sun and arrows. The Assyrian pointed (or conical) helmet had also neck protection<sup>(43)</sup>. Yadin observes “The most vulnerable part of the soldier in battle was his head. And so the search for protection by means of some form of helmet goes back to early times. ... The only improvements in the Eastern helmet were the armored neckband, which protected the gap between the original helmet and the coat of mail, a collar made of scales”<sup>(44)</sup>. It is not inconceivable that this collar made of scales appeared as if spun.

The suggested minor emendation **במשי** => **במשי** (a transposition of two very similar letters) can be readily understood as resulting from a scribe’s subconscious harmonization with the form of the following **פרווי**, **משי**, which occurs only once in the Hebrew Bible (Exod 35,25), appears to mean there “what had been spun” and the root **סיה** is applied to various materials, including hair (Exod 35,26)<sup>(45)</sup>. Though the form **משי** (construct state) does not occur in the Hebrew Bible, similar forms do occur: **מאוי** (Ps 140,9) and **מדוי** (Deut 7,15). Making the suggested emendation obviates the need for changing **ראש** into a plural, since **במשי ראש** would mean “into the spun(s) of the head” = “into the spun of each of the heads”. Finally, the meaning of **משי** “what had been spun” would very well fit the context of the verse here. It may refer to the braids at the back of the head, the locks of hair, or the armored neckband attached to the helmet, a collar made of scales. Each of these is in the warrior’s back where he is most vulnerable — and there he is pierced. Since a warrior would not normally expose his vulnerable side to an enemy, it must be assumed that he has been defeated and is fleeing.

\*  
\* \*

Obviously, even a reasonable interpretation of Hab 3,14a would remain inconclusive without some contextual links to the verse and the text in which

<sup>(42)</sup> FISHBANE, “שער”, 331-332.

<sup>(43)</sup> D.J. WISEMAN, “The Assyrians”, *Warfare in the Ancient World* (ed. J. HACKETT) (New York 1989) 45.

<sup>(44)</sup> YADIN, *The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands*, 15.

<sup>(45)</sup> In Akkadian *tāmû* (*tāvû*) means “spin”. The Arabic **طوى** means “fold, wind”.

it is embedded. It would be futile to even attempt here an analysis of the plethora of interpretations that have been offered for Hab 3,14. Since the focus of this paper is Hab 3,14a, I will only describe the contextual framework, without going into the details of supporting evidence. It seems that in Hab 3,14 God is back on His chariot (see v. 15), the enemy is fleeing on horseback (פרו) and exposing his back to Him, who pierces the enemy's head at the back, perhaps by throwing the javelin, or piercing with a spear/lance<sup>(46)</sup>. These very horsemen, who have so much enjoyed the chase and the loot when they attacked Judah, are now the fugitives. God is chasing now these horsemen, piercing the braids (מטוי) at the back of their head<sup>(47)</sup>. I suggest emending the first colon according to scheme <=> נקבת במוי ראש פרו <=> נקבת במשׁוֹי <=> ראש פרו where נקבת במשׁוֹי <=> ראש פרו means "You pierced at the spun(s) of the head of his (fleeing) horsemen".

As to the remainder of the verse, יסערו עליושׁתם כמו לאכל עני במסחר, the first two words (יסערו להפיצי) seem to refer to the arrival of the Chaldeans in 1,6-11, where they pass by "as the wind". The first two colons thus express a tit-for-tat situation. Those Chaldeans who passed as a storm trying to scatter the defenders are now being scattered in pursuit by the Lord. Thus, יסערו would mean, "who came as a storm"<sup>(48)</sup>. The prophet uses the singular להפיצי because he wants to express his intimate relation with his people in which "I" and "them" fuse into one, it is a singular representing a nation. Perhaps it refers to both scattering of the defenders and the scattering of the exiled in the Babylonian Empire<sup>(49)</sup>.

The arrival of an enemy normally caused the populace to scatter and hide

<sup>(46)</sup> ANDERSEN, *Habakkuk*, 313. Andersen translates "Their hair didst thou scatter in the wind", but does not provide any explanation.

<sup>(47)</sup> YADIN, *The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands*, 402-403. The equipment of the gods has been conceived as that of the heroic warriors, and so was the case for God in poetic creations. The standard weaponry of a chariot was the bow and the driver's spear. It is conceivable that each of the crew had a personal weapon such as an axe, mace, sword, etc. God, as the single rider of the chariot uses the bow (v. 11), and implicitly a mace (v. 13) and spear (v. 14).

<sup>(48)</sup> יסערו, the Qal imperfect 3<sup>rd</sup> masculine (plural) of סעד, means "they violently shake (Jonah 1,11), toss (Isa 54,11), scatter or disperse (Zech 7,14; Hos 13,3), or rush in". Most of the versions read יסערו as a verb, either as the imperfect plural or the participle, and understand it as the activity (shaking, storming) of God's enemies. The Septuagint translates יסערו as "they shall tremble in it". Both the Targum and the Vulgate understand יסערו as "rushing in as a whirlwind". The Peshitta and Barberini, however, read יסערו as "those who trust", confusing the ס with the ט. Perhaps לאכל of the last colon played some role in the confusion, since סעד means "support, sustain, stay", and the sense "sustain" can be accomplished through eating (Gen 18,5) (MARGOLIS, "The Character of the Anonymous Greek Version of Habakkuk, Chapter 3", 142). Ibn Ezra translates יסערו "they move". BHS suggests the reading יסערו followed by כמץ (kammōs) "as chaff", which is obtained from כמו. Note that ו and ז are similar in the paleoscript. Margolis (p. 427) injects באש (b'ēš) after יסערו, explaining the loss in the MT as a haplography resulting from the homoioteleutonic באש – ראש (ב and ר being virtually identical in the paleoscript).

<sup>(49)</sup> להפיצי is either the Hiphil infinitive of פיצ, "to scatter", or of שפץ, "to shatter". Both meanings may have been intended. The Septuagint appears to separate להפיצי into לה + a form of פצה, translating "at it, they shall burst". The reading "they shall burst (their bridles)", may have been influenced by the mention of horses in verse 15 and perhaps a nuance of "horsemen" in פרו. The Targum appears to translate להפיצי as "you drowned them", the Peshitta and Barberini omit the word altogether and the Vulgate takes it to be "to disperse me".

in the surrounding difficult to access areas as mountains and caves (Jer 4,29; Nah 3,18). Enemy cavalry foraged for these escapees and their caches of food, wine, oil, and cattle. Naturally, the enemy was exultant when after an arduous search they found the poor folks in hiding. This appears to be the context of the second hemistich. While the verse as a whole presents a clear and powerful image in this context, the reconciliation of the MT with this image is somewhat more problematic. The second hemistich says something to the effect “Their glee (עליצתם)<sup>(50)</sup> is killing the poor (or my people)<sup>(51)</sup> in hiding, or the derisive Their glee — as when killing the poor (or my people) in hiding”. Unfortunately, the standard meaning of כמו לאכל “as to eat” and metaphorically “as to kill”, do not fit the presumed sense. Already the versions struggled with the phrase כמו לאכל. The Septuagint adds “they shall be”, changes the order of לאכל and עני, and reads אכל instead of לאכל. The resulting translation is “they shall be as a poor man devouring in secret”. The Peshitta and Barberini omit כמו<sup>(52)</sup>. Perhaps, במסתר לאכל עני was a coined phrase, or Habakkuk is using this phrase as an oblique reference to Ps 10,9 and from there to the following verses 10,11-14, which recall Habakkuk’s basic complaint, to which the theophany is a full response.

I make the following minimal emendation, יסערו / ראש פרו, / נקבת במס<ו>ראש פרו, / עליצתם כמו “לאכל עני במסתר” reading “You pierced into the spun of the head of his horsemen, who stormed to disperse me, their glee — as ‘to devour (kill) afflicted (my people) in hiding’”.

Thus, while the specific original is not clear, that much seems implied: The Lord will in the theophany pierce the napes of the fleeing Babylonians, who have previously so perversely enjoyed hunting down the afflicted Judeans.

11519 Monticello Ave  
Silver Spring MD 20902

Aron PINKER

<sup>(50)</sup> The feminine noun (suffixed) עליצתם means “their exaltation or joy”. This word occurs only here. It seems to be a derivative from the root עלץ, which means “to exult, to rejoice, to be joyful”. The Septuagint translates עליצתם as “their bridles”, probably reading מצלתם (cf. Zech 14,20). The Targum appears to translate עליצתם as “because they oppressed and enslaved” (ושעבדו על דרחיקו), perhaps reading אליצתם (Jud 16,6). The Peshitta understands עליצתם as “in their savagery” and the Vulgate “their exultation”. Barberini takes עליצתם as “in their own self-will”, probably reading על עצתם “on their burning”).

<sup>(51)</sup> עני may be a stand-in for עמו (Ps 149,4). Such an emendation can be justified by the similarity between ם and ן in the paleoscript and the Targum version.

<sup>(52)</sup> H. SHY, *Tanhum Ha-Yerushalmi’s Commentary*, 236. Tanhum says, “there is no need in כמו”. Eaton notes that the section יסערו ... כמו “offers perhaps the hardest problem of the whole chapter, and hope of a scientific solution has almost been abandoned. In particular the construction ‘their exultation (was) as though to eat’ is very unconvincing, and ‘to scatter me’ is also strange. ...I suggest that, following Driver’s elucidation of עליצתם (see Note 52), a solution is now in sight. Following this noun we require a verb; כמו suggests the root כמח ‘to crave’ (Ps 63,2 || צמא), a meaning which will fit well. Either the (consonantal) form may be explained as due to syncope, כמו (kāmu) standing for the 3<sup>rd</sup> plural perfect Qal כממו, though there is no exact parallel for this form” (J.H. EATON, “The Origin and Meaning of Habakkuk 3”, ZAW 76 (1964) 155-156). Kaufmann suggests the emendation עליצת לבמו “their heart’s delight” (*Toldot Ha-emunah Ha-Israelit*, 307-308). However, לבמו is not attested elsewhere in the Bible, though it is a possible poetic form. Moreover, while כ and ב are similar in the square script and ל and ך are very different in both the paleoscript and the square script, making this attractive reading unacceptable.

## SUMMARY

In Hab 3,14a the minimal emendation of במשיו “with his staffs” into במשו “into the spun of” is suggested. Hab 3,14 is perceived as describing God on His chariot chasing the enemy’s fleeing horsemen, piercing the spun or braids at the back of their head. These horsemen have previously much enjoyed the chase and the loot when they attacked Judah.

## **“Returning” to the Hospitality of the Lord A Reconsideration of Psalm 23,5-6**

How would the ancient Israelites have made sense of the metaphorical language about God as host in Ps 23,5-6? In this article, we demonstrate that Ps 23,5-6 should be read in light of the ancient custom of hospitality. In addition, we argue that English translations of Ps 23,6 should follow the Masoretic Text and read “I shall return to the house of the Lord” as opposed to the more traditional, “I shall dwell in the house of the Lord”<sup>(1)</sup>, which appears to be based upon the Septuagint’s rendering of the text.

### *1. Ps 23 and the Problems with Ps 23,5-6*

Ps 23 has prompted a variety of scholarly conversations. We will mention three. First, scholars have classified Ps 23 as a variety of forms. For instance, Ps 23 has been labeled a psalm of confidence or trust<sup>(2)</sup>, a psalm of thanksgiving<sup>(3)</sup>, and a royal psalm<sup>(4)</sup>. Second, the structure of Ps 23 has been debated repeatedly. One of the primary questions has been: Does the “shepherd” metaphor control only a portion of Ps 23, or does it control the whole of Ps 23? As a result, scholars have argued that the “shepherd” metaphor dominates vv. 1-2<sup>(5)</sup>, 1-3<sup>(6)</sup>, 1-4<sup>(7)</sup>, or all of 1-6<sup>(8)</sup>.

Finally, scholars have expressed diverse opinions about the original setting of Ps 23, which are generally supported using the imagery found in Ps 23,5-6. For instance, it has been argued that Ps 23,5-6 alludes to a liturgical, thanksgiving setting, which included a sacrificial banquet and which provides

<sup>(1)</sup> See e.g., the KJV, NKJ, NAS, NIV, NRSV, and NJB translations of Psalm 23,6.

<sup>(2)</sup> E.g., H. GUNKEL, *Introduction to Psalms*. The Genres of the Religious Lyric of Israel (Macon, GA 1998) 121, 191; D.N. FREEDMAN, “The Twenty-Third Psalm”, *Michigan Oriental Studies in honor of George G. Cameron* (ed. L.L. ORLIN) (Ann Arbor 1976) 139; A. DEISSLER, *Die Psalmen* (Düsseldorf 1984) 96; P.D. MILLER, Jr., *Interpreting the Psalms* (Philadelphia 1986) 112; and E.S. GERSTENBERGER, *Psalms*. Part 1 with an Introduction to Cultic Poetry (FOTL 14; Grand Rapids 1988) 113-115.

<sup>(3)</sup> E.g., S. MOWINCKEL, *The Psalms in Israel’s Worship* (Nashville 1979) I, 125-126; E.A. LESLIE, *The Psalms*. Translated and Interpreted in the Light of Hebrew Life and Worship (New York 1949) 232; H-J. KRAUS, *Psalms 1-59*. A Commentary (Minneapolis 1988) 306; and K. SEYBOLD, *Die Psalmen* (HAT I/15; Tübingen 1996) 101.

<sup>(4)</sup> E.g., J.L. MAYS, *Psalms* (Int; Louisville 1994) 117.

<sup>(5)</sup> C.A. BRIGGS – E.G. BRIGGS, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Psalms* (Edinburgh 1906) 207; and M.E. TATE, “Psalms”, *Mercer Commentary on the Bible* (ed. W.E. MILLS – R.F. WILSON) (Macon, GA 1995) 454.

<sup>(6)</sup> E. VOGT, “The ‘Place in Life’ of Ps 23”, *Bib* 34 (1953) 195-196.

<sup>(7)</sup> P.C. CRAIGIE, *Psalms 1-50* (WBC 19; Waco 1983) 205; and J.L. CRENSHAW, *The Psalms*. An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI 2001) 61.

<sup>(8)</sup> E.g., J. MORGENSTERN, “Psalm 23”, *JBL* 65 (1946) 15-18; L. KÖHLER, “Psalm 23”, *ZAW* 68 (1956) 227-234; MAYS, *Psalms*, 116; and J.C. MCCANN, Jr. “The Book of Psalms: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections”, *The New Interpreter’s Bible* 4 (Nashville 1996) 767.

the proper angle of vision for the entire psalm<sup>(9)</sup>. Others have argued against a worship context and instead believe Ps 23,5-6 reflects the perspective of an individual pious Jew<sup>(10)</sup>. Still others contend that the psalm is drawing upon Exodus imagery in order to illuminate either the historical contexts of pilgrimages to Jerusalem<sup>(11)</sup> or Israel's return from exile<sup>(12)</sup>.

Despite the validity of such questions about the original, historical, or liturgical contexts of Ps 23,5-6, we prefer to postpone conversations about the *Sitz im Leben* until after we have fully explored the imagery of the text itself. In part, we are suggesting that scholars should first seek to understand the metaphor of God as host in Ps 23,5-6 on its own terms before proceeding to questions about the original context. Recently scholars have begun to ascribe more significance to the metaphor of God as host in Ps 23,5-6 and, in some cases, have also begun to recognize the link between the metaphor of God as host and the ancient Israelite custom of hospitality<sup>(13)</sup>. Yet, this link has not been fully explicated.

## 2. The Custom of Hospitality in Ancient Israel

Unlike modern "hospitality" which may well be extended to one's neighbors, the ancient Israelite custom of hospitality revolved around the kind treatment of strangers or travelers. In particular, both the worship of the Lord and societal norms created the expectation that faithful Israelites should supply passersby with both provisions and protection<sup>(14)</sup>. Furthermore, following the expected protocol, the hosts and guests often forged long-term, reciprocal relationships in which both parties presumed the other's assistance whenever they were in their counterpart's region (e.g., Josh 2,1-21; 9,6.11.15.18-21; Judg 4,17; 2 Kgs 4,8-10.25-31).

Quite appropriately, Abraham's extension of gracious hospitality to the three messengers of the Lord in Gen 18,1-33 becomes the paradigm for ancient Israelite, Jewish, and early Christian hospitality<sup>(15)</sup>. Abraham not only greeted his guests with honor as he bowed down before them, but he also provided them with an elaborate feast and an opportunity to rest from their travels. Moreover, the elaborate feast that Abraham and Sarah prepared included large portions of bread, a prepared calf, curds, and milk. Finally, in the later traditions about Abraham's hospitality, writers not only emphasize

<sup>(9)</sup> E.g., VOGT, "The 'Place in Life' of Ps 23", 195-211; and CRAIGIE, *Psalms 1-50*, 207-208; and MAYS, *Psalms*, 118.

<sup>(10)</sup> MORGENSTERN, "Psalm 23", 19-24; and KRAUS, *Psalms 1-59*, 306.

<sup>(11)</sup> FREEDMAN, "The Twenty-Third Psalm", 139, 147; C.C. BROYLES, *Psalms* (NIBCOT 11; Peabody, MA 1999) 123-125; and H. SCHMIDT, *Die Psalmen* (Tübingen 1934) 40.

<sup>(12)</sup> P.A. MILNE, "Psalm 23: Echoes of the Exodus", *SR* 4/3 (1974-1975) 246; and M.S. SMITH, "Setting and Rhetoric in Psalm 23", *JSOT* 41 (1988) 61-66.

<sup>(13)</sup> K. SCHAEFER, *Psalms* (Berit Olam; Collegeville, MN 2001) 58, 149; and CRENSHAW, *Psalms*, 62.

<sup>(14)</sup> J. KOENIG, "Hospitality", *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (ed. D.N. FREEDMAN) (New York 1992) III, 299.

<sup>(15)</sup> KOENIG, "Hospitality", 300. See also, A.E. ARTERBURY, "Abraham's Hospitality among Jewish and Early Christian Writers: A Tradition History of Genesis 18:1-16 and Its Relevance for the Study of the New Testament", *PRSt* 30/3 (2003) 359-376.

the extravagance of Abraham’s table, but they also emphasize Abraham’s decision to run eagerly out of his tent in order to convince the passersby and travelers to come into his home<sup>(16)</sup>.

Beyond Abraham, hospitality was often held up as a prized virtue in the ancient Israelite and later Jewish societies in general. The Hebrew Scriptures describe a variety of hosts who extend hospitality to strangers or travelers in an exemplary fashion. For instance, Lot extends hospitality to Yahweh’s messengers by bowing down before them and pleading with them twice to turn aside into his house. While doing so, he shelters, feeds, and protects his guests (Gen 19,1-3, cf. *1 Clem.* 11.1). Laban ratifies a hospitality relationship with Abraham’s traveling servant when he runs out to greet him and invites the stranger into his house. Consequently, Laban feeds his guest’s camels, supplies his guest with water so he can wash his feet, and feeds his guest (Gen 24,10-61). Similarly, Joseph extends hospitality to his brothers, even though they do not yet recognize him. Joseph has them brought into his house, gives them water for washing their feet, and provides them with food and drink at his table (Gen 43,16-34).

Rahab provides shelter, bedding, and protection to the Israelite spies in return for her own future protection (Josh 2,1-21; cf. Heb 11,31; Jas 2,25; *1 Clem.* 12.1-3). Jael, as part of an ongoing hospitality alliance, extends hospitality to Sisera. Jael goes out to meet him and beseeches him to enter her tent. Once inside, she provides him with milk, covers him with a blanket, and vows to protect him from his pursuers (Judg 4,17-22; 5,24-30). In addition, the old Ephraimite extends hospitality to the Levite and his concubine in Judg 19,15-28. The Ephraimite brings them into his house, feeds their donkeys, allows them to wash their feet, provides them with food and drink, and protects the Levite<sup>(17)</sup>.

When Samuel welcomes Saul as a guest, he feeds Saul a special portion of food, allows Saul to sleep overnight on his roof, and the next morning escorts his guest to the edge of the city (1 Sam. 9,18-27). The widow of Zarephath feeds Elijah for many days by means of a miraculous supply of flour and oil. In the meantime, she allows Elijah to lodge in her upper room (1 Kgs 17,8-16). Similarly, a Shunammite woman hosts Elisha whenever he travels to the region of Shunem. As a result, the Shunammite woman builds a guest room specifically for Elisha (2 Kgs 4,8-36). In addition, Job faithfully opens his doors to travelers and strangers (Job 31,32; cf. *T. Job* 10.1-3; 25.5; 53.3), and the Deuteronomist informs us that Yahweh provides food and clothes for strangers (Deut 10,18).

Other clear references to hospitality in the Hebrew Scriptures include Nathan’s famous parable in which he describes how an unscrupulous host provides for his guest (2 Sam 12,4), and the commands in the Torah that

<sup>(16)</sup> For later descriptions of Abraham’s hospitality see Philo, *Abr.* 107-118; Josephus, *Ant.* 1.196-198; *T. Ab.* 1.1-8; *1 Clem.* 10.7; m. Sot 10b; *Abot. R. Nat.* 7.2; and *Gen Rab* 43.7; 49.4.

<sup>(17)</sup> See, S. LASINE, “Guest and Host in Judges 19: Lot’s Hospitality in an Inverted World”, *JSOT* 29 (1984) 37-59. Lasine argues that the Ephraimite’s hospitality as depicted in Judg 19,16-28 actually represents a perverted form of this custom. Most scandalously, the old Ephraimite fails to protect his guest’s concubine.



direct the Hebraic people to love and protect the stranger (Lev 19,33-34; Deut 10,18-19). Outside of the Hebrew Scriptures, hospitality continued to be upheld as a meritorious, Jewish custom up through the first century CE (e.g., Tob 5,1-22; 6,11-10,11; Wis 19,14-17; *T. Zeb.* 6.4; and Josephus, *Ant.* 1.246-255. Cf. Sir 29,22-27), afterward in the Mishnah (Pea 1.1) and the Talmud (b.Ber 63b; b.Shab 127a; b.Qid 39b), and even later in GenR 38,23<sup>(18)</sup>.

The larger Mediterranean world also valued the custom of hospitality. First, we see references to the custom of hospitality among the non-Israelite peoples of the ancient Near East. For instance, in the Egyptian "Story of Sinuhe" (c. 1800 BCE), Sinuhe claims that he made all travelers stop over at this house and gave them water (94-97)<sup>(19)</sup>. Likewise, in the teachings of the Egyptian Amen-em-ope (c. 1250-1000 BCE), a host is promised financial reward when he or she gives "the stranger olive oil" from his or her jar (26.9-14)<sup>(20)</sup>. Similarly, the Ugaritic story of Aqhat (c. 1500-1250 BCE) narrates the arrival of the divine metalworker, Kothar-wa-hasis (A.v.5-31)<sup>(21)</sup>. When Danel sees Kothar-wa-hasis coming in the distance, he instructs his wife to prepare a lamb for Kothar-wa-hasis. As a result of his hospitable actions, Danel is rewarded. Second, hospitality was a developed custom among the Greek civilizations as evidenced by the writings of Homer. For instance, it has been estimated that there are eighteen scenes in Homer's writings that demonstrate his view of hospitality<sup>(22)</sup>.

Third, we continue to see hospitality lifted up as a prized custom among the early Christians as well (e.g., Heb 13,2; 1 Tim 3,2; Hermas, *Mand.* 8.10, *1 Clem.* 10.7; 11.1; 12.3)<sup>(23)</sup>. Again, we see the standard elements of food (e.g., Luke 10,40; Acts 16,34; *Gos. Thom.* 14, 61, 64; *Acts Pil.* 14.2; 15.3-4; 16.4) and lodging (e.g., Acts 10,6.23; *Acts Pil.* 15.3). In addition, Jesus criticizes his host for not kissing him, anointing his head, or providing him with water so he could wash his feet (Luke 7,44-46). Finally, the hosts often

<sup>(18)</sup> J. KOENIG, *New Testament Hospitality: Partnership with Strangers as Promise and Mission* (Philadelphia 1985) 16, 46.

<sup>(19)</sup> M. LICHTHEIM, *Ancient Egyptian Literature* (Berkeley 1973) I, 222-223. See also, J.B. PRITCHARD, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton 1955) 18, 20; and A.F. RAINEY, "The world of Sinuhe", *Israel Oriental Studies II* (ed. Richard Walzer) (Tel Aviv 1972) 372. Rainey comments on the nomadic culture of the Levant during the 20<sup>th</sup> century BCE.

<sup>(20)</sup> V.H. MATTHEWS – D.C. BENJAMIN, *Old Testament Parallels. Laws and Stories from the Ancient Near East* (New York 1997) 274, 282. For a discussion of the care of the Egyptian gods for the poor, oppressed, and vulnerable in Egyptian society see H.C. WASHINGTON, *Wealth and Poverty in the Instruction of Amenemope and the Hebrew Proverbs* (SBLDS 142; Atlanta 1994), 107.

<sup>(21)</sup> MATTHEWS – BENJAMIN, *Old Testament Parallels*, 66-68. See also, P. CRAIGIE, *Ugarit and the Old Testament* (Grand Rapids 1983) 58-61; N. WYATT, *Religious Texts from Ugarit* (London 2003) 246-312; and P. XELLA, "L'épisode de Dnîl et Kothar (KTU 1.17 = CTA 17 v 1-31) et Gen. xviii 1-16", *VT* 28 (1978) 483-488.

<sup>(22)</sup> S. REECE, *The Stranger's Welcome. Oral Theory and the Aesthetics of the Homeric Hospitality Scene* (Ann Arbor 1993) 6.

<sup>(23)</sup> J.B. MATTHEWS, "Hospitality and the New Testament Church: An Historical and Exegetical Study" (Th.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary 1964) 168. See also, H. RUSCHE, "Gastfreundschaft und Mission in Apostelgeschichte und Apostelbriefen", *ZMR* 41/4 (1957) 250-268; and A.J. MALHERBE, *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (Philadelphia 1983) 101.

escorted their guests to their next destination (e.g., Acts 17,14-15; 21,5.16; *Acts Pil.* 14.3; 15.4), supplied them with provisions for their journey (e.g., Acts 28,10; *Gos. Thom.* 88; *Acts Pil.* 14.3), and sent them on in peace (*Acts Pil.* 14.3).

To sum up, we can see that hospitality was a well known and virtually universal custom in antiquity<sup>(24)</sup>. Furthermore, we can detect a variety of recurring elements that are present in the ancient Israelite expression of hospitality and that are also important for our reading of Ps 23,5-6. These features include: the host often sees the travelers from a distance and runs out to offer hospitality to them<sup>(25)</sup>; hospitality appears to be ratified when the guest is brought into the host's dwelling<sup>(26)</sup>; the host always provides food, which is often more extravagant than originally promised<sup>(27)</sup>, and may provide lodging<sup>(28)</sup>; the host protects the guests during their stay from abuse by the host's fellow citizens and/or the guests' enemies<sup>(29)</sup>; the guest generally stays for a short period of time<sup>(30)</sup>; and once the relationship is established, it is assumed that the guest can return at any point in the future and receive a hospitable reception<sup>(31)</sup>.

### 3. Hospitality in Ps 23,5-6

In this article, we are contending that the metaphor of God as host in Ps 23,5-6 drew upon the common Israelite custom of hospitality. The metaphor of God as host would have likely evoked a picture of this custom in the minds of the hearers that was as vivid as the metaphor of God as shepherd (Ps 23,1-4). In fact, each line of Ps 23,5-6 correlates with standard Israelite hospitality and can therefore be understood without first theorizing about an original, historical or liturgical life setting for the psalm<sup>(32)</sup>.

a) Ps 23,5a – “You prepare a table before me in the presence of my enemies”

This phrase alludes to the two most prominent components of hospitality. As we have seen, hosts were expected to provide food for their guests at their table, and they were expected to protect their guests from enemies. Regardless

<sup>(24)</sup> For a more complete definition of hospitality in ancient Israelite, Greco-Roman, and early Christian contexts see A.E. ARTERBURY, *Entertaining Angels*. Early Christian Hospitality in its Mediterranean Setting (Sheffield - forthcoming).

<sup>(25)</sup> Gen 18,2; 19,1 and 24,29.

<sup>(26)</sup> Gen 19,3; 24,29; 43,17; Josh 2,1 and Judg 19,21.

<sup>(27)</sup> Gen 18,5-7; 19,3; 24,33; 43,34; Judg 19,6.21; 1 Sam 9,24; 10,4; 2 Sam 12,4; 1 Kgs 17,13-16; 2 Kgs 4,8. Cf Tob 7,9; Josephus, *Ant.* 1.252 and Philo, *Abr.* 108.

<sup>(28)</sup> Gen 19,2; 24,25; Josh 2,8; Judg 19,4; 19,21; 1 Sam 9,25; 2 Kgs 4,10. Cf Tob 6,11 and *Jos. Asen.* 21.1.

<sup>(29)</sup> Gen 19,7-8; Josh 2,4; Judg 9,18 and 19,23. Cf Judg 4,17-22 and Jer 14,8.

<sup>(30)</sup> Gen 18,1-33 and 1 Sam 9,19.26.

<sup>(31)</sup> Judg 4,17 and 2 Kgs 4,8-36.

<sup>(32)</sup> Since ancient hospitality was expressed in dynamic relationships between hosts and guests we have not applied R. Alter's notion of “literary type-scenes” to these texts. It is not surprising to see some variation in the way ancient authors narrated hospitality encounters. See R. ALTER, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (New York 1981) 47-62.

of whether Ps 23 is a psalm of trust or thanksgiving, any ancient Israelite who could either anticipate or recall the traveler's vulnerable position could have claimed these words as his or her own. Anyone who had heard the stories about the vulnerable positions of Yahweh's messengers in Gen 19, the Israelite spies in Josh 2, Sisera in Judg 4, or the Levite and his concubine in Judg 19 would have had a strong warrant for needing to express either trust in or thankfulness for the Lord's protection. The words in Ps 23,5-6 are the type of words that a hopeful or thankful guest would use when reflecting upon the upright hospitality of God, who either will feed or has fed the guest and will protect or has protected the guest from danger<sup>(33)</sup>.

b) Ps 23,5b – “you anoint my head with oil”

While this phrase does not have a direct parallel to the hospitality scenes that we cited in the Hebrew Scriptures, we can easily envision ancient Israelite hosts providing their guests with olive oil for the refreshing of sun baked skin<sup>(34)</sup>. We did, however, observe the Egyptian Amen-em-ope referring to the giving of olive oil to the stranger. Moreover, within a context of Jewish hospitality, Jesus criticizes his Pharisaic host for not anointing his head with oil (Luke 7,46). Hence, it is logical to conclude that in Ps 23,5b we see a picture of God as host anointing and refreshing the well-traveled psalmist<sup>(35)</sup>.

c) Ps 23,5c – “my cup overflows”.

The overflowing cup or the abundant cup appears to be a commentary on the extravagance of God's provisions for guests. As noted above, the host often provides more extravagant provisions than either the host promised (Gen 18,5-8) or the guest requested (Gen 24,17-20 and Judg 4,19). In addition, the host often provides the best provisions for the guest (1 Sam 9,23)<sup>(36)</sup>. In Ps 23,5b, just like Abraham's feast or the widow of Zarephath's miraculous supply of food for Elijah, the Lord is described as providing the psalmist with more provisions and superior provisions than the psalmist actually needs. The Lord, as a host, has vast resources upon which to draw.

d) Ps 23,6a – “Surely goodness and mercy shall pursue me all the days of my life”;

Here, the psalmist's words certainly provide an ironic contrast. Rather than enemies pursuing the traveler, goodness and mercy will now do so<sup>(37)</sup>. Yet, perhaps there is also a vivid comparison in this phrase. We have repeatedly seen good and faithful hosts pursuing their potential guests in the hospitality encounters we have examined. Many of the model hosts in the Hebrew Scriptures do not simply wait to offer hospitality to the traveler once the traveler has requested assistance. Instead, these role models run out to stop

<sup>(33)</sup> F.L. HOSSFELD – E. ZENGER, *Die Psalmen* (Würzburg 1993) 155.

<sup>(34)</sup> CRENSHAW, *Psalms*, 62.

<sup>(35)</sup> DEISSLER, *Die Psalmen*, 98. Deissler describes v. 5b as a temple meal in which God acts as host and anoints one's head with oil.

<sup>(36)</sup> V.H. MATTHEWS, “Hospitality and Hostility in Judges 4”, *BTB* 21 (1991) 15.

<sup>(37)</sup> CRENSHAW, *Psalms*, 62.

the passersby and convince them to accept hospitality in their home. For example, Abraham sees his guests from a distance and runs out to meet them (Gen 18,2-5). Even though Lot’s guests first decline his offer, he strongly urges them to enter his tent (Gen 19,1-3). Laban runs out to greet Abraham’s servant, who becomes his guest (Gen 24,29). Jael encourages Sisera to turn aside into her tent (Judg 4,18), and the Shunammite woman persuades Elisha to eat in her home (2 Kgs 4,8).

This proactive approach to hospitality is noticeably embellished in both Philo’s and *The Testament of Abraham*’s reflections on Abraham’s hospitality. Philo says Abraham ran out of his house and begged the strangers who were passing by his home to stay with him because he was so eager to extend hospitality to them (Philo, *Abr.* 107). “For in a wise man’s house no one is slow in showing kindness; but women and men, slaves and free, are full of zeal to do service to their guests (ξενιζομένων)” (Philo, *Abr.* 109; LCL). In *The Testament of Abraham*, the author tells us that Abraham pitched his tent at the crossroads of the oak of Mamre so that he could “welcome everyone who passed by — rich and poor, kings and rulers, the crippled and the helpless, friends and strangers, neighbors and passersby” (*T. Abr.* 1.1-2). In a similar manner, Job is also portrayed as being highly proactive in his extension of hospitality to strangers. According to later tradition, Job was so determined to be prepared for any traveler who might pass by that he kept thirty tables spread at all times. These tables were to be used exclusively by strangers (*T. Job* 10.1-3, cf. 25.5 and 53.3). In addition, given this emphasis on hosts taking the initiative with potential guests in both the Hebrew Scriptures and in later Jewish literature, it is not surprising that Paul directs the Roman Christians to pursue (διώκοντες)<sup>(38)</sup> hospitality as a manifestation of love in Rom 12,13b. These proactive stances toward hospitality suggest that the ideal host for both ancient Israel and for later Judaism should go out seeking strangers to be his or her guest rather than simply waiting for strangers to approach him or her.

Thus, Ps 23 not only contrasts the psalmist’s enemies with goodness and mercy, but the psalm also personifies goodness and mercy in the form of the ideal host of the Hebrew Scriptures. Saying that goodness and mercy pursue the psalmist is not very different from saying that righteous hosts like Abraham, will pursue the psalmist for the rest of his or her days.

e) Ps 23,6b – “and I will return to the house of the Lord the length of my days”.

First, it is somewhat puzzling that most interpreters do not translate the verb (שׁוּב) as “return” in Ps 23,6. Instead, they opt for the more traditional rendering of “dwell” (שָׁב), even when they acknowledge that “return” (שׁוּב) is the literal reading of the text<sup>(39)</sup>. Others wrestle with this problem when they

<sup>(38)</sup> This is the same root word that is found in Psalm 23,6 LXX.

<sup>(39)</sup> E.g., NAS; CRAIGIE, *Psalms*, 204; W.O.E. OESTERLEY, *The Psalms* (London 1962) 183; and KRAUS, *Psalms 1-59*, 304. Craigie contends that “and I shall return in the house of the Lord” is the literal reading. Similarly Kraus acknowledges that the MT reads, “and I come back”, which would “refer to a vow of pilgrimage”. Yet, Kraus says the Septuagint and Jerome’s translation of “and I dwell” is the better translation.

claim that the psalmist vows to “return” to “dwell” in the temple<sup>(40)</sup>. Yet, clearly “return” (שׁוּב) provides a more literal English translation<sup>(41)</sup>.

Alternatively, translating (שׁוּב) as “return” not only serves as the more literal translation of the Masoretic Text, but this translation also fits the context of hospitality far better than “dwell” does. Seldom does a traveling guest take up residence with his or her host even though Elijah’s stay in 1 Kgs 17,8-16 was lengthy. Rather, once a long-term relationship has been established, the guests return to their host’s house and hospitality whenever they are in the region again. This pattern of returning to the host’s home is the pattern we see between Elisha and the woman of Shunem (2 Kgs 4,10-36) and between Sisera and Heber the Kenite (Judg 4). A similar pattern can be seen in the New Testament when Paul tells Philemon, his former host, to get the guest room ready (Phlm 1,22). In addition, the return of the guests to their former host’s home at a later time is quite pronounced in the Greco-Roman world (e.g., Xenophon of Ephesus, *An Ephesian Tale*, 158-59 and 166). As a result, the translation of (שׁוּב) as “to return” is to be preferred both because it is the more literal translation and because it fits better with the metaphor of hospitality that is being employed in Ps 23,5-6.

#### 4. *Ps 23 as a Whole*

When one takes the language and imagery of Ps 23 as a whole, one is struck by the transitory nature of these images. On the one hand, vv. 1-4 describe the lengths to which the Lord as a good shepherd goes to guide the sheep while they are moving about from one location to another. On the other hand, vv. 5-6 describe the extent to which the Lord is committed to hosting the travelers who are outside of their home region. Hence, both sections revolve around the idea of the Lord’s comfort for a people who are on the move, who are on a journey.

Furthermore, if we move beyond the attempt simply to read this psalm as an independent psalm and seek to read it in a canonical context, then one must acknowledge that the language and images in Ps 23,5-6 could easily have had additional significance for those who participated in the worship of ancient Israel. In particular, the phrase, “the house of the Lord”, apparently alludes to the temple on other occasions in the Psalter (e.g., Ps 27,4-6).

As a result, when we return to the question of the *Sitz im Leben* or the context in which this psalm was most often read/heard among the ancient Israelites, we do not believe that the language of Ps 23 is specific enough to afford us a definitive answer. In fact, since the metaphors of the Lord as shepherd and the Lord as host are so broad and readily adaptable to numerous individual and collective settings among the ancient Israelites, it may be best to envision the psalm as being read in multiple contexts<sup>(42)</sup>. Yet, given that the ancient custom of hospitality involved travelers and given that the

<sup>(40)</sup> BRIGGS – BRIGGS, *The Book of Psalms*, 207-12.

<sup>(41)</sup> BROYLES, *Psalms*, 126. Broyles provides an exception. He not only acknowledges that “to return” is the more literal reading, but he also justifies this translation by locating it in a context of pilgrimages to Jerusalem.

<sup>(42)</sup> W. H. BELLINGER, Jr., *The Psalms* (Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentaries; Macon - forthcoming).

Jerusalem temple is referred to as “the house of the Lord” on other occasions in the Psalter, our findings would support the argument that the ancient Israelites likely recited this psalm while making pilgrimages to the Jerusalem temple.

\*  
\* \*

The image of God as host in Ps 23,5-6 was understandable to the ancient hearers/readers of this psalm regardless of the form, structure, or setting in which they may have read it or with which they may have associated it. Just as the rod and the staff make complete sense within the metaphor of the Lord as a shepherd apart from any liturgical double meaning, so also the imagery in Ps 23,5-6 has an independent logic that can be located within the custom of hospitality apart from its liturgical double meaning. As interpreters of Ps 23, we should not, therefore, allow legitimate conversations about the liturgical setting to blur the metaphor in the text nor our translation of the text.

Rather, the key to interpreting Ps 23,5-6 is found in ancient Israel’s custom of hospitality. This ancient Israelite cultural expression would have most certainly provided the angle of vision from which the ancient Israelites heard or read and interpreted these verses. Finally, a grasp on the custom of hospitality not only helps us to make sense of the ideas present in Ps 23,5-6, but it also encourages us to follow the Masoretic Text more boldly and translate the text as “I shall return to the house of the Lord” as opposed to the more traditional translation of “I shall dwell in the house of the Lord”.

Baylor University  
One Bear Place # 97284  
Waco, Texas, USA 76798-7284

Andrew E. ARTERBURY  
William H. BELLINGER, JR.

## SUMMARY

The image of God as host in Ps 23,5-6 is best interpreted in light of the ancient custom of hospitality. The subsequent interpretation then emboldens us to translate Ps 23,6 more literally as “I shall return to the house of the Lord” rather than “I shall dwell in the house of the Lord”.

## These Are the Ones ... (Rev 7)

In Revelation 7,13 John inquires as to the identity of the countless multitude whom he sees. An elder responds, “These are the ones who come out of the great tribulation”. Admittedly a first reading of Revelation 7 may lead one to the conclusion that the uncountable multitude (the Great Multitude) from “every nation, all tribes, peoples, and tongues” (7,9)<sup>(1)</sup>, is in contrast with the 144,000 Jews listed in 7,4-8<sup>(2)</sup>. In this paper, however, I will examine the thematic features relating to John’s depiction of the righteous in his account of the Two Witnesses in Rev 11,3-13<sup>(3)</sup> and how these features might affect our understanding of Revelation 7,1-17<sup>(4)</sup>.

Why should the account of the Two Witnesses influence our reading of the accounts of the 144,000 and the Great Multitude? I suggest two factors strongly contend that 10,1–11,13 parallels 7,1-17. First, both sections serve functionally similar roles. That is, they are both intercalations (interludes, or parentheses) in the midst of their accompanying series of judgments<sup>(5)</sup>. In fact, in both instances these intercalations occur after the disclosing of the sixth item in each series. Furthermore, each appears closely related to that sixth item. 7,1-17 relates directly to the sixth Seal by answering the question of 6,17: “who is able to stand?” (cp. 7,9; and perhaps 7,1)<sup>(6)</sup>. The relationship of the intercalation of 10,1–11,13 and the sixth judgment is less clear. A good case, however, exists that it relates directly with the words in the closing of the sixth Trumpet, which reiterates the people’s failure to repent. Richard

(1) All translations are the author’s. John uses this expression, though varied, seven times (5,9; 7,9; 10,11; 11,9; 13,7; 14,6; 17,15). For a defense of the view that each of these expressions, though variant, intends to refer to all the nations of the world, see: R. BAUCKHAM, *Climax of Prophecy*. Studies in Revelation (Edinburgh 1993) 326-337.

(2) I might query “A first reading for whom?” That is, can we be certain that in the late first century early Christian interpretive milieu, the readers would have necessarily understood Israel in a woodenly literal manner? I hesitate to accept this suggestion due to the consistent practice of the NT, and especially the seven letters of Revelation 2–3 (cf., 2,9, 17; 3,9, 12), of applying OT Israelite language to the NT communities. Even in this text, those of the great multitude from every nation perform functions befitting Israelite priests (7,15; cp. Exod 19,6, 10, 14; Ezek 37,26-28).

(3) The account of the Two Witnesses in 11,3-13 is part of a larger unit of 10,1–11,13.

(4) In a sense, this paper builds off an assertion made by Kenneth Strand more than twenty-five years ago, when he inquired as to whether or not Revelation contained a “pattern which shows correlation(s) between sections in a first part of the book and sections in the last part” (K. STRAND, *Interpreting the Book of Revelation* [Worthington 1979] 44). The difference is that Strand wishes to compare a portion of Revelation with its chiasmic counterpart; whereas, I am viewing the portrait of the righteous as a development within a larger setting. That is, I am analyzing John’s depiction of the righteous in terms of a thematic growth and development — though due to limited space the present work is limited to only these two sections within the first half of Apocalypse.

(5) Schussler Fiorenza, comments on chapters 10–11, “they have the same structural function within Revelation as the interlude of chapter 7” (E. SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, *Revelation*. Vision of a Just World [Minneapolis 1981] 74). See also: P.E. HUGHES, *The Book of Revelation* (Pillar NT Commentaries; Grand Rapids 1990) 92.

(6) SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, *Revelation*, 65-66. HUGHES, *Revelation*, 95.



Bauckham argues convincingly that the ministry of the Two Witnesses results in the conversion of the nations (cp. 11,13)<sup>(7)</sup>.

Secondly, both of these intercalations present a delay in their respective series of judgments<sup>(8)</sup>. Thus, the intercalation of 7,1-17 suspends the series of seven seals — that resumes in 8,1 — and the intercalation of 10,1-11,13 serves to suspend the series of seven trumpets<sup>(9)</sup>. Furthermore, the focus of each these intercalations depicts the state of the righteous during that delay<sup>(10)</sup>.

### 1. A Thematic Look at the Righteous in the Two Intercalations

To begin, it is my suggestion that in John's account of the Two Witnesses (Rev 11,3-13) four key foci relating to the righteous are present<sup>(11)</sup>. These foci include: first, the righteous are accorded divine protection during the time of their witnessing. Secondly, they function as faithful witnesses<sup>(12)</sup>. Thirdly, the righteous suffer persecution, perhaps, even to the point of death, either during the time of their witnessing, or after they have completed their testimony<sup>(13)</sup>. Finally, the righteous are vindicated by God<sup>(14)</sup>.

Furthermore, an underlying thesis in this paper is that Revelation tends not only to recapitulate material, but that in doing so its general pattern is to develop and expand previous themes — oftentimes making explicit what was

<sup>(7)</sup> Cf. BAUCKHAM, *Climax*, 12, 238-337.

<sup>(8)</sup> This delay would have been enhanced in an oral enactment. It would have been especially heightened in the account of the six Seals, since the first four Seals follow one another with a measure of rapidity.

<sup>(9)</sup> Other factors include the literary links between each of the intercalations and chapter 5. 7,1-17 employs the 'hearing and seeing' motif that it makes evident in 5,5-6. 10,1-1,13 compares the 'strong angel' (5,2) with 'another strong angel' (10,1). This leads to the plausible conclusion that the open scroll, which the angel is holding in 10,2, is to be identified with the sealed scroll of chapter 5.

<sup>(10)</sup> See: BAUCKHAM, *Climax*, 12. Schussler Fiorenza adds to other parallels. Namely, that both passages refer to the same time period and that each section may be viewed as an introduction to the sections that follow (*Revelation*, 74).

<sup>(11)</sup> I do not intend to suggest that each of the four foci receives equal attention at this point or any point of the Apocalypse.

<sup>(12)</sup> On the theme of witness throughout Revelation, Vern S. Poythress notes: "Revelation is full of the theme of witness. Jesus Christ is the pre-eminent witness (1,5; 3,14; 19,11). Imitation of him may include martyrdom (12,11). Revelation itself is a witness, a testimony. It intends in turn to strengthen the testimony of its readers". (V.S. POYTHRESS, *The Returning King* [Phillipsburg, NJ 2000] 71).

<sup>(13)</sup> The question of whether some suffer during the time of the witnessing or not will not be addressed in the body of this work, since I only intend to affirm the presence of the theme that the righteous will be persecuted. To answer this question in relation to the Two Witnesses of chapter 11, for example, — where it is stated that they are not killed until they have completed their testimony — encompasses a plethora of exegetical issues. For, we would have to ascertain if the two witnesses are just that two witnesses, in which case they do not suffer death until they have completed their testimony, or whether they are representatives of a class (e.g., the church), in which case some may suffer martyrdom, though the whole will not be defeated until they have finished their testimony.

<sup>(14)</sup> To suggest that this ultimate vindication occurs at a given point in history — such as the second coming of Christ — would likewise entail unnecessary argumentation. It is not central to this thesis when the vindication occurs, but that the vindication does occur.

previously only implicit<sup>(15)</sup>. Thus, I assert that by means of this method the account of the Two Witnesses may be viewed as developing and expanding the account of the 144,000 and the Great Multitude of Rev 7.

How might this influence the determination of the identity of the two groups depicted in Revelation 7? It is my contention that the same four foci explicitly present in the account of the Two Witnesses (11,3-13) materialize in the description of the 144,000 and the Great Multitude (7,1-17) with two caveats. First, the four foci are not as explicitly present in the account of the 144,000 and the Great Multitude as it is in the account of the Two Witnesses. Secondly, when we examine Rev 7,1-8 and 7,9-17 we find that each incorporates only two of the four foci. That is, the account of the 144,000 incorporates only the first two foci, and the account of the Great Multitude the latter two. If John intends in these two intercalations to highlight the state of the righteous before, during, and after the accompanying judgments, and if these portraits are thematically parallel, then the application of all four foci to the Two Witnesses in Rev 11 may well contend for the understanding of Rev 7 as depicting one group of persons from two perspectives. For it seems strange that John would apply only two attributes to each of the groups. If all four foci are to be applied to both the 144,000 and the Great Multitude in Rev 7, then I suggest that a simpler solution would be to identify the two groups.

## 2. 11,3-13 The Two Witnesses and the Four Foci

The account of the Two Witnesses provides the clearest evidence for the presence of each of the four foci<sup>(16)</sup>. First, divine protection is accorded the Two Witnesses in 11,5. Secondly, that the two individuals in 11,3-13 are explicitly identified as the “Two Witnesses” (11,3) serves to justify the assertion that this text focuses on the witnessing activity of the righteous<sup>(17)</sup>. Thirdly, they are persecuted and eventually killed (11,7). Finally, they are vindicated in the presence of their enemies by means of their resurrection (11,11-13).

### a) Focus #1: Divine Protection<sup>(18)</sup>

Our first of the four foci relates to the divine protection of the righteous. That God divinely protects the Two Witnesses reasonably derives from

<sup>(15)</sup> Vern Poythress suggests that Revelation displays a literary growth in which early on the author “doesn’t want to give away too much”. Hendriksen claims that Revelation reveals, “a glorious unity and gradual blossoming of thought.” Later he adds, “The book reveals a gradual progress in eschatological thought” (W. HENDRIKSEN, *More than Conquerors* [Grand Rapids 1962] 33, 35). Since, however, it is well beyond the purpose of this paper to defend this assertion, I will attempt to defend it in part through the analysis below.

<sup>(16)</sup> However, it does not constitute, in accord with the literary suggestion proposed here, the most expansive passage detailing the fate of the righteous in relation to each of the foci.

<sup>(17)</sup> Again, it is not crucial to this work whether these “Two Witnesses” constitute two particular individuals, or whether they represent the church universal. The point here is that “two” righteous men are set in a context that delineates each of the four foci.

<sup>(18)</sup> I do not intend to delineate the parameters of what ‘protection’ entails: whether this be protection from physical or psychological harm, or spiritual protection.

11,5<sup>(19)</sup>. There John asserts that they have supernatural abilities to defend themselves — though only for the duration of their ministry (11,7) — against enemy attacks.

Confirmation that divine protection is in view derives from the relation with the measuring of the Temple (11,1-2) and the Two Witnesses. Though I suggest that there are valid reasons for associating the provision of protection afforded the Two Witnesses with the measuring of the temple in 11,1-2, it extends beyond the scope of this essay to demonstrate this. Nonetheless, allow me parenthetically to refer to the thoughts of G. K. Beale and G. B. Caird. First, Beale asserts that “Verses 3-6 explain the primary purpose of the ‘measuring’ in vv. 1-2. That is, God’s establishment of his presence among his end-time community as his sanctuary is aimed to ensure the effectiveness of their prophetic witness”<sup>(20)</sup>. Similarly, Caird claims that “The object of measuring the Temple was to ensure that God’s Two Witnesses should have free scope to complete their testimony without hindrance from inner doubts or outward coercion”<sup>(21)</sup>.

Thus, the point that the righteous receive divine protection appears justified. Assuming the validity of the association of measuring the temple in 11,1-2 with the Two Witnesses only solidifies this conclusion — assuming of course that, “measure the temple of God, and the altar, and those who worship in it” (11,1), connotes divine protection<sup>(22)</sup>.

#### b) Focus #2: Witnesses

God clearly establishes the Two Witnesses to proclaim the gospel. In 11,3 it states that “they will prophecy” (11,3). In addition, they receive the explicit title of “Two Witnesses” (11,3). John identifies the Two Witnesses as the “the two lampstands” (11,4). That this indicates their call to a prophetic mission receives almost unanimous acclaim<sup>(23)</sup>. One need only refer to the opening chapters of the Apocalypse itself, where John explicitly identifies the seven churches as “seven golden lampstands” (1,12), to see the use of lampstands as imagery connoting the witnessing activities of the Church. This also receives support from the use of lamp in the OT and NT, the Apocrypha, and non-biblical writings as figurative expressions for the Word of God, the message of the prophets, and the presence of God<sup>(24)</sup>.

The fact that there are two Witnesses, also supports the premise that their primary function is to bear testimony<sup>(25)</sup>. The presence of two witnesses is

<sup>(19)</sup> Schussler Fiorenza suggests that “Rev 11,5-6 metaphorically elaborates their prophetic power and protection by God” (*Revelation*, 77).

<sup>(20)</sup> G.K. BEALE, *The Book of Revelation* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids 199) 572.

<sup>(21)</sup> G.B. CAIRD, *A Commentary on the Revelation of St. John the Divine* (New York 1966) 133.

<sup>(22)</sup> Cf. L. MORRIS, *The Revelation of St. John* (TNTC; Grand Rapids 1987) 142; CAIRD, *Revelation*, 131-32; R.H. MOUNCE, *The Book of Revelation* (NICNT; Grand Rapids 1977) 219; BEALE, *Revelation*, 558-59, 570-71.

<sup>(23)</sup> This is certainly a strong reference to the Holy Spirit through the relation of lampstands and Zech 4,2-6, but this feature transcends the objectives of this work. Cf. BEALE, *Revelation*, 206-07.

<sup>(24)</sup> Cf., Zech 4,2-6; Matt 5,14-16; John 5,35; Sir 48,1; *Targ. Ps.-J.* Zech 4,7.

<sup>(25)</sup> Morris suggests that ‘the number two may stand for adequacy of testimony’ (MORRIS, *Revelation*, 143). Caird similarly suggests that “The Christian martyrs will

likely predicated upon the OT law, which required two witnesses for the establishment of any testimony against the law<sup>(26)</sup>. Therefore, the fact that there are two witnesses appears to function as a means of establishing the credibility of their legal testimony against the world. A. A. Trites suggests that "Their fire is the actual testimony which they must give in a Roman court of law"<sup>(27)</sup>.

Further attestation of their character as witnesses is the fact that they possess the ability to spew fire out of their mouths: "fire proceeds out of their mouth" (11,5). That this signifies judgment is widely acknowledged. Furthermore, that mouths represent their message appears equally justified. The use of fire proceeding from a mouth outside of the Apocalypse supports this conclusion. Jeremiah 5,14 provides a background for understanding the fire from the mouths of the Two Witnesses as representative of their message<sup>(28)</sup>. Josephus, similarly, claims that Elijah's calling down fire from Heaven served to prove he was a true prophet<sup>(29)</sup>. In fact, the ability of the Two Witnesses likely contrasts with the demonic hordes in 9,17, 18; 13,5; and 16,13<sup>(30)</sup>. The references to the mouths of demonic, or demonically empowered entities (as in 13,1-10), and the reiteration of the deceptive aims of these beings (cp. 13,14) form a stark contrast with the testimony of the Two Witnesses. Furthermore, there is likely a contrast between the mouths of the demonic beings and the sword that proceeds from Christ's mouth (1,16; 19,15, 21). That the "sharp two-edged sword" (1,16) represents His words is derived from the parallels with Heb 4,12 and 2 Thess 2,8. In the latter passage, Christ "will slay" his enemies with the "breath of his mouth". The combination of these passages and Revelation affirms that Christ defeats his enemies by His very proclamation, which the Apocalypse represents by a sharp two-edged sword.

Finally, in regards to the prophetic call of the Two Witnesses, due attention is warranted to the powers granted to them, in that they appear to embody the prophetic ministries of Moses and Elijah<sup>(31)</sup>.

Therefore, it is apparent that the Two Witnesses function as conveyers of the Gospel in accordance with the prophetic ministries of Moses and Elijah.

---

provide dual evidence necessary to sustain their case and to thwart the accuser" (MORRIS, *Revelation*, 135). Cf. J.P.M. SWEET, *Revelation* (London 1979) 184; SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, *Revelation*, 78; HUGHES, *Revelation*, 124.

<sup>(26)</sup> Cf., Num 35,30; Deut 17,6; 19,15; also, Matt 18,16; Luke 10,1-24; 1 Tim 5,19.

<sup>(27)</sup> A.A. TRITES, *The New Testament Concept of Witness* (MSSNTS 31; Cambridge 1977) 167.

<sup>(28)</sup> Jer 5,14 reads: "Because you have spoken this word, Behold, I am making My words in your mouth fire and this people wood, and it will consume them". NASB. Cp., also, Isa 11,4; 1,16; 2,12, 16; 19,15, 21. LADD, *Revelation*, 155; SWEET, *Revelation*, 185; HUGHES, *Revelation*, 124.

<sup>(29)</sup> Josephus, *Ant.* 9.23.

<sup>(30)</sup> The same phrase occurs in 9,17, 18.

<sup>(31)</sup> Cf. BEALE, *Revelation*, 582-85; J.F. WALVOORD, *The Revelation of Jesus Christ* (Chicago 1966) 180; POYTHRESS, *Returning King*, 129; WILCOCK, *Heaven Opened*, 105; MOUNCE, *Revelation*, 216; G.R. BEASLEY-MURRAY, *The Book of Revelation* (New Century Bible; Greenwood, SC 1974) 180; CAIRD, *Revelation*, 135; R.H. CHARLES, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Revelation of John* (ICC; Edinburgh 1920) 283; D.E. AUNE, *Revelation* (WBC 52a-c; Nashville 1998) 600, 603.

They are explicitly called witnesses: they are the two lampstands and the Word proceeds from their mouths.

#### c) Focus #3: Enduring Persecution

The third focus regards the persecution of the righteous. The explicit references to the martyrdom of the Two Witnesses support our thesis. John records that the beast from the abyss will “will make war with them, and overcome them, and kill them” (11,7). In addition to this explicit statement, there are also implicit indications that the Two Witnesses suffer persecution.

First, one may surmise that if the Two Witnesses have the ability “to devour their enemies” (11,5), then such enemies must be conceived as attempting to inflict sufferings upon them. For, John seemingly predicates their powers upon the OT principle of *lex talionis* <sup>(32)</sup>. Secondly, John notes that the bodies of the Two Witnesses lie, “in the street of the great city which spiritually is called Sodom and Egypt, where also their Lord was crucified” (11,8) <sup>(33)</sup>. Describing this city as “Sodom and Egypt” —, which greatly complicates any effort in determining the actual city, if any — I suggest serves to provide an association with places in which the righteous have suffered at the hands of their enemies. Beale similarly claims that the description belies “places where the saints lived as aliens under persecution” <sup>(34)</sup>. That Egypt was regarded as a place which persecutes the saints is evident from Joel 3,19. Trites postulates that “This city is called ‘Sodom’ because it is devoted to evil and destined to destruction... It is termed ‘Egypt’ because in it the people of God are persecuted and oppressed” <sup>(35)</sup>.

Therefore, it is apparent that the Two Witnesses suffer persecution. This persecution entails minimally their martyrdom, though I believe that a reasonable case exists that the Two Witnesses are persecuted prior to their deaths.

#### d) Focus #4: Vindication of the Righteous

Finally, the vindication of the righteous in chapter 11 appears in verses 11-13 where the Two Witnesses are resurrected while their enemies “beheld them” (11,12). Beale comments,

God restores the witnesses to himself after their apparent defeat at the end of the church age. The restoration consists in an overturning of their vanquished condition. The portrayal of the restoration depicts God raising the witnesses from the dead before the eyes of their enemies... It seemed that God had deserted the witnesses by leaving them in a subdued condition... But he vindicates them by delivering them and demonstrating that he is their covenantal protector... At the

<sup>(32)</sup> Cp. Deut 19,15; Num 35,30; Lev 24,17-21. Cf. also, Rev 16,1, 2.3.4.6.8.10. 12.17; where the verb “ἐκχέω” is used for the pouring out of God’s wrath in response to the pouring out of the blood of the saints. Cf. J.M. FORD, *Revelation* (AB; Garden City 1975) 171.

<sup>(33)</sup> Identifying whether this city is actually Rome, Jerusalem, the Roman Empire, etc., is not pertinent to this investigation and, therefore, will not be addressed here.

<sup>(34)</sup> BEALE, *Revelation*, 591.

<sup>(35)</sup> TRITES, *Concept of Witness*, 168.

least, the ascent of the witnesses figuratively affirms a final, decisive deliverance and vindication of God's people at the end of time<sup>(36)</sup>.

The resurrection of the Two Witnesses in the presence of their enemies likely serves as an explicit indication of their vindication. Ladd affirms that it serves as a "sign to those whom they had been witnesses that they were truly prophets"<sup>(37)</sup>. The righteous are encouraged that though the wicked appear to inflict the righteous with suffering, which brings them great joy (11,10), it is the righteous that eventually reap the eternal inheritance.

### 3. 7,1-17 *The 144,000, the Great Multitude, and the Four Foci*

Of the four foci, the presence of the provision of divine protection for the righteous—the first focus—necessitates little defense. Less clarity is present in the second—that the righteous function in the capacity of witnesses. The third focus, that of their enduring persecution, is relatively obscure, though most scholars suggest the "great multitude" (7,9) represents the martyrs<sup>(38)</sup>. In regards to the fourth focus, the latter half of this chapter proclaims their vindication as indicated by their presence in heaven (7,9-17), though this interpretation is fraught with difficulties. That this passage lacks the clarity in each of the four foci, compared, for example, with the Two Witnesses in chapter 11, may result from the Apocalypse's tendency to recapitulate certain events/features with the latter accounts providing details<sup>(39)</sup>.

#### a) Focus #1: Divine Protection

Though the sealing of the 144,000 from each of the tribes of Israel has fostered a great number of interpretations, our primary concern — in accordance with our first focus — is that they are righteous persons, which virtually all affirm, that are afforded divine protection<sup>(40)</sup>. That God protects the 144,000 derives from the stated purpose of their being sealed. Namely, according to 7,3, the righteous are afforded protection from the plagues of

<sup>(36)</sup> BEALE, *Revelation*, 596-97.

<sup>(37)</sup> LADD, *Revelation*, 159.

<sup>(38)</sup> E.g., BEASLEY-MURRAY, *Revelation*, 145; W. HENDRIKSEN, "More Than Conquerors" (Ph.D. diss., Pike's Peak Bible Seminary 1939) 134-35; R.W. WALL, *Revelation* (New International Biblical Commentary; Peabody, MA 1991), 117. Though Mounce suggests that "The arguments for identifying the 144,000 with a select group of martyrs, however, is far from conclusive (R.H. MOUNCE, *Revelation* [NICNT; Grand Rapids 1998] 159).

<sup>(39)</sup> For example, one may examine the depth of chapters 12-14 in recapitulating the events of chapter 11. Bauckham suggests that "We can begin to see that what chapters 12-14 add to the account in 11,3-13 is primarily a much fuller exposition of the conflict between the forces of evil and the witnessing church, to which 11,7 briefly alludes". 285. See discussion below.

<sup>(40)</sup> Determining the nature of the protection exceeds our interests as well. Essentially, commentators view this protection (and in chapter 11): spiritually (BEALE, *Revelation*, 409-410; HUGHES, *Revelation*, 93-94); protection from demons (R.H. CHARLES, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Revelation of St. John with Introduction, Notes and Indices* [ICC; Edinburgh 1963] 269); or, as some form of physical protection (MOUNCE, *Revelation*, 218-19; WALVOORD, *Revelation*, 140; H. LINDSAY, *There's a New World Coming* [New York 1975] 107-08). On the other hand, G.B. Caird claims that it is "ambiguous, since it does not protect them from death" (*Revelation*, 97).



chapter 6<sup>(41)</sup>. This passage, in fact, provides the most explicit declaration of divine protection accorded to the righteous. The protection reappears in 9,4 where the locusts “were told that they should not harm the grass of the earth, nor any green plant, nor any tree, but only those who do not have the seal of God on the forehead”.

#### b) Focus #2: Witnesses

In conjunction with our second focus, the suggestion that the 144,000 function as witnesses is widely accepted among commentators, though it does not derive from any explicit indications in the text. Many who advance the suggestion that the 144,000 represent witnesses or evangelists, fail to provide any textual argumentation for this suggestion. Walvoord, for example, puts forward the suggestion that the 144,000 are ethnic Israelites who are converted in order to bear witness to the gospel during the tribulation period<sup>(42)</sup>. In his commentary, however, he does not mention any exegetical evidence for this assertion.

Beale, however, asserts that the presence of Christ’s name on their foreheads confirms their role as witnesses and enables them to persevere and confess his name. He concludes: “Hence, the seal empowers the 144,000 to perform the witnessing role intended for true Israel”<sup>(43)</sup>. Bauckham, perhaps, argues more convincingly that the 144,000 constitute an army for the purpose of a holy war<sup>(44)</sup>. In his assessment, they prove victorious not by actually waging war with arms. Instead, they are victorious in the same way that Christ was victorious. That is, Christ’s army truly “follows the Lamb wherever He goes” (14,4). Bauckham postulates that they follow Christ both “as the ‘faithful witness’ ... and the sacrificial death to which this led”<sup>(45)</sup>. His proposal, however, does not intend to convey the notion that chapter 7 alone suggests that the 144,000, or the great multitude, constitute witnesses.

With a strong emphasis on the churches’ role as witnesses — clearly conveyed by the lampstand imagery — we may surmise that anyone who receives God’s divine protection necessarily fulfills some role of evangelism. It is difficult, however, to suggest that this is their function according to Revelation 7 alone. However, if we grant the proposal that Revelation continues to expand on earlier conceptions, then Bauckham’s and similar proposals, that later chapters clarify the function of the 144,000, merit attention.

<sup>(41)</sup> It is important to note that the narrative of 7,1-3 occurs temporally prior to the unleashing of the events entailed in the six seals. For, as Beale asserts, “Vv 1-3 must be referring to a time immediately preceding the plagues of 6,1-8... If the time of 7,1-3 did not directly precede that of 6,1-8, there would be an irreconcilable contradiction between ch. 6 and 7,1-3, since it is clear in ch. 6 that the first six seals harm the earth and its inhabitants, while in the beginning of ch. 7 the earth and its inhabitants are portrayed as not yet harmed” (BEALE, *Revelation*, 408). Thus, we have confirmation that it is not unprecedented for the events of a later chapter to detail events temporally preceding those of a previous chapter.

<sup>(42)</sup> As a pretribulational premillennialist, Walvoord believes that the church will be raptured to Heaven at the beginning of the final seven years that precede Christ’s return. Around that time, 144,000 Jews are converted in order to be witnesses during the church’s absence. See: WALVOORD, *Revelation*, 140.

<sup>(43)</sup> BEALE, *Revelation*, 411.

<sup>(44)</sup> BAUCKHAM, *Climax*, 217-237.

<sup>(45)</sup> BAUCKHAM, *Climax*, 232.



## c) Focus #3: Enduring Persecution

That the righteous are depicted as suffering persecution, even to the point of death, is reasonably evident within 7,9-17. The clearest indication resides in the angelic declaration about the great multitude: “these are the ones who come out of the great tribulation” (7,14). The expression, “the great tribulation” likely refers to Dan 12,1<sup>(46)</sup>. The Danielic context incorporates a time of persecution and suffering among the righteous<sup>(47)</sup>. The use of “tribulation” in Revelation corresponds to the context of persecution<sup>(48)</sup>. Furthermore, a comparison of Matt 24,21 and the only other use of “tribulation” with the adjective “great” in the NT, confirms this conclusion. For, in Matthew’s account, the expression occurs in the context of widespread and unparalleled distress. Thus, Caird concludes: “It is not their salvation that the martyrs are celebrating, but their triumphal passage through persecution”<sup>(49)</sup>.

Furthermore, many affirm that those dressed in white robes in Revelation 7,14 are specifically martyrs. Walvoord adds that “The wonderful blessing of the martyred saints in the presence of the Lord is spelled out in these verses”<sup>(50)</sup>. Morris, however, dissents from this position. He claims: “Against this, there is no indication in the narrative such as we get elsewhere, e.g. the reference to those ‘slain because of their testimony for Jesus’ (6,9)”<sup>(51)</sup>. Morris, however, fails to account for the association of white robes with the souls of the martyrs under the altar in 6,9-11. It appears that, by this verbal association with an earlier passage, John conveys the same considerations for the great multitude without an explicit statement. Such a conclusion may be present for the reader by this strong association<sup>(52)</sup>.

In addition, there is some evidence that behind each of the passages there are allusions to Daniel 7. In his remarks on the death and resurrection of the Two Witnesses in Revelation 11, Beale notes:

Dan. 7,21 is a prophecy of a final kingdom on earth that will persecute and defeat God’s people. Afterward, the persecutors themselves will be judged and the saints will inherit the kingdom of the world (so Dan. 7,22-27). In particular, Dan. 7,22 says that God ‘gave judgment to the saints,’ which is a suitable anticipated, prophetic answer to the saints’ prayer for judgment of the oppressors in Rev. 6,10-11. John sees this prophecy as fulfilled in the world’s persecution of the church at the end of history<sup>(53)</sup>.

<sup>(46)</sup> BEALE, *Revelation*, 433.

<sup>(47)</sup> Cf. Dan 11,30-39, 44; 12,10.

<sup>(48)</sup> Cf. 1,9; 2,9, 10, 22.

<sup>(49)</sup> CAIRD, *Revelation*, 100. See also, CHARLES, *Revelation*, 209-14.

<sup>(50)</sup> WALVOORD, *Revelation*, 148.

<sup>(51)</sup> MORRIS, *Revelation*, 113-14.

<sup>(52)</sup> Therefore the assertion by Beasley-Murray that “It is a puzzling feature to the present writer that the majority of commentators on the Revelation in this century identify the great multitude with the martyrs. Of this there is not a hint”, is an overstatement (BEASLEY-MURRAY, *Revelation*, 145).

<sup>(53)</sup> BEALE, *Revelation*, 588.

Given, then, the relationship of the great multitude to the martyrs in 6,9-11, one may extend the application of Dan 7 to both of these passages, since the Great Multitude entails persecuted saints.

These connections, however, cannot be established with certainty in the limited scope of this essay. Thus, in consideration of the four foci of this essay, we must conclude that though the suggestion that the righteous' presence in heaven connotes their suffering martyrdom is appealing in light of the whole of the Apocalypse — which often portrays the righteous as martyred — it cannot be fully justified from the context of Revelation 7,9-17 alone. That Revelation 7, however, conceives of the righteous as those who have endured persecution, is derived from the fact that they have come out of the "great tribulation". Whether this entails martyrdom, which seems reasonable, cannot be fully determined.

#### d) Focus #4: Vindication of the Righteous

The presence of the righteous in heaven, before the throne of God, implies their vindication. This is supported by the fact that those before the throne (7,15) are 'the ones who have come out of the great tribulation' (7,14). This thought, however, is encapsulated with only a brief description<sup>(54)</sup>, and is incomplete unless it is compared to the account of the Two Witnesses in Revelation 11,3-13 (and the 144,000 in Revelation 14,1-5 as well). In both of these passages, especially the former, the resurrection of the righteous in the presence of their enemies and their place in heaven seemingly proclaim their vindication<sup>(55)</sup>. However, if Revelation recapitulates certain themes and events, and if indeed it tends to expand on them when it recapitulates, then understanding the presence of the righteous of 7,15-17 in heaven may well indicate their vindication.

\*  
\* \* \*

At this point, we should reiterate that of the four foci pertaining to the righteous, each of which was clearly present in the account of the Two Witnesses (11,3-13), only the first two were present in the portrait of the 144,000. Moreover, in the account of the Great Multitude only the last two were present. If, then, we were to read the accounts of the 144,000 and the Great Multitude as a unity, the depiction of the righteous in terms of the four foci accords with the account of the Two Witnesses. In light of Revelation's proposed literary habit of making explicit features that were previously only implicit, it is not surprising that each of the four foci is more explicitly present in the latter account.

Thus, a thematic analysis of John's depiction of the righteous in Revelation 11,3-13 — the account of the Two Witnesses — lends support to the thesis that the 144,000 and the Great Multitude of Revelation 7 should be viewed as encompassing the same group.

<sup>(54)</sup> Hendriksen suggests, "A few verses are devoted to a description of the Church triumphant after the final judgment" (*Conquerors*, 35).

<sup>(55)</sup> Cf. Rev 11,11-12.

I do not intend, however, to suggest that this analysis will serve as a definitive, conclusive answer to the complex issues concerning the interpretation of Revelation 7.

701 Brewster Rd.  
Collegeville, Pa. 19426

Rob DALRYMPLE

### SUMMARY

The thematic features relating to John's depiction of the righteous in the intercalations of Rev 11,3-13 and 7,1-17 as well as how these features might affect our understanding of Revelation 7,1-17 are examined. Four foci pertaining to the righteous are explicitly present in the account of the Two Witnesses (11,3-13). All four foci, also, materialize in the description of the 144,000 (7,1-8) and the Great Multitude (7,9-17). However, when we examine Rev 7,1-8, we find that John only incorporates the first two of the four foci (Divine Protection and Witnesses) while in the account of 7,9-17, only the latter two appear (Enduring Persecution and Vindication of the Righteous). If, however, we read Rev 7,1-17 as the account of one group, then the thematic parallels with the intercalation of Rev 11,3-13 are retained.

## La remarque énigmatique d'Ac 5,4 dans la légende d'Ananias et Saphira

A la fin du chapitre quatrième et au début du chapitre cinquième des Actes des Apôtres, deux passages consécutifs contiennent les modalités du partage des biens du novice au bénéfice de la communauté qu'il rejoint. Après l'histoire du lévite chypriote Joseph, surnommé Barnabas, une curieuse légende rappelle au chapitre cinquième la donation des biens fonciers du couple Ananias et Saphira<sup>(1)</sup> en vue d'intégrer la communauté. Ananias et sa femme Saphira ont commis une faute en conservant une partie de la somme de la vente de leurs domaines. Ils n'ont déposé «au pied des apôtres» qu'une partie du produit de la vente. Pierre questionne alors Ananias et lui demande des explications aux versets 3 et 4. Confronté à son mensonge, Ananias trépassa sur le champ. Trois heures après, sa femme Saphira arriva et Pierre la mit également face à son mensonge. De même, elle mourut instantanément et fut enterrée auprès de son époux. La double mention de la crainte de tous ceux qui apprenaient l'événement, en particulier les membres de l'*ecclesia*, souligne la fin édifiante de l'histoire. Il s'agit en quelque sorte du modèle à ne pas suivre pour les novices qui postulent à l'entrée dans la communauté. A l'opposé, Barnabas constitue le modèle vertueux à suivre. Mais derrière la légende d'Ananias et Saphira, les détails des reproches adressés ne sont pas clairs, notamment au verset 4.

### 1. Traduction et commentaire d'Ac 5,4

οὐχὶ μένον σοὶ ἔμενεν καὶ πρᾶθεν ἐν τῇ σῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ὑπῆρχεν; τί ὅτι ἔθου ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦτο οὐκ ἐψεύσω ἄνθρωποις ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ.

En effet, le texte du verset 4 semble difficile à comprendre et à traduire, si bien que la majorité des traducteurs ont usé de périphrases et de restitutions pour aboutir, quelquefois, à des significations diamétralement opposées<sup>(2)</sup>. Le recours aux différents manuscrits du texte n'est d'aucun secours. Le texte

<sup>(1)</sup> Sur le sens de la mention de la femme d'Ananias, Saphira, dans la propriété des biens, cf. J.D.M. DERRETT, «Ananias, Sapphira and the Right of Property», *Studies in the New Testament* (Leiden 1977) II, 193-201, sp. 195-196.

<sup>(2)</sup> Cf. la *Traduction Œcuménique de la Bible* (TOB) traduit le début du verset 4: «Ne pouvais-tu pas le garder sans le vendre, ou, si tu le vendais, disposer du prix à ton gré?»; *the Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version* (RSV) comprend: «While it remained unsold, did it not remain your own? And after it was sold, was it not at your disposal?»; *the King James Version of the English Bible* (KJV): «Whiles it remained, was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power?»; la *Bible* de Louis Segond (LSG): «S'il n'eût pas été vendu, ne te restait-il pas? Et, après qu'il a été vendu, le prix n'était-il pas à ta disposition?»; la *Bible de Jérusalem* (BJ): «Quand tu avais ton bien, n'étais-tu pas libre de le garder, et quand tu l'as vendu, ne pouvais-tu disposer du prix à ton gré?»; *die Elberfelder Bibel* (ELB): «Blieb es nicht dein, wenn es unverkauft blieb, und war es nicht, nachdem es verkauft war, in deiner Verfügung?»

occidental remplace τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦτο par ποιῆσαι πονηρόν. Mais le texte ne fait pas sens<sup>(3)</sup>.

A la lecture du début du verset 4, les deux premières propositions peuvent sembler redondantes<sup>(4)</sup>: οὐχὶ μένον σοὶ ἔμενον καὶ πρᾶθέν ἐν τῇ σῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ὑπῆρχεν. Selon Ac 5,2, Ananias, de connivence avec sa femme, n'a déposé qu'une partie du prix de la vente de son domaine foncier aux pieds des apôtres en gage de cession de son bien à la communauté. Mais en Ac 4,32, il est spécifié que tout (ἅπαντα) bien doit être mis en commun. L'autre partie du prix de la vente est détournée au profit du couple. Le verbe utilisé pour énoncer cette idée en Ac 5,2.3, νοσφίζω, n'indique pas une simple dissimulation d'une partie du prix de vente, il signifie un véritable détournement de fonds<sup>(5)</sup>. Dans les deux versets, la préposition ἀπὸ suivant le verbe νοσφίζω peut signifier à la fois la provenance, auquel cas, le détournement qualifie tout le montant du domaine: ἀπὸ τῆς τιμῆς τοῦ χωρίου indiquerait le détournement «(à partir) du montant du domaine»; et la séparation d'une partie d'un tout, auquel cas, le détournement porte sur «(une partie) du montant du domaine». Dans la première hypothèse de traduction, l'auteur généralise le détournement à toute la vente, afin de montrer que la faute d'Ananias et Saphira a corrompu, en quelque sorte, l'ensemble de la vente, non seulement le montant dissimulé, mais aussi la somme donnée aux apôtres. Dans la seconde hypothèse de traduction, choisie par la majorité des exégètes, seule la partie du montant de la vente non-versée à la communauté relève du détournement de fonds. En ce sens, les deux propositions d'Ac 5,4a sont des gloses de confirmation du méfait du couple. Le début du verset 4 peut faire penser à un interrogatoire où l'enquêteur, ici sous les traits de Pierre, essaie d'obtenir confirmation des faits délictueux. Ainsi, au début du verset, οὐχὶ n'est pas une simple négation, il s'agit d'un adverbe, donc à traduire comme tel, qualifiant les deux propositions du verset 4a.

Un autre problème de compréhension concerne le sujet de μένον, «(ce qui est) restant», au verset 4aα, et celui de πρᾶθέν, «(ce qui a été) vendu», au verset 4aβ. Le sujet logique s'accordant avec le participe présent actif au neutre singulier, μένον, et le participe aoriste passif au neutre singulier, πρᾶθέν, est le dernier nom commun au neutre singulier précédant les deux participes. Il s'agit de χωρίον, le «domaine», dernier mot du verset 3. La

<sup>(3)</sup> La question d'une source textuelle à la légende d'Ananias et Saphira reste posée: l'histoire rappellerait Jos 7,1-26 avec Achan, cf. E. HAENCHEN, *The Acts of the Apostles. A Commentary* (Oxford 1971) 239. Mais les deux récits comportent beaucoup de différences. D. MARGUERAT, «La mort d'Ananias et Saphira (Ac 5.1-11)», *NTS* 39 (1993) 220, admet que le récit a une source, sauf pour le verset 4. Avec HAENCHEN, *The Acts*, 241, les versets 7 à 11 sur le sort de Saphira seraient une extension du récit dit initial. G. SCHNEIDER, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (HTKNT 5/1; Freiburg 1980) I, 371 et R. PESCH, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (EKKNT 5/1; Zurich-Einsiedeln – Neukirchen 1986) I, 196, se prononcent contre cette idée.

<sup>(4)</sup> Cf. l'avis de P.B. BROWN, *The Meaning and Function of Acts 5:1-11 in the purpose of Luke-Acts* (Boston 1969) 97-102.

<sup>(5)</sup> D.P. SECCOMBE, *Possessions and the Poor in Luke-Acts* (SNTU B,6; Linz 1982) 212, comprend νοσφίζω comme une donation anticipée, en ce sens, le verbe signifierait la diminution d'un bien déjà aliéné: «The story only makes sense if the couple had previously declared their intention to donate the land to the community.» Mais il n'y a pas d'appui textuel pour confirmer cette hypothèse.

compréhension de la construction au génitif, τιμῆς τοῦ χωρίου, comme le sujet des deux participes est difficile à soutenir, car τιμή est un nom féminin.

Au début du verset 4, μένον, «(ce qui est) restant», se rapporte à la fin du verset 3, c'est-à-dire «(ce qui est) restant» du domaine détourné. La locution désigne l'autre partie du domaine détourné par Ananias, c'est-à-dire ce qui reste du prix de vente du domaine non-versé aux apôtres. Le participe présent, μένον, fait donc référence au reste de quelque chose, c'est-à-dire à la partie du domaine remise aux apôtres sous une forme pécuniaire. Ainsi, au verset 4α «(ce qui est) restant (= l'autre partie du domaine détourné) ne restait-il pas à toi?», que signifie la mention de la conservation du domaine, c'est-à-dire d'une partie du prix de vente versé à la communauté? La formulation interrogative au verset 4α peut se comprendre comme le rappel par Pierre de l'usufruit qu'Ananias conserve sur cette partie du domaine après le don à la communauté. On défendra de nouveau cette hypothèse lors de la comparaison avec la propriété des biens dans la communauté de Qumrân.

Le participe aoriste πρᾶθέν, «(ce qui a été) vendu», s'accorde bien avec χωρίον, le «domaine»; il désigne l'ensemble du domaine vendu, la partie versée dans les caisses de la communauté des apôtres et la partie détournée par Ananias. Ainsi, le verset 4αβ, «(ce qui a été) vendu, ne se trouvait-il pas en ta possession?», se comprend comme un rappel de Pierre pour signifier à Ananias que le don a été effectué de plein gré, sans contrainte de la part des apôtres.

Ainsi, les deux propositions au début du verset 4, les deux gloses de confirmation, obéissent chacune à des motivations éditoriales différentes, bien que l'auteur les place en parallèle dans son libellé: en Ac 5,4α, οὐχὶ μένον σοὶ ἔμενεν, «(ce qui est) restant, ne restait-il pas à toi?», rappelle à Ananias la conservation de l'usufruit de son domaine après le don aux apôtres; et en Ac 5,4αβ, πρᾶθέν ἐν τῇ σῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ὑπῆρχεν, «(ce qui a été) vendu, ne se trouvait-il pas en ta possession?» rappelle aussi à Ananias qu'il a effectué le don de son plein gré, personne ne l'a contraint. Le verset 4α rappelle le statut de la terre donnée aux apôtres, alors que le verset 4αβ répond à une préoccupation éthique.

Des exégètes<sup>(6)</sup> ont reconnu dans le début du verset 4 une chronologie dans la description du bien d'Ananias et Saphira avant sa remise aux apôtres. Les deux propositions aux versets 4α et 4αβ auraient, selon cette hypothèse, pour but de rappeler la liberté d'Ananias quant à l'usage de son bien<sup>(7)</sup>. Le verset 4α signifie à Ananias qu'il était libre de la jouissance de son domaine avant la vente et le verset 4αβ ajoute qu'Ananias était libre de l'usage de l'argent tiré de son bien après la vente. Mais les termes «(ce qui est) restant» (μένον) et «il restait» (ἔμενεν) au verset 4α supposent que l'on se situe bien après la vente. De plus, s'il y a une chronologie dans le verset 4, elle est entre les versets 4a et 4b. En effet, les propos de Pierre situent rétrospectivement l'action du verset 4a avant le dépôt du produit de la vente aux apôtres, car, au verset 4bα, τί ὅτι ἔθου ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου τὸ πρῶγμα τοῦτο, «Pourquoi donc

<sup>(6)</sup> Cf. entre autres, MARGUERAT, «La mort d'Ananias et Saphira», 226 et du même auteur, *La première histoire du christianisme, les Actes des Apôtres* (LD 180; Paris 1999) 257: «Ananias demeurerait totalement libre de l'usage de son bien, soit avant la vente (οὐχὶ μένον σοὶ ἔμενεν), soit après (πρᾶθέν ἐν τῇ σῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ὑπῆρχεν)».

<sup>(7)</sup> On a seulement reconnu cette idée dans le verset 4αβ.

as-tu mis en ton cœur cette affaire?», on revient au moment de la décision de frauder, donc quelques instants avant la conséquence de cette décision, c'est-à-dire le dépôt d'une partie seulement du prix de la vente aux pieds des apôtres. C'est le moment crucial de la décision de frauder que Pierre veut marquer devant Ananias, le moment où débute le délit. Puis dans le verset 4bβ, Pierre énonce la sentence morale: οὐκ ἐψεύσω ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ, «Tu n'as pas menti aux hommes mais à Dieu»<sup>(8)</sup>.

Ainsi le verset 4 peut se traduire: «(ce qui est) restant, ne restait-il pas à toi et (ce qui a été) vendu, ne se trouvait-il pas en ta possession? Pourquoi donc as-tu mis en ton cœur cette affaire? Tu n'as pas menti aux hommes mais à Dieu.»

## 2. Une comparaison avec la communauté de biens à Qumrân

Depuis la découverte fortuite des manuscrits de Qumrân, un parallèle a été effectué entre d'une part, la légende d'Ananias et Saphira, en particulier la dissimulation fautive d'une partie des biens au moment d'entrer dans la communauté et d'autre part, les sanctions consécutives à un même délit, lors de l'intégration du novice dans la communauté de Qumrân. Au début de la *Règle de la Communauté* découverte dans la grotte 1, 1QS I 11-13, il est fait mention du don de tous les biens à la communauté<sup>(9)</sup>:

Et tous les volontaires attachés à sa [Dieu] vérité apporteront toute leur intelligence, leur force et leur bien (כול דעתם וכוחם ורובם) dans la communauté de Dieu, afin de renforcer leur intelligence dans la vérité des préceptes de Dieu et d'ordonner leur force selon la perfection de ses [Dieu] voies et tout leur bien (וכל הונם) selon son [Dieu] juste conseil.

Dans une partie sur le fonctionnement de la communauté, en 1QS VI 16b-23a, le novice doit suivre différentes étapes successives avant d'intégrer la communauté comme membre de plein droit:

Et quand il [le novice] s'approchera du conseil de la communauté, il ne touchera pas à la purification des Nombreux avant qu'on ne l'ait examiné sur son esprit et sur son action, avant qu'il n'ait achevé une année entière. Et, en outre, qu'il ne mêle pas un bien à la propriété des Nombreux (אל יהערב בהון הרבים). Quand il aura achevé une année à l'intérieur de la communauté, les Nombreux délibéreront sur son cas, selon son intelligence et ses actes en ce qui concerne la Loi. Si le sort échoit en sa faveur, qu'il s'approche de l'assemblée de la communauté en accord avec les prêtres et la majorité des membres de leur alliance,

<sup>(8)</sup> PESCH, *Die Apostelgeschichte*, 198, se demande «Weil Hananias nicht sein ganzes Herz an Gott... gehangen hatte?» Plus loin dans l'ouvrage, 202, l'auteur relève que d'une part, la non-totalité de l'argent versé est due au rôle de Satan comme diviseur, en lien avec Ac 5,3, et d'autre part, ce méfait s'inscrit à l'encontre de la plénitude de l'engagement requise par le *pneuma*. L'exégète a peut-être en tête le passage de 1 Co 5,5. Cf. les développements théologiques de R.F. O'TOOLE, «"You Did Not Lie to Us (Human Beings) but to God" (Acts 5,4c)», *Bib* 76 (1995) 182-209.

<sup>(9)</sup> Cf. la description d'Eusèbe de Césarée, *Praeparatio Evangelica* 8.11.4,8-12.



on versera alors son bien et ses possessions (יִקְרִיבוּ גַם אֶת הָרוֹץ וְאֶת מְלֻאכְתּוֹ) dans la main de l'homme (qui est) l'inspecteur des possessions des Nombreux. Et il inscrira ceci à son crédit avec sa main, et il ne devra pas le dépenser au profit des Nombreux. Il ne touchera pas au banquet des Nombreux avant qu'il n'ait achevé une seconde année au milieu des membres de la communauté. Quand cette seconde année sera achevée, il sera examiné: d'après la décision des Nombreux, et si le sort échoit en sa faveur, il sera inscrit dans l'ordre de son rang parmi ses frères, pour ce qui a trait à la Loi, au droit, à la purification et son bien sera (alors) mélangé (וְלִעְרַב אֶת הָרוֹץ) (à celui des Nombreux). Son conseil et son jugement appartiendront à la communauté.

Au cours de la première année de noviciat, le postulant ne peut mêler ses biens à la communauté. Ce n'est qu'à la fin de cette première année probatoire que le novice laisse ses propriétés et ses revenus à l'inspecteur de la communauté. Le versement est dûment enregistré et demeure soustrait à la dépense sous le contrôle de ce même inspecteur. Puis, à la fin de la seconde année, le novice voit son bien mélangé à la caisse de la communauté. Ainsi trois étapes sont clairement distinguées pour intégrer la communauté. Il s'agit vraisemblablement d'éprouver la motivation et les capacités du postulant avant l'entrée de plein droit dans la communauté. Les biens du novice suivent ces trois étapes en étant progressivement intégrés à la communauté, parallèlement au cheminement du novice à travers les différents examens. L'étape intermédiaire est remarquable, car parmi les fonctions de l'inspecteur, celui-ci effectue, avec l'assentiment du novice, une saisie conservatoire des biens de ce dernier pendant un an. Cette deuxième étape vise peut-être à éprouver le novice en lui retirant le confort matériel tiré de ses biens. De plus, un *ostrakon* de jarre datant du début du I<sup>er</sup> siècle de notre ère a été découvert en 1996 au pied du mur de clôture séparant *Khirbet Qumrân* du cimetière à l'est. Ce serait le brouillon d'un acte de donation à la communauté (אֶת הָרוֹץ à la ligne 2) d'une propriété, incluant un esclave, appartenant à un homme appelé חֲנִי. Bien que la lecture du texte soit discutée<sup>(10)</sup>, il semblerait que le document soit le brouillon d'un acte d'enregistrement du transfert de la propriété d'un nouveau membre à la communauté de Qumrân. Après avoir mentionné l'esclave et les limites du domaine, la ligne 8 fait état de la confirmation du serment de quelqu'un à la communauté de Qumrân (וְכַמְלֻתוֹ לִיְהוָה). La donation de la propriété du novice dénommé חֲנִי est faite à un certain מִן נַחְמִי, il pourrait s'agir de l'inspecteur dont il est question à la deuxième étape du noviciat, à la fin de la première année. Toujours est-il que le texte d'Ac 5,1-11 ne dit mot de telles étapes de noviciat<sup>(11)</sup>. On a remarqué que la seule

<sup>(10)</sup> Cf. les hypothèses de F.M. CROSS et E. ESHEL, «Ostraca from Khirbet Qumrân», *IEJ* 47 (1997) 17-28, disputées par A. YARDENI, «A Draft of a Deed on an Ostrakon from Khirbet Qumrân», *IEJ* 47 (1997) 233-237. L'*editio princeps* est réalisée par F.M. CROSS et E. ESHEL, *Qumran Cave 4.XXVI. Cryptic Texts and Miscellanea, part 1* (ed. S.J. PFANN et al.) (DJD XXXVI; Oxford 2000) 497-507, pl. XXXIII.

<sup>(11)</sup> R. BAUCKHAM, *The Book of Acts in its First Century Settings, Palestinian Setting* (Grand Rapids 1995) IV, 338-339, semble transposer les différents phases de noviciat à la communauté décrite dans les Actes des Apôtres, mais il n'y a pas d'appui textuel pour envisager une organisation identique entre les deux communautés.

chronologie rappelée par Pierre est située entre le moment de la décision de frauder (v.4b) et le moment du dépôt d'une partie du prix de vente dans les caisses de la communauté (v.4a).

Les commentateurs<sup>(12)</sup> de la légende d'Ananias et Saphira ont surtout relevé les sanctions qui découlent du non-respect de la cession des biens personnels à la communauté de Qumrân, en 1QS VI 24-25a:

Et voici les ordonnances par lesquelles on jugera sur enquête de la communauté selon les cas: s'il se trouve parmi eux un homme qui mente à propos de bien (אשר ישקר בדון), et qui le fasse sciemment, il sera exclu du milieu de la purification des Nombreux (pendant) un an, et il sera puni quant au quart de sa nourriture.

De nouveau, le passage qumrânien diffère du texte des Actes des Apôtres, car le code pénal qumrânien ne prévoit en cas de mensonge sur sa propriété qu'un an de mise à l'écart de la communauté et qu'un quart de sa ration quotidienne en moins. De fait, l'exclusion n'est que temporaire et la privation alimentaire est moindre. Le fautif demeure membre de la communauté, il subit simplement une sanction. Dans la légende d'Ananias et Saphira, il ne s'agit pas de sanctions conservées dans un code pénal, la mort frappe sur le champ Ananias puis Saphira selon un scénario presque burlesque. La soudaineté de la mort des fautifs, par deux fois, vise à signaler la rapidité de la sanction divine et de son application. L'auteur ne cherche pas une description réaliste à tout prix, il veut signifier aux lecteurs et aux futurs membres de la communauté ce qu'il ne faut pas faire. Le détournement des fonds destinés à la communauté est passible de mort immédiate: la légende est rédigée à des fins édifiantes, il ne saurait être question au premier plan d'un véritable code pénal pour la communauté décrite dans les Actes des Apôtres.

Tous les commentaires sur le livre des Actes des Apôtres en restèrent à ces quelques occurrences qumrâniennes citées en guise de parallèles. Les deux communautés ont des sanctions différentes quant au non-respect de la cession des biens des membres à la communauté, mais elles prônent toutes deux la donation totale des propriétés et revenus. Pourtant, d'autres occurrences nuancent cette conception de la communauté des biens à Qumrân. En effet, dans la *Règle de la Communauté*, une négligence quant aux biens de la communauté est punie d'un remboursement de la part du membre fautif en 1QS VII 6b-8a:

Et s'il [un membre] se montre négligent au préjudice des biens de la communauté (בדון היחד), au point de causer leur perte, il les remboursera totalement et si sa main ne parvient pas à les rembourser, il sera puni soixante jours.

<sup>(12)</sup> Cf. par exemple, HAENCHEN, *The Acts*, 241; B.J. CAPPER, «The Interpretation of Acts 5.4», *JSNT* 19 (1983) 117-131, sp. 126-127, dont une comparaison avec les Pythagoriens; du même auteur, «In der Hand des Anania. Erwägungen zu 1QS VI,20 und der urchristlichen Gütergemeinschaft», *RevQ* 12 (1986) 223-236. H. HAVELAAR, «Hellenistic parallels to Acts 5.1-11 and the problem of conflicting interpretations», *JSNT* 67 (1997) 63-82, et J. DUPONT, «La communauté des biens aux premiers jours de l'Eglise (Actes 2, 42.44-45; 4, 32.34-35)», *Etudes sur les Actes des Apôtres* (LD 45; Paris 1967) 503-519, sp. 513-516, examinent des parallèles avec les littératures grecques.

Le remboursement suppose une possession personnelle; l'expression «sa main» (יָדוֹ) peut également s'interpréter en ce sens. Il est difficile de reconnaître derrière l'expression un travail supplémentaire effectué par l'adepte au bénéfice de la communauté, puisque celui-ci travaille déjà pour la communauté. L'usage d'un bien familial est aussi difficile à reconnaître dans cet article du code pénal.

Dans un autre écrit, le *Document de Damas*, retrouvé dans la *genizah* qaraïte du vieux-Caire et dans quelques grottes aux alentours de Qumrân, on suppose aussi une propriété personnelle des membres de la communauté ou au moins, la conservation d'un usufruit après le don des biens à la communauté. Dans une partie sur le serment judiciaire, en CD IX 10b-16a, les biens d'un propriétaire, membre de la communauté, peuvent être perdus ou volés:

Et toute chose perdue sans qu'on sache qui l'a volée de la possession du camp où elle a été volée, on fera jurer son propriétaire par le serment de malédiction. Et celui qui aura entendu, s'il connaît (le voleur) et ne le dénonce pas, sera coupable.

Toute chose (acquise par délit) et qu'on veut restituer, s'il n'y a pas de propriétaire, celui qui la restitue se confessera au prêtre, et cela appartiendra à celui-ci, indépendamment du bélier du sacrifice offert pour le délit.

Et pareillement, toute chose perdue qui sera retrouvée et qui n'aura pas de propriétaire appartiendra aux prêtres. Quant à celui qui a retrouvé la chose, on ne sait pas son jugement. Si les propriétaires ne sont pas retrouvés, ils (les prêtres) en seront gardiens.

De même, en CD XIV 12b-13, un salaire est versé aux membres et ceux-ci semblent disposer personnellement de la somme. Le salaire ne semble pas versé directement dans les caisses de la communauté<sup>(13)</sup>:

Et [voici] la règle relative aux Nombreux pour subvenir à tous leurs besoins. Le salaire de deux journées au moins pour chaque mois, tel est ce qu'ils verseront dans les mains de l'inspecteur et des juges.

Dans le passage de CD XVI 13-18, on interdit l'envoi d'offrandes volontaires au Temple de Jérusalem. L'existence d'offrandes volontaires peut supposer une propriété personnelle ou bien un usufruit sur le domaine personnel cédé à la communauté:

Au sujet de l'ordonnance relative aux dons volontaires. Qu'on ne voue à l'autel rien d'illégalement acquis. Et aussi que les prêtres n'acceptent pas d'Israël une chose illégalement acquise. Qu'on ne consacre pas la

<sup>(13)</sup> Philon d'Alexandrie, *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 85-86, indique, au contraire, que les salaires sont versés intégralement dans les caisses de la communauté. La distinction entre le patrimoine ou le capital d'une part, et le revenu d'autre part, opérée par J. TAYLOR, «The community of goods among the first Christians and among the Essenes», *Historical Perspectives: From the Hasmonaeans to Bar Kokhba in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. D. GOODBLATT – A. PINNICK – D.R. SCHWARTZ) (STDJ 37; Leiden 2001) 155 et 159, n'est pas démontrée. Philon d'Alexandrie n'a qu'une connaissance indirecte des pratiques esséniennes, d'où une description de sa part souvent approximative de la mouvance essénienne.

nourriture de sa maison à Dieu; car c'est ce qu'il a dit: 'Ils se font la chasse l'un à l'autre par l'anathème.' (Mi 7,2) Et qu'on ne consacre rien de tout [...] sa propriété il consacrera [...] sera puni celui qui voue [.....]

Un autre passage du *Document de Damas* suggère également une possession personnelle ou la conservation d'un usufruit. En CD XII 8b-11a, il est explicitement interdit de vendre à des non-Juifs, ce qui sous-entend une possession privée ou un usufruit<sup>(14)</sup>:

Qu'on ne vende pas de bêtes ou d'oiseaux purs aux non-Juifs, afin qu'ils ne les sacrifient pas. Et le contenu de son grenier ou de sa cuve, qu'on refuse de toute sa force de leur en vendre quelque chose. Et quant à son esclave et à sa servante, que nul ne les leur vende, parce qu'ils sont entrés avec lui dans l'Alliance d'Abraham.

Ainsi les quelques extraits évoqués pourraient indiquer tantôt une communauté des biens, tantôt une propriété privée au sein de la communauté. L'hypothèse de la conservation d'un usufruit sur le bien donné à la communauté au moment de l'entrée dans celle-ci semble la solution la mieux à même d'expliquer des passages qui apparaissent contradictoires. De plus, à la lecture des extraits cités, le *Document de Damas* semble plus explicite quant à une propriété personnelle au sein de la communauté ou au maintien d'un usufruit sur son ancienne propriété. La *Règle de la Communauté* semble mettre davantage l'accent sur une communauté des biens, bien qu'une allusion en 1QS VII 6b-8a laisse entrevoir une conception plus complexe de la propriété à Qumrân. Ces différences entre la *Règle de la Communauté* et le *Document de Damas* pourraient s'expliquer par les auteurs et les lecteurs de ces deux documents. Le *Document de Damas*, attesté à l'extérieur du corpus scripturaire qumrânien, serait le manifeste du mouvement essénien, un des trois grands courants de pensée juifs qui traversent le judaïsme quelques siècles avant notre ère. Au sein du mouvement essénien, les habitants de *Khirbet Qumrân* ne constitueraient qu'une communauté essénienne parmi d'autres. Les notices des auteurs antiques sur les Esséniens attestent la variété des communautés esséniennes: il existerait des Esséniens mariés avec femme et enfants et vivant paisiblement dans les villes, d'autres Esséniens ont adopté le célibat et se sont retirés des tumultes de la vie urbaine pour vivre en communauté<sup>(15)</sup>. L'examen des quelques tombes exhumées du cimetière de Qumrân tendrait à confirmer l'appartenance des Qumrâniens à la catégorie des Esséniens célibataires et retirés du monde<sup>(16)</sup>. Ainsi la *Règle de la*

<sup>(14)</sup> En CD XIII 14-16a, l'obligation d'informer l'inspecteur en cas d'achat ou de vente suggère qu'il s'agit plutôt de l'usage des biens de la communauté par un ou plusieurs membres. En ce sens, on ne peut reconnaître une allusion à une propriété personnelle des membres ou même à un usufruit sur le domaine ou les revenus donnés: «Et qu'aucun des membres de l'alliance de Dieu ne fasse de transactions avec les fils de la fosse si ce n'est de la main à la main. Et qu'on ne fasse pas d'association pour l'achat ou la vente sans le faire savoir à l'inspecteur qui est dans le camp et sans agir loyalement».

<sup>(15)</sup> Cf. Flavius Josèphe, *Guerre des Juifs* 2.8.13,160.

<sup>(16)</sup> Cf. J. Zias, «The Cemeteries of Qumran and Celibacy: Confusion Laid to Rest?», *DSD* 7 (2000) 220-253.

*Communauté* serait une déclinaison du manifeste essénien qu'est le *Document de Damas*; en ce sens, les Qumrâniens d'obédience essénienne ont adapté le *Document de Damas* à leur idéal de vie, ce qui explique les nuances sur des points précis entre les deux documents<sup>(17)</sup>. Ainsi, les passages cités du *Document de Damas* énoncent une règle générale pour tous les Esséniens, notamment ceux qui sont mariés et qui mènent une vie normale auprès de leurs concitoyens. Ces occurrences trahissent une insertion des Esséniens dans la société juive, c'est pourquoi les biens personnels de chaque membre ou leur usufruit semblent conservés. Une même conclusion peut être formulée pour les Qumrâniens, même si cela semble moins explicite dans la *Règle de la Communauté*. Les biens ayant appartenu à chaque membre, avant son entrée dans la communauté décrite dans le *Document de Damas* et la *Règle de la Communauté*, ont bien été versés dans les caisses de la communauté essénienne, mais chaque membre a pu conserver l'usufruit de ses biens<sup>(18)</sup>.

S'il y a une comparaison à faire entre la communauté décrite dans les Actes des Apôtres et un autre groupe, il faut comparer avec le modèle de la communauté essénienne vivant en milieu urbain, participant à la vie en société, comme la communauté des Actes des Apôtres. En ce sens, la proposition énigmatique d'Ac 5,4aα pourrait s'expliquer avec le rappel qu'Ananias conservait un usufruit sur ses biens après les avoir donnés à la communauté, d'où l'absurdité du mensonge du couple stigmatisée par Pierre.

Université Catholique de l'Ouest,  
49000 Angers - France

David HAMIDOVIĆ

## RESUME

Derrière la légende d'Ananias et Saphira en Ac 5,1-11, le détail des reproches adressés par Pierre au couple est peu clair. La traduction du verset 4 résiste à l'entendement. On propose de comprendre le verset 4aα comme le rappel à Ananias de la conservation de l'usufruit sur son domaine, après la cession aux apôtres. Le verset 4aβ serait, quant à lui, le rappel qu'Ananias a effectué le don de plein gré, d'où l'absurdité de la dissimulation d'une partie de la vente du domaine. La comparaison avec la communauté de biens décrite dans les écrits esséniens et qumrâniens soutient la possibilité de la conservation d'un usufruit sur le domaine cédé à la communauté.

<sup>(17)</sup> Les différences entre la *Règle de la Communauté* et le *Document de Damas* ont été relevées très tôt dans l'étude des deux documents: cf, entre autres, A.R.C. LEANEY, *The Rule of Qumran and Its Meaning: Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (London 1966); P. WERNBERG-MØLLER, *The Manual of Discipline, Translated and Annotated with an Introduction* (STDJ 1; Leiden 1957); C. RABIN, *The Zadokite Documents* (Oxford 1954); P.R. DAVIES, *The Damascus Document: An Interpretation of the "Damascus Document"* (JSOT Supplement series 25; Sheffield 1983).

<sup>(18)</sup> TAYLOR, «The community of goods», 155, écrit «They [les membres] kept property that they already possessed, but its use and usufruct were ceded to the community». Mais les textes cités attestent l'inverse: la cession de la propriété des biens à la communauté (cf. les étapes du noviciat en IQS VI 16b-23a) et la conservation individuelle de son usufruit.

# RECENSIONES

## Vetus Testamentum

Thomas HIEKE, *Die Genealogien der Genesis* (Herders Biblische Studien 39). Freiburg – Basel – Wien – Barcelona – Rom – New York, Herder 2003. xii-420 p. 15 × 22,7.

In this typographically appealing edition of his *Habilitationsschrift*, Dr. Thomas Hieke — Assistant Professor for Biblical Theology at the University of Regensburg — undertakes the remarkable task not only of reading Genesis as a coherent book, but also of establishing a reading procedure (*biblischen Auslegung*) that would allow the biblical totality as context for such a reading. Hieke orients his interpretation around the spectre “text – reader” rather than the conventional “author – text” (15, 325, etc.) From this starting point he interprets the genealogies and what he calls genealogical information in Genesis as being the backbone of the book. Indeed, this genealogical trajectory extends into Exodus 6, Numbers 3, Ruth 4 (and Matthew 1), and therefore could be seen as running throughout the Bible.

The first part of the book attends to academic basics: a selective history of research, remarks on methods, definitions and theories. This part identifies the “*toledoth* system” so evident on the textual surface of Genesis and also the “genealogical system” of the book. The latter, which connects to the first, consists of all kinds of genealogical information in scattered utterances on parenthood, childhood, brotherhood, marriages, etc. It is this larger “genealogical system” that is Hieke’s ultimate target of interpretation. Evidently, as a category this “genealogical system” is different from the bulk of *toledoth* passages.

The second part gives a review of genealogical information in what is perceived of as the genealogically identified textual units of Genesis: Gen 2,4–4,26; 5,1–6,8; 6,9–9,29; 10,1–11,9; 11,10–26; 11,27–25,11; 25,12–18; 25,19–35,29; 36 and finally 37–50. Also the extension of the “genealogical system” is examined: Exod 1,1–5; 6,16–25; Num 3,1–4; Ruth 4,18–22. Every section in Part Two has the same pattern of discussion: delimitation of the relevant section, discussion of grammatical and form critical issues, the integration of genealogical information in the context of the section, and the function of the genealogical information in the narratives. When read consecutively, the sections on “function” in fact seem to form a statement on biblical theology in the “genealogical system” of Genesis.

Part Three presents a synthesis. First, the “*toledoth* system” is exposed as the literary principle structuring the Book of Genesis. Secondly, the “genealogical system” that expands that first system, is interpreted as the

central theological statement of (the final text of) Genesis. That statement, Hieke argues, finds a two-pointed continuation in Exodus / Numbers and in Ruth, and also in non biblical Second Temple Jewish literature. One continuation attempts to relate later royal dynasties to Abraham and Adam through David. The other branch attempts the same thing for the priesthood through Phinehas. Also, this part gives a discussion of the role of women in the genealogies of Genesis, before concluding concerning the functions of the “genealogical system” of Genesis. As Hieke sees it, the function is to provide a pattern for understanding world and life. The genealogies create identity and express social and political relations. They also have religious function, partly by identifying all humankind as being of the same origin, and at the same time partly also pointing out one family line as the chosen lineage. The literary function of the “genealogical system” is primarily that of creating a structured totality (*eine geordnete literarische Einheit*).

The last part attempts to forge the findings of Part Three into a hermeneutical argument. Hieke would like to give a “reflection of the readerly process of the book of Genesis as a totality, when read from the perspective of the genealogies” (334: *Reflexion des Lektürevorgangs des gesamten Buches Genesis von den Genealogien her.*) Such a reader-oriented interpretation is in principle never ended. What it uncovers is the *potential meaning* of Genesis to what Hieke calls a model reader. This established, the book re-surveys issues discussed in Part Three, now aiming for its relevance to a *biblische Auslegung*.

*Die Genealogien der Genesis* is a veritable source of information. The altogether some 200 pages of exegetical deliberation in Part Two give a good accumulation of observations to all aspects of genealogy, family relations, life span, etc. in Genesis (and beyond). Even elsewhere, Hieke has done a considerable job in collecting and documenting biblical passages and secondary literature pertinent to his theme. During his 420 pages Hieke does indeed bring fresh insight. As but one example, he observes that Noah in the MT chronology is the first descendant to be born after the death of Adam, and this throws light both upon Noah’s name and the story connected to him (73). More frequently, however, Hieke’s contribution is that of collecting and organizing already given insights. Strangely, all relevant titles by John Van Seters are missing (for instance his *Prologue to History. The Yahwist as Historian in Genesis* [Louisville KY 1992] or his article “The Primeval Histories of Greece and Israel Compared”, ZAW 100 [1988] 1-22). Scholars may miss a few other English titles as well. Moreover, Hieke’s material is not always well organized. For example, we would expect to have the full philological discussion on *toledoth* where the issue is first raised (43, cf. 20), or at least a pointer to another location in the book where full data were gathered. Instead, information on this issue is found in scattered places (227, 315f, etc.), without evident cross references. Such issues aside, the bibliographic effort of the book is formidable.

Hieke covers several areas of insight. However, his involvement in neighbouring fields is not always extensive. For instance, the import of social anthropological kinship theories for reading Genesis should go beyond the technical classifications enumerated by Hieke (22-27). Also, the rather mono dimensional exposition of genealogical fluidity (307-311, etc.) is unsatis-



factory, weaker even than what is found in Robert R. Wilson, *Genealogy and History in the Biblical World* (Yale New Eastern Researches 7; New Haven 1977). Similarly, while noting the existence of comparative material in Mesopotamian sources, Hieke does not enter into evaluation of that material and its significance for interpreting Genesis. One assumes this could be due to the decision to read the “final text” only, and to dismiss all text genetic discussion. Still, these neighbouring fields should be important for reading the genealogies of Genesis, and Hieke’s way of focusing the “final text” is perhaps the most problematic aspect of the book:

My first point is trivial. Hieke has decided to read “the final text”. Still, virtually all exegetical literature to which he makes reference, is oriented either towards exploring the intention of a presumed *author*, or towards identifying textual meaning in a specific *historical context*. Incidentally, Hieke is coloured by his predecessors when employing their results. For instance, he refers to Genesis 6,1-4 as “particular tradition” and ends up reading this passage as only loosely integrated into the main text (67-68). I do not object to this reading, but it does indicate that Hieke is not simply “reading the final text”. One is at loss for a fundamental clarification of the status of historical-critical scholarship in Hieke’s reader-oriented investigation.

My second point goes to the concepts of “reader” and “reading”. Hieke accepts the view that readers contribute to making sense of a text. Presumably, therefore, a reader’s cultural predisposition must play a role in the construction of meaning. Still, there is no attempt to clarify basic reading assumptions in the “model reader”. By way of example, Hieke does not discuss the concept of a “book”. He simply states that through its genealogical framework Genesis allows itself to be read as a well organized literary unit (312, etc.). There is of course a *toledoth* structure in Genesis. But would that indicate that a culturally competent reader should start reading the book as a *unit* — *ein Einheit* — oriented around this trajectory? In view of recent discussion of the ANE book phenomenon — and of the shape of most biblical books! — it seems more reasonable to assume that a literate reader as presupposed by Genesis would in fact see a book as a multi-voiced entity facilitating different discourses at one and the same time. If so, that “model reader” looking for literary unity in Genesis would have to be a *modern* reader, wouldn’t s/he? This points to the question of what precisely *is* the relation between ancient and modern “sense making” in Hieke’s *biblische Auslegung*? Is his “model reader” Jewish or Christian, ancient or post-modern? Is there any way of falsifying a reading or, for that matter, the interests of a reader or the (political) effect of a reading? It seems to me that the book fails to contribute clarity and genuine insight on such hermeneutically pivotal issues.

One material effect of Hieke’s dedication to the final text is a certain one-sidedness in his perspective. He declares that “genealogy in a wider sense is the main theme of the book” (252), and his entire reading sometimes attempts to verify and sometimes rather assumes this position. To my mind, Genesis (and certainly the Bible) is too complex to be collated under any one single theme. Reading Genesis primarily as a genealogy seems to me not to do justice to the book. The corresponding identification of a “genealogical

system" in Genesis remains unclear to me. I do miss a proper discussion of the status of this "system" as compared to the "*toledoth* system" – which is clearly a redactional layer in the book. Similarly, I sense that characterising for instance the genealogical information of Genesis 4–5 as "a logical and coherent sequence" (*eine logische und kohärente Abfolge*) (80) is to claim more than most interpreters would accept. In short, the willingness to find "systems" in Genesis sometimes seem overwhelming.

Such issues aside, Hieke's book will stand tall for a long time as an important collection of biblical and scholarly material pertinent to the issue of genealogy in Genesis (and in the Bible). It gives a convincing synopsis of primary and secondary material to the *toledoth* which structure the final layers of Genesis (see for instance 241–251). Hieke has also demonstrated that a reader choosing to take these *toledoth* as a clue for reading may find further information on genealogical and family issues in the book. Indeed, he has shown that such a reading was current in Persian and later periods (270–278). This reading was not the only reading of Genesis. Possibly, it was not very influential, and quite probably it cannot have been conceived of by its practitioners as the only way of accounting for the entire book of Genesis. Still, this reading does point towards messianic expectations in Qumran, and hence to Matthew 1. For this reason, such readings might after all play a part in a *biblische Auslegung*, although the hermeneutical presuppositions for such a reading still need further elaboration.

PO Box 5144, Majorstuen  
N-0302 Oslo

Terje STORDALEN

W. A. M. BEUKEN, *Jesaja 1–12* (Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Alten Testament). Freiburg, Herder 2003. 17 × 23,7. 368 p.  
€ 60 / sFr 100

In a review of Willem Beuken's *Isaiah: Vol. 2, Part 2: Isaiah 28–39* (Historical Commentary on the Old Testament; Leuven 2000) published in the *Review of Biblical Literature* 5 (2003) 268–270 (also published on-line at [bookreviews.org](http://bookreviews.org)), I expressed the hope that he would find a way to write a commentary on Isaiah 1–12. The editors of the Historical Commentary on the Old Testament had apparently decided to assign Beuken commentary only to Isaiah 13–27 and 28–39. Happily, the Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Alten Testament has seen fit to publish the present volume. When combined with his projected two volumes in English in the HOT series (the volume on Isaiah 13–27 has not yet appeared) and his four volumes in Dutch on Isaiah 40–66 in *De Prediking van het Oude Testament* (published 1979–89), the present volume will complete Beuken's commentary on the entire book of Isaiah. Biblical interpretation, particularly interpreters of the book of Isaiah, is all the richer with the fruits Beuken's work of well over a quarter century now available.

Beuken clearly views Isaiah 1–12 as the first segment of the entire book of Isaiah, and the present volume provides a brief introduction to Isaiah 1–66 as a whole. His commentary is informed to a certain extent by the synchronic issues of the literary form and the diachronic issues of the formation of Isaiah as a whole, but the present volume focuses strictly speaking on Isaiah 1–12 as a redactional block within the book of Isaiah. He labels this approach a “diachronic reflektierten Synchronie (a diachronically reflected synchronism)” (11), which reflects his view that consideration of the final or synchronic form of the book must be considered in relation to the historical context of its formation through all stages. This redaction-critical approach, which provides the methodological basis for his commentary on Isaiah 1–12, displays both strengths and weaknesses.

Beuken’s introduction to Isaiah includes a relatively standard array of topics. He begins with consideration of the prophet Isaiah ben Amoz, his times, and his life work. The person Isaiah is somewhat obscured within the present form of the book, although he clearly lived during the latter part of the eighth century B.C.E. when the Assyrian empire began to take control of Israel and Judah. Isaiah especially takes up the threat of judgment by the one and only God that this period represents, although he looks to the future to comfort the mourners in Zion.

His overview concerning the structure and compositional history of the book of Isaiah considers the book to be a “literarische Kathedrale (literary cathedral)” (27), which presupposes a process of growth that extends over more than five centuries through the time of the production of the Septuagint form of the book in the middle of the second century B.C.E. He provides a brief overview of two major models for explaining the growth of the book of Isaiah. The first is the “Vereinigungshypothese (unification hypothesis)”, which posits that the three major collections that comprise the book, viz., Proto-, Deutero-, and Trito-Isaiah, developed independently in relation to their own historical contexts prior to their collection into a single book. The second is the “Fortschreibungshypothese (continuous writing or expansion hypothesis)”, which posits the continued expansion and reinterpretation of earlier materials that culminated in the formation of the entire book. Beuken relies heavily on Ulrich Berges, *Das Buch Jesaja. Komposition und Endgestalt* (Herders biblische Studien 16; Freiburg 1998) (see my review of this volume in *RBL* 4 [2002] 211–214) in opting for a version of the unification hypothesis that posits the formation of the book through a final combination of Isaiah 1–39 and 40–66 following the combination of sub-collections, including Isaiah 1–12; 13–27; and 28–39. Recent literary critical scholarship has pointed to the manifold problems of such a model, particularly since it posits a largely diachronic reading model based on the supposed original core of Isaiah’s oracles rather than a synchronic reading model based on the final form of the text. To a certain extent, such a model tacitly prejudices the results of the analysis by assuming an early core to be found at the outset rather than by beginning with an evaluation of the final form of the text for evidence of redactional activity. Do we know that prophetic books originally constituted collections rather than planned literary works? Consideration of the Masoretic and Septuagint forms of Jeremiah suggests the latter model, even though we have difficulty understanding the

literary form of either version. One must first establish how all of the components of Isaiah 1–66 fit together before disassembling them and considering the components as discrete collections rather than as planned components of a larger literary work. Such a course of action does not deny the possibility of redaction-critical analysis as many contemporary literary critics contend; rather it places redaction-criticism on a more secure literary-critical foundation than has been the case in the past.

Beuken's introduction to Isaiah 1–12 reflects similar literary- and redaction-critical premises. He first places Isaiah 1–12 in the context of Isaiah 1–39, which is particularly striking since there has never been any decisive evidence that Isaiah 1–39 ever constituted a self-contained prophetic composition (many have already noted the transitional function played by Isaiah 36–39 and other texts in linking chapters 1–39 and 40–66 together). Like many scholars, he posits that Isaiah's oracles appear primarily in Isaiah 1–12 and 28–32, with a few examples to be found in Isaiah 13–27. He posits a three-stage model of growth based upon the hypothesis of the so-called Isaian "Denkschrift (Memoir)" or "Immanuelschrift (Immanuel document)" in Isaiah 6,1–8,18, that presents the work of the eighth-century prophet and his disciples at the center of Isaiah 1–12. The expanded Immanuel document in Isaiah 5,1–9,6 then encases the earlier material in a symmetrical ring composition that includes a prolog and woe oracles in Isa 5,1–7, 8–24(25–30) respectively and an epilog with refrained poem concerning YHWH's outstretched hand in Isa 8,19–9,6 and 9,7–10,4 respectively. The order of its components indicates that the ring composition lacks symmetry. The whole focuses on judgment and righteousness in Isaiah's time, but looks forward to the righteous rule of Josiah in the latter part of the seventh century B.C.E. Later editorial adjustments appear in the form of selected elements of this material (e.g., Isa 5,9–10, 13–14), which reflect the concerns of the Babylonian exile. A post-exilic stage in composition sees the addition of two overtures in Isa 1,1–31 and 2,6–4,6, that take up lament and judgment and stem largely from the prophet, as well as the poetic compositions of Isa 10,5–11,16 that call for the shoot of Jesse to gather Israel's dispersed prior to the thanksgiving song of the elect in Isaiah 12.

Having provided an overview analysis of Isaiah 1–12, he presents a model for the formation of Isaiah 1–39 in which chapters 1–12 and 28–32 form the core of the book. The Isaian materials are supplemented redactionally and combined with collections in Isaiah 13–23; 24–27; and 36–39 in a process that extends from the seventh century B.C.E. redaction of Isaiah's oracles through the post-exilic (Persian) period, in which Isaiah 1–39 is correlated with Isaiah 40–66.

Beuken introduces readers to the textual versions, including the major masoretic codices (Leningrad and Aleppo), the Qumran scrolls, the Septuagint, Targum Jonathan, the Peshitta, the Vulgate, and the Greek versions of Theodotion, Aquila, and Symmachus (although in practice Beuken does not take up the literary and interpretative character of these versions, but employs them primarily to interpret the Masoretic text). His discussion of literary features includes narrative and poetry; parallelism, colometry, sentence structure, and text structure; and stylistics. An overview of traditions employed in Isaiah includes YHWH's lordship over creation;

Sinai traditions; Zion traditions; the Exodus, Wilderness, and Conquest traditions; and Nathan's promise to the house of David.

Within the book of Isaiah, Isaiah 1–12 presents the meaning of Immanuel for the whole book, which posits a future righteous king to be realized successively through Hezekiah in Isaiah 36–39 and the unnamed servant of YHWH in Isaiah 40–66.

The commentary for each section includes a selected bibliography, a German translation of the text with textual notes, an analysis of the pericope in question, a verse-by-verse exposition, and a discussion of the overall interpretation of the pericope. At all points, Beuken is in full conversation with the latest work in Isaian scholarship.

An example of Beuken's exegesis further indicates strengths and weaknesses in this commentary.

Beuken argues that, following the superscription in Isa 1,1, two overtures to the book appear in Isa 1,2–2,5 and 2,6–4,6. Both focus on the punishment and lament of Jerusalem and Judah, prior to YHWH's renewal of Zion in the aftermath of punishment. The first culminates in the nations' acquisition of divine Torah (Isa 2,1–5), and the second focuses on the security of saved remnant under YHWH's protection at Zion (Isa 4,2–6). But one must ask how Beuken arrives at such an interpretation, especially since Isa 1,2–31 is fundamentally concerned with the purification of Jerusalem and not with the question of the nations' acquisition of Torah as stated in 2,1–5. Even in Isa 2,1–5, the portrayal of the nations' streaming to Zion is hardly the central point. Instead, this text focuses on an invitation to Jacob to join the nations. Given the differences between Isa 1,2–31 and 2,1–5, is there truly a basis to claim that both text together form a single unit? A similar question might be posed concerning his identification of Isa 2,6–4,6 as unit distinct from Isa 1,2–2,5. Isaiah 2,6 begins with the particle, *kî*, which links this verse syntactically with the preceding verse 5. Such a link makes a great deal of sense, since v. 5 invites Jacob to join the nations, and v. 6 then begins an explanation as to why Jacob is unable to do so.

Three factors seem to lie at the base of Beuken's decision. First is the superscription in Isa 2,1, which he interprets (following Ackroyd) not as a superscription to a major textual block within the book of Isaiah but as a means to identify the following oracle in Isa 2,2–5 (which appears in a slightly different form in Mic 4,1–5) as the work of Isaiah (and therefore not of Micah). Second is the rendering of *kî* not as a syntactical connector ("for, because") but as a particle of emphasis or affirmation ("ja" in his translation). Third is the old premise that pre-exilic (older) prophets must be messengers of judgment and that exilic/post-exilic (later) prophets and redactors must be messengers of salvation.

But such decisions must be questioned. It is not entirely clear that Isa 2,1 should reflect a concern with authorship. Indeed, Isa 1,1 has already made that claim, and it is not clear why it should be repeated just one chapter later (we may also note that citations and allusions to this oracle in Joel 4,9–12 and Zech 8,20–23 seem not to be concerned with the question of whether this is an Isaian or a Micah oracle). Furthermore, the other major superscription in the book in Isa 13,1 likewise identifies the following material as Isaiah's, but it also identifies the following oracle as a pronouncement concerning Babylon

(much as the other oracles concerning the nations in Isaiah identify their subject matter). Based on this analogy, it seems likely that Isa 2,1 is not so much interested in identifying Isaiah as the author of the following piece (we already know that by virtue of Isa 1,1 and its placement in the book) as it is in identifying the subject of the oracle's concern with Judah and Jerusalem. Secondly, the particle *kî* is frequently read as an emphatic particle, but this cannot be done without taking account of its syntactical function as a connecting particle. Third, are we able to distinguish messages of judgment and salvation so neatly in relation to the pre-exilic or exilic/post-exilic periods? Any survey of prophecy in the ancient Near East tells us that prophets routinely dealt with both judgment and deliverance—the prophets of Mari, Babylonia, and Egypt surely did not take the Babylonian exile into consideration in the way that many of us expect for Israelite and Judean prophets. Although the exile is a major factor in our prophetic books, should we not be prepared to see prophetic messages that take up both questions of judgment and restoration in the same composition and in the same historical periods? Holding out the possibility of restoration is after all an effective means to persuade an audience to adopt the recommended course of action and thereby to avoid the judgment. The Mari prophets seem to know this. Why not Isaiah and his tradents?

When read in relation to the links between Isa 2,5 and 2,6 noted above, we may observe that the entirety of Isa 2,6-4,6 is concerned with Judah and Jerusalem, whereas Isaiah 5-12 takes up concerns with *Israel* and Jerusalem. When read together as a unit, Isaiah 2-4 as a whole begins in 2,1 with its own superscription, continues 2,2-4 with a scenario of the ideal for Jerusalem at the center of the nations, and concludes in 2,5-4,6 with a description of the process by which Jerusalem will be purified for this role. In the present form of the text, Isaiah 2-4 then elaborates — in far greater detail and with far more theological grounding on Jerusalem's place at the center of creation — on the scenario of punishment and purification laid out for Jerusalem and Judah in Isa 1,2-31. Such a reading takes seriously the literary signals of the text *qua* text, viz., a superscription introduces a block of text concerned with a major theme; it is not limited to a historical question in relation to a single oracle within a book already ascribed to Isaiah. The *kî* has a syntactically binding function that must be recognized within that text. The goal of an idealized Zion is a means to convince a reading or hearing audience that the punishment of Jerusalem was somehow worthwhile or at least meaningful.

We may press the inquiry even further. If Isa 1,2-31 and 2,1-4,6 are focused on Jerusalem at the outset of the book, is it really the case that the book is primarily concerned with Immanuel or messianic figures in general? Given the burial of Immanuel in the center of Isaiah 1-12, must we ask whether these figures only play a subservient role in relation to the central concern with Zion that is articulated at the beginning (Isaiah 1; 2-4) and end (Isaiah 65-66) as well as throughout the book?

These critiques must be viewed as a means to engage in conversation with Beuken's commentary. Despite the observations and considerations laid out here, this volume must be recognized as a substantive, rich, and detailed contribution to the interpretation of the book of Isaiah in general and Isaiah 1-12 in particular. Hopefully, the various publishers of Beuken's volumes on



Isaiah will see fit to offer all of them in a single language, German, English, or Dutch (or perhaps even all three!), and thereby make this important work available to the widest audience possible.

Claremont School of Theology  
1325 N. College Ave.  
Claremont, CA 91711  
U.S.A.

Marvin A. SWEENEY

Karin SCHÖPFLIN, *Theologie als Biographie im Ezechielbuch*. Ein Beitrag zur Konzeption alttestamentlicher Prophetie (FAT 36), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2002. ix-392 p. 16 × 23,5 cm

Este libro es la publicación de la tesis de habilitación, dirigida por el Prof. H. Spieckermann y aceptada en la Universidad de Göttingen en el semestre de invierno de 2001-2002.

La tesis de esta monografía está claramente expresada en diferentes momentos: el libro de Ezequiel no es una redacción de escritos de un profeta Ezequiel que transmite su experiencia religiosa, sino un producto de escritorio organizado en forma de autobiografía que se manifiesta a la mirada atenta del estudioso como una biografía ficticia o ficción biográfica con la intención de transmitir un mensaje teológico.

El interés de este estudio está lógicamente centrado en los capítulos 1–24, ya que es en ellos donde aparece claramente el carácter pseudo-biográfico del texto, dejando de lado en cuanto objeto central de la investigación textos considerados como desarrollos posteriores a partir del texto más antiguo. Las referencias a textos de Ez 1–24 y 33 ocupan así casi seis columnas en el índice de textos citados, mientras un tercio de columna queda reservado para los demás capítulos.

Un objetivo complementario de este estudio es precisar el concepto de profecía, si de “un” concepto se puede hablar, o al menos el concepto de profecía que surge del libro de Ezequiel, abandonando algunas representaciones ingenuas defendidas, aún hoy, inclusive por autores de renombre y transmitidas por generaciones sin alteraciones fundamentales.

El material exegético sobre el cual la autora funda sus afirmaciones está constituido por: Ez 21 (sección 2 del trabajo), las expresiones introductorias y conclusivas de los oráculos (sección 3), el “programa profético” que incluye Ez 1–7 (sección cuarta), las “reflexiones explícitas” sobre el actuar profético de Ez 12–14 (sección 5) y, en fin, algunas “indicaciones autobiográficas” en Ez 24 y 33 (sección 6) antes de llegar a la consideración de conjunto (sección 7).

La atribución del libro a un “profeta Ezequiel” sería un fenómeno semejante a la atribución de algunos salmos a autores explícitamente nombrados en los epígrafes, con la diferencia que allí se trata de figuras históricas relativamente conocidas en la tradición de Israel, mientras Ezequiel no es mencionado en otros textos fuera de su libro.



Los juegos de palabras en torno a la raíz  $\text{מח}$  permitirían suponer, por el contrario, que el nombre mismo del presunto profeta es un modo de resumir la totalidad de su profecía: “El Señor fortifica” al profeta y a los suyos. Ezequiel sería entonces un libro pseudo-epigráfico, así como el Pentateuco es atribuido a Moisés, aunque no atribuido a un personaje famoso para fundamentar la autoridad del texto, como ocurre con los textos pseudo-epigráficos apocalípticos.

El libro de Ezequiel supone la primera deportación por Nabucodonosor, la toma y destrucción de Jerusalén y la segunda deportación, aunque las referencias a estos acontecimientos sean genéricas. La atribución de algunos textos (“poéticos auténticos” en la exégesis tradicional) al profeta-poeta Ezequiel, a diferencia de los textos prosaicos, es insostenible. Lo que ciertamente resulta obvio es que el libro de Ezequiel, al igual que una gran parte de los textos bíblicos, se apoya sobre la tradición teológica y lingüística de Israel, expresada en la Biblia Hebrea.

El carácter de ficción biográfica del libro de Ezequiel está respaldado por una conciente y consecuente concepción que se manifiesta en las expresiones autobiográficas (palabras del profeta en primera persona), tal vez bajo el influjo del libro del profeta Jeremías. Estas expresiones tienen la función de presentar a Ezequiel como un vidente y receptor de la palabra divina, verdadero sujeto de todo el texto si se exceptúan unas pocas reacciones del profeta a esa palabra. Las fórmulas introductorias del acontecimiento de la palabra y las fórmulas conclusivas que anuncian la realización futura del anuncio confirman que todo el texto se centra en la palabra del Señor.

Destinatario del texto es la “casa de Israel”, concebida como una unidad ideal pero realmente dividida entre los “deportados”, con quienes vive el profeta, y los residentes en Jerusalén después del desastre.

El carácter del libro de Ezequiel, que podríamos llamar “académico”, se manifiesta tanto en la concepción general del libro como en el recurso a la tradición literaria y teológica precedente.

La gran visión inicial (cc. 1–3) establece la autoridad del mensaje que se comunicará en el libro, así como la autoridad del profeta para transmitirlo y la dureza del destinatario para aceptarlo. Los gestos proféticos de los cc. 4–5 (y 12; 21; 24) preanuncian el modo de cumplimiento del castigo divino (el sitio y la caída de Jerusalén), castigo tematizado como “Día de YHWH” en Ez 7. Ez 6 fundamenta el castigo con las referencias a la idolatría, tema que será desarrollado minuciosamente en la segunda gran visión de las “abominaciones” cometidas en el templo (Ez 8–9).

Los capítulos 12–14 comprenden las elaboraciones teológicas sobre el profetismo: la contraposición de profetas verdaderos y falsos, la confusión de profetismo y magia, el derecho de interrogación de la voluntad de YHWH. Los cc. 15; 16; 17; 19 y parcialmente 21; 22; 23; 24 son considerados como variaciones sobre el tema fundamental del anuncio de castigo y la aniquilación de Jerusalén. El ciclo de los anuncios de castigo se cierra con los gestos simbólicos de Ez 21,23–28 y 24,15–24 que preparan así el anuncio de la caída de Jerusalén de 33,21–22.

El material contenido en los capítulos 25–32 procura consolidar la imagen del cumplimiento de la voluntad de YHWH sobre las naciones, del

mismo modo que se cumple sobre Israel. En fin, los capítulos 34–48 establecen un contraste más o menos detallado y preciso con la primera parte del libro. No obstante, la segunda sección del libro de Ezequiel no ocupa el centro de interés de la tesis.

Aparte de la composición de la “autobiografía” ficticia del profeta, el otro rasgo que denota el carácter académico del texto de Ezequiel es la técnica de seleccionar, desarrollar y combinar motivos de la tradición teológica precedente. Así, la visión de la divinidad (Ez 1) se inspira en la visión de Is 6, la vocación del profeta (Ez 2–3) en textos de Jeremías, el endurecimiento del pueblo en el motivo teológico de Is 6,9–10.

La referencia a la tradición se manifiesta también en motivos y expresiones precisos. Schöpflin relaciona la visión de Ez 1 con textos como Ex 33,11; Dtn 34,10 por la afirmación de hablar con el Señor “cara a cara”, y con Num 12,8 (“contemplar la תמונה, forma, semejanza). Tal vez haya que notar que Ezequiel privilegia sin embargo la expresión sacerdotal del Levítico (“visión” / “aspecto” מראה) que recuerda más bien Ex 3,3; 24,17, y que está también presente en Num 12,6.8. De todos modos, queda claramente establecida una relación con la imagen profética de Moisés. La crítica sobre los falsos profetas está bajo el fuerte influjo de la teología dtn-dtr, presente en Jeremías y en Dtn 13,2–6; 18,18–22.

Esta sumaria presentación de algunos de los aspectos más interesantes de la tesis de Schöpflin deja entrever que su obra se sitúa en una línea exegética y teológica que está conquistando cada vez más adeptos: algunos libros proféticos no son documentos surgidos de la mano de un personaje real, conocido o más o menos desconocido, responsable de la profecía, y ni siquiera de sus “discípulos”, que respetuosamente conservarían y transmitirían sus palabras, sino obras literarias, religiosas y teológicas, dependientes de numerosos influjos.

En los últimos decenios se ha renunciado a determinar un autor responsable de algunos textos proféticos, como es el caso de la segunda o tercera parte del libro de Isaías. Sin embargo, también textos estimados tradicionalmente como muy antiguos y productos “directos” de la predicación de los profetas (Oseas, Amos y el mismo Isaías) están hoy sometidos a una cuidadosa observación que procura determinar qué parte del libro se puede considerar una respuesta a una presunta situación, por ejemplo, del siglo VIII. En este sentido el trabajo de Schöpflin constituye una contribución importante a esta búsqueda, al alinearse decididamente y con un cuidadoso estudio en una posición crítica frente a las interpretaciones tradicionales.

Sorprende que la selección de un material, a primera vista asaz heterogéneo, no esté suficientemente justificada. Lo mismo se puede aplicar a la precisa relación de los textos escogidos con algunas conclusiones que aparecen en la sección 7. Con frecuencia el lector tiene la impresión de encontrarse frente a un clásico “comentario” del libro de Ezequiel, limitado a algunos capítulos y a los problemas allí presentes (el género del relato de vocación, o las “acciones simbólicas”), más que ante un estudio que elige atentamente solamente aquellos elementos que ayudan a demostrar su tesis central. El tratamiento del material exegético es clásico, minucioso, documentado y maduro, pero, como suele ocurrir en los comentarios, no aporta novedades substanciales.

Un aspecto relativamente nuevo en el estudio exegético de Schöpfung es su interés por clarificar las relaciones comunicativas entre los personajes de los textos, incluyendo el emisor — YHWH, el receptor — el profeta, y el destinatario (p. ej. el pueblo en el exilio o en Jerusalén) (véanse p. ej. pp. 53-54; 100; 124-125; 192). El estudio de las fórmulas introductorias y en particular de aquellas encapsuladas unas en las otras — como había sido notado ya hace muchos años — ha llevado a la autora a matizar el proceso de comunicación de YHWH con el pueblo por medio del profeta, que es uno de los aspectos más misteriosos del libro y directamente conectado con el problema de la autobiografía, ya sea real o ficticia. Es este campo se podrían haber escogido otros puntos de vista para un ulterior desarrollo, tal vez con mayores consecuencias.

De hecho un estudio brillante, no obstante su dificultad, e importante en este campo (R. Nay, *Jahwe im Dialog. Kommunikationsanalytische Untersuchung von Ez 14,1-14 unter Berücksichtigung des dialogischen Rahmens in Ez 8-11 und Ez 20* [Analecta Biblica 141; Roma 1999]), ha sido relegado al olvido en la obra de Schöpfung que, por otra parte, cita una amplia bibliografía. El descuido es lamentable, porque Nay estudia a fondo varios de los textos de Ezequiel tratados en la presente monografía. En esta misma línea de investigación hay que citar también la tesis de R. A. Dus, defendida en el Pontificio Instituto Bíblico en 1999 (*Las parábolas del Reino de Judá. Lingüística textual y comunicación (Ez 17; 19; 21)* [Paraná 2003]), que analiza otro de los capítulos centrales elegidos por Schöpfung (Ez 21).

La inclusión de Ez 7 en la obra de Schöpfung llama la atención porque, como reconoce la autora, es un texto complicado que no aporta material importante para el tema de la “autobiografía”. Sobre Ez 7 se puede consultar ahora J. Cahinga, *O fim da iniquidade, esperança de uma nova era. Uma leitura apocalíptica di Ez 7* (Roma 2003), tesis defendida en la Pontificia Universidad Gregoriana en 2002. Esta contribución, que Schöpfung tampoco pudo consultar, podría ser un buen punto de partida para profundizar en la función de Ez 7, un texto que se separa en mucho de la línea general de la “autobiografía teológica” de Ezequiel.

Estas dos últimas observaciones bibliográficas solamente quieren sugerir que la interesante propuesta de Schöpfung de una teología como biografía está abierta aún a ulteriores precisiones.

Via della Pilotta, 25  
00187 Roma

Horacio SIMIAN-YOFRE, S.J.

Alison LO, *Job 28 as Rhetoric. An Analysis of Job 28 in the Context of Job 22-31* (SVT 97). Leiden, Brill, 2003. xiv-310 p. 16 × 24,5

Dr. Alison Lo's study of the rhetorical role of Job 28 is a slight revision of her doctoral thesis written for the University of Gloucestershire. She argues that Job 28 is an integral component in the book's dramatic movement and properly belongs to Job's third speech in the third cycle of the dialogue (chs.

27–28). Thereby she challenges head on the position of the majority of scholars who have either dismissed this song of wisdom as insertion reflective of conventional wisdom theology or reassigned it to one of the other speakers of the dialogue.

Lo arrives at this interpretation of Job 28 through the use of rhetorical criticism. In her judgment this methodology best equips an interpreter to account for the numerous incongruities and gaps found throughout the Book of Job. The Joban poet frequently employed contradictory juxtaposition as a rhetorical device to probe deeply into the issue of the suffering of the righteous and to motivate the audience to forsake traditional thinking for a new understanding of the suffering of the innocent in relationship to God's justice, particularly as expressed in the Yahweh speeches. That the author favored this rhetorical style is immediately visible in the bold contrast between the silent, submissive Job of the prologue and the verbose, challenging Job of the dialogue. When facing these contradictions, past interpreters sought to eliminate most of them; however, many current interpreters, influenced by the principles of rhetorical criticism, view such gaps and contradictions as integral to the author's design.

An important component of rhetorical analysis is the identification of the audience. Conceding that it is impossible to reconstruct the original audience, Lo posits a rhetorical audience. This audience adheres to traditional theodicy as articulated by Job's friends, namely that all suffering is retribution for wrongdoing. Yet this audience, like Job, is deeply troubled by the challenge that innocent suffering has for belief that God is just.

In this study Lo shows the vital role that the third cycle plays in changing ingrained dogmas about human suffering. Her interpretation of this cycle differs greatly from the majority of scholars, who judge this apparently trite cycle to have suffered severe dislocations in its history of transmissions, e.g., the brevity of Bildad's third speech (ch. 25) and the lack of a third speech from Zophar (ch. 25). Most scholars have attempted to reconstruct a full third cycle by assigning some of the pericopes with contradictory ideas in the Joban speeches to either Bildad and/or Zophar. Lo accuses these scholars of being bound to the principle of consistency. This bondage has prevented them from discerning the author's use of contradictory juxtaposition as a rhetorical device for leading the audience into a new understanding of the way God relates to human suffering. She is correct in stating that most rearrangements of the third cycle of speeches are guided by the principle of uniformity. However, several contemporary scholars have focused on the text at hand rather than centering their study on a reconstruction of this cycle. These scholars, including some who judge a variety of passages as impossible in Job's mouth, are not as bound to the principle of consistency as Lo claims. Thus her accusation against those who rearrange the third cycle as being in bondage to consistency, being repeated several times, turns it into a caricature.

In this study Lo investigates the rhetorical character of Job's four speeches in the third cycle (chs. 22–31), the home of Job 28. Not surprisingly, she interprets the length and the purpose of this cycle differently than the majority of commentators. For her this cycle consists of chapters 22–31, a position that is assumed rather than defended. The assignment of Job's

extensive avowal of innocence (chs. 29–31) to this cycle, however, is unacceptable for several reasons: 1) It has a distinctive heading (29,1), signaling that it stands outside of the dialogue. 2) This speech has a unique, more complex structure than any of Job's speeches in the dialogue, thereby signaling that it has a different purpose than those speeches. 3) Here Job summarizes his key positions, showing clearly the position he has arrived at as he seeks to force God to answer him. Job's avowal of innocence, then, stands outside the dialogue as it opens the next major division in the book (29,1–42,6).

Lo argues that in the third cycle the author charts a different course. In the earlier cycles the poet focuses on the tension between Job's integrity and God's and now exposes the deep inner tensions in Job: "the fluctuation of hope and despair (Job 23), the contradiction between belief and experience (Job 24), the strongest condemnation of the friends' wrongdoings (Job 26–27), the deepest contemplation over wisdom (Job 28), and the firmest determination to confront God (Job 29–31)" (56). These numerous contradictory juxtapositions bring out the depth the anguish such cruel, undeserved suffering has produced in Job.

Lo arrives at this interpretation by focusing on the contradictory juxtapositions in Job's four speeches in this cycle (chs. 23–24; 26; 27–28; 29–31). To illustrate her methodology for supporting the canonical order of these speeches, her argumentation in support of 24,18–24, which describes the swift, certain downfall of the wicked, as an integral part of Job's first speech of this third cycle will be considered in some detail. Most readers are disturbed by Job's recounting the fate of the wicked at this point, for his words not only sound like the positions set out by the comforters, they stand in stark contradiction to his preceding bitter complaint that God fails to keep times of judgment (24,1–17). The difference in outlook between these units is so sharp that most interpreters move 24,18–24 into one of the friends' speeches. Lo acknowledges that Job's jumping from a bitter complaint to reciting traditional lines that depict the certain punishment of the wicked is "abrupt and dissonant" (108). Nevertheless, she defends these words as having been spoken by Job by showing that this contradiction carries forward two sets of contradictions embedded early in this speech. The first contradiction captures the tension between Job's growing confidence of receiving a just trial before God over against his increasing despair at not finding God (23,3–7 vs. 23,8–9). In the second contradiction Job expresses his confidence that God knows he is innocent, yet he stands in dread of God's power, especially if God grants him a hearing (23,10–12 vs. 23,13–16). In the third contradiction Job explicates the agonizing tension between reality and theology: the reality that the weak suffer grave misfortune (24,1–17) despite the wisdom teaching that all receive just retribution (24,18–24). For Lo this last contradictory juxtaposition exposes the deep anxiety Job feels before the reality that God works differently than he has believed. Out of deep agony Job concludes with the poignant rhetorical question — "if it is not so, who will prove me a liar, and show that there is nothing in what I say?" (24,25). For Lo this question "broadens the audience's horizon, showing that traditional retribution is inadequate to account for the existence of evil in the world" (124). That is, the Joban poet employs three contradictory juxtapositions in

this speech from Job to open the audience's eyes both to the truth of Job's words and to the inaccuracy of Eliphaz's last arguments on the certainty of retribution (ch. 22). The author also employs this rhetorical tool to equip the audience to understand God's charge that Job has darkened counsel by putting God in the wrong (e.g., 38,2; 40,8).

Throughout her analysis Lo employs sound hermeneutical procedures. In particular she makes a careful comparison of 24,18-24 with similar genres in the various Joban speeches and, then, compares each of its lines with similar wording in the speeches of the friends. Next she evaluates this pericope in the light of the variety of genres in Job's speeches. From this comparative study she argues that there is not sufficient reason to remove these words from Job's speech.

After investigating the contradictions in the third cycle, Lo undertakes a thorough analysis of Job 28. Since she is committed to working with the present state of the text, she assumes that the heading at 27,1 correctly identifies ch. 28 as a continuation of Job's speech begun in ch. 27. Her rhetorical analysis of ch. 28 is similar to that illustrated for chs. 23-24. She does an excellent job of showing that his speech is an integral component of the book: 1) Job 28,28 forms an inclusio with the opening description of Job in 1,1. 2) This verse also establishes a connection with reference to the fear of God at the end of the Elihu speeches (37,24). However, she could have developed the connection more extensively, especially since D.J.A. Clines and E.L. Greenstein (*Job 28. Cognition in Context* [ed. E. van Wolde] [Leiden 2003] 57-92, 253-80) find such strong literary connections between the song of wisdom and the Elihu speeches that they assign the song to Elihu. 3) This song judges the friends extensive expositions as failing to offer Job any insight into his suffering. 4) For Lo the quest for wisdom is a conceptual overlay to God's being just and yet allowing the righteous to suffer, the position elaborated in the Yahweh speeches (chs. 38-41). She shows that the song of wisdom prepares the audience for the tactic Yahweh takes in his two speeches. More precisely, Lo judges the song of wisdom to be "a false climax". Thus it is a rhetorical ploy that prepares the audience to receive Yahweh's argument. 5) The contrast between divine wisdom (28,21-27) and wisdom available to humans (28,28) offers the key for comprehending Job's contrite response to the Yahweh speeches (42,1-6). 6) In the immediate context 28,28 functions as a foil for Job's next speech, thereby heightening his avowal of innocence (chs. 29-31).

In spite of these keen insights into the role of Job 28 in Job's search for a resolution to his plight, the vast shift in style from Job expressed solemn resolve in daring oaths (ch. 27) to the abstract, contemplative style of the song and back to a determined avowal of innocence (chs. 29-31) is a major obstacle to accepting Lo's conclusion that this song was spoken by Job. To account for these sharp swings in mood Lo postulates that Job's preceding oaths in which he rejects the position of the friends (27,2-6) move him to contemplate the impossibility of humans' attaining wisdom. Lo claims that Job's immediate return to swearing an avowal of innocence grew out of his contemplation of wisdom. Her explanations on this matter are purely speculative, for no signals in the text support them. In fact, Job's complex avowal of innocence is an expansion of his assertion in 27,6: "I hold fast my



righteousness, and will not let it go; my heart does not reproach me for any of my days". The close tie between Job's oaths on both sides of the song of wisdom indicates that these two speeches were composed to stand in tandem before the song became part of the dramatic movement. Lo's attempt to account for the deep tension between these oaths and the contemplative song on the basis of contradictory juxtaposition is unconvincing, for the shifts in mood are too extreme.

Nevertheless, most of Lo's insights into the vital rhetorical role of Job 28 in the dramatic movement of the Book of Job remain valid if this song is assigned to the Joban poet rather than to Job. In the Book of Job, as is the case with most books in the Hebrew Scriptures, the author has an omniscient perspective. This approach is clearly visible in the prologue where the author provides the audience with a heavenly perspective into the cause and reason for Job's suffering, reasons hidden from the characters of the dialogue. So it is tenable to think that the poet composed this song about wisdom and appropriately placed it at the end of the dialogue to provide the audience a reflective respite, allowing them to ponder what the preceding discussion in the dialogue, and also to prepare them for the course the dramatic action will take. In placing the song here the author skillfully includes a piece that stands in contradiction with the immediate context in order to address the issue of human suffering and God's wisdom more generally than would be possible within a Joban speech.

Lo's work is lucid. Each of the five chapters is clearly outlined. She guides the reader through each step of her skillful, rhetorical study. Her work displays the value of rhetorical criticism as a vibrant methodology for interpreting the dynamic plot development in the received text of the Book of Job. In bringing out the distinctive contribution of the third cycle both to the dramatic movement of the story and the theological development of the issues pertaining to the suffering of the innocent, she makes a significant contribution to the interpretation of the Book of Job. There is also a valuable appendix that looks at the use of contradictory juxtapositions in other biblical texts: Proverbs, Pss 9–10; 73, and Ecclesiastes 1,12–2,26; 3,1–15; 3,16–22; 5,9–19; 8,10–15; 9,1–12; 11,7–12,8. Lo's study of Job 28 makes a solid contribution to the intellectual ferment surrounding the interpretation of Job 28, and her study will motivate closer readings of the Book of Job.

Azusa Pacific University  
901 East Alosta Avenue  
Azusa, CA 91702

John E. HARTLEY



## Novum Testamentum

Thomas KAZEN, *Jesus and Purity Halakhah. Was Jesus Indifferent to Impurity?* (Coniectanea Biblica. New Testament Series 38).  
Almqvist & Wicksell International, Stockholm 2002.

Cet ouvrage se veut à la fois une investigation thématique sur le Jésus historique et un débat éclairé sur la *halakhah* relative à la pureté corporelle, les deux étant menés en lien constant avec une évocation circonstanciée de la société juive contemporaine. Le champ de l'information est immense. Il comprend les sources littéraires, du Lévitique et des Nombres à la *Mishnah*, en passant par les œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie et de Flavius Josèphe, les livres du Nouveau Testament et plus encore les manuscrits de la mer Morte; en allant si besoin des messages prophétiques et sapientiels à celui de Jean le Baptiste. L'auteur n'omet pas l'appoint utile de sources parallèles, ainsi le Papyrus *Egerton 2* ou le Papyrus *Oxyrhynchus 840*, l'*Évangile de Thomas* et d'autres. Sont prises en compte aussi, positivement, les sources non littéraires, au premier chef archéologiques; également, des données sociologiques voire ethnologiques et anthropologiques, certaines à références régionales, en l'occurrence galiléennes. Le dossier apparaît largement pluridisciplinaire, ce qu'accentue encore la réflexion méthodologique servant de prolégomènes à l'ensemble du propos. Bref, on percevra d'emblée combien l'éclairage de la société judaïque du premier siècle de notre ère, celui qui vit se manifester Jésus de Nazareth, en Galilée bien plus qu'ailleurs, est riche et diversifié. Le livre s'enrichit d'Excursus dont on appréciera l'utile richesse en dépit de la concision nécessaire: par exemple, sur la pureté comme métaphore, sur le sacrifice pour le pardon des péchés, sur la lèpre, sur l'immersion et le renouvellement de l'Alliance dans la *Règle de la communauté* de Qumrân.

Ce livre suppose une longue et onéreuse recherche. Il n'est destiné qu'à l'étude. D'où son caractère noblement austère. Très pédagogique, il se présente comme un vaste fichier, organisé et raisonné, balisé d'une multitude de titres et de sous-titres, précis et descriptifs. Un réseau peut-être excessif de *Summaries*, sectoriels puis généraux, aide à suivre ou si besoin à reprendre le cours encombré des développements et des débats. Car débat incessant il y a. D'abord, avec les chercheurs — parmi lesquels notre auteur se place — qui ont le souci prioritaire sinon exclusif de mettre en lumière le caractère essentiellement juif du Jésus de l'histoire. Ceci, au risque de ne plus laisser le moindre espace à tout écart significatif. Pour d'aucuns en effet, Jésus ne serait qu'un Juif à la conduite «judaïque» sur tout point irréprochable. L'éminent G. Vermes voit même dans sa mort le simple effet d'un malheureux malentendu. Th. Krazen, lui, veut s'employer à chercher la différence, sans toujours pour autant la rendre saillante tant est nuancée sa démarche et limité son objet, l'attitude de Jésus face à l'impureté corporelle. Celle-ci n'a guère été traitée dans les nombreuses études consultées, si ce n'est de quelque façon par les commentateurs du chapitre 7 de l'Évangile de Marc, la fameuse polémique sur «le pur et l'impur». Et le présent ouvrage de décrocher l'approche de la version évangélique pour la resituer dans le cadre originel d'une première

interprétation des actions ou des omissions du Jésus historique, plus précisément d'un crédible *Gesamtbild* de celui-ci en relation vécue avec les concepts de pureté et d'impureté, celle-ci étant conçue comme l'antithèse de la sainteté. Cela renvoie aux comportements et aux actes du Galiléen, davantage qu'à ses paroles et plus encore ses pensées. D'où le traitement, en un second temps, des témoins écrits du registre narratif, exorcismes, guérisons et autres, plus riches de références concrètes et d'enseignements directs que les textes à teneur conflictuelle ou polémique. Car l'étude de Th. Krazen s'intéresse surtout à l'état corporel de contagion par contact, situation soumise aux purifications légales selon Lévitique 12–15 et Nombres 19. Sont visés principalement les cadavres, les maladies de peau (globalement la lèpre) et les écoulements (de sperme et de sang). Les passages: Marc 5,21-24 et 35-43 (la résurrection de la fille de Jaïre), Marc 1,40-45 (la guérison d'un lépreux) et Marc 5,25-34 (la guérison de la femme au flux de sang), renvoient respectivement à ces trois cas. Notons que la réglementation de la pureté dans la société judaïque pré-chrétienne appartient à l'ordre du rituel ou du cultuel. Ce qui n'a rien à voir avec la notion moderne d'hygiène. Maïmonide (1135-1204) sera le premier à risquer le lien entre les deux, en attendant le XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle.

L'objectif de la présente étude, c'est de saisir, ou plutôt de «reconstituer» la situation religieuse, sociale et existentielle dans laquelle se trouvait Jésus quand il affrontait un fait patent d'impureté corporelle; et de comprendre ainsi la raison et le fait de son comportement propre. Et comportement propre il y a, qui dérangeait volontiers. Th. Krazen cherche à savoir ce qui le caractérise et définit, et ce qui l'explique, pour être à même de déceler qui il dérange. Une question de méthode ici se pose. Un supposé ou apparent laxisme de Jésus face aux rigueurs d'une *halakhah* qui, dans le domaine de la pureté corporelle, ne cessait alors de renfoncer ses principes et ses règles, ne constitue pas une explication suffisante. Pas plus que sa volonté, héritée des Prophètes et des Sages d'Israël et sans doute assumée par Jean le Baptiste, de préférer la pureté morale, intérieure et du cœur, à la pureté rituelle, extérieure et legaliste. Ni que son opposition à l'un ou l'autre groupe, les Pharisiens par exemple. Même pas son commerce prolongé avec la Galilée, éloignée des rouages régulateurs de la capitale religieuse, Jérusalem, du Temple d'abord. Certes, chacun de ces faits peut apporter un élément partiel d'explication, quant au contexte lui-même, mais combien insuffisant. Il faut un vrai modèle, apte à faire pièce au «paradigme» de la pureté corporelle qui s'exprimait à l'époque. Th. Krazen le trouve dans la façon propre qu'a Jésus d'intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir face à la manifestation de plus en plus généralisée d'un système de pureté dont la rigidité au demeurant gagnante ne cessait de s'amplifier. Chez un homme du commun, l'attitude du Galiléen n'aurait ni surpris ni choqué. Mais la réserve récurrente de ce dernier a pu se trouver interprétée comme une prise de distance voire une opposition véritable. Et par la suite on réinterprétera, en d'autres contextes, cette première interprétation, dans un sens cette fois conflictuel ou polémique qu'attestent les Évangiles. Quand il approchait un cadavre, un lépreux ou un malade souffrant d'écoulements, Jésus de Nazareth s'appliquait comme spontanément à agir comme annonateur du Royaume de Dieu: comme le témoin conscient de la force divine qui agissait en lui et se déployait par lui. Cela ne pouvait que produire des effets

perceptibles vis-à-vis du respect exigé des termes de la Loi. C'est jusqu'à cette première phase, originelle, de l'interprétation que notre chercheur tient à remonter. C'est là qu'il situe la limite de sa recherche.

Sur l'épistémologie de celle-ci, Th. Krazen s'explique avec pertinence dans la première partie de son livre. À l'école de théoriciens du discours historique en tant que celui d'une science sociale, il préconise avec bonheur de ne pas totalement séparer le sujet de l'objet, «l'objectivité dans l'histoire ne pouvant être une objectivité de fait mais de relation: relation entre fait et interprétation, entre passé, présent et futur» (35). Il juge le concept d'authenticité problématique, la notion de vérité religieuse ne lui étant d'ailleurs liée que depuis le Moyen Âge: il doit être utilisé avec discernement. Il résume en ces termes sa méthode: «Avec tous les outils dont on dispose, nous ne pouvons que descendre vers la couche la plus ancienne possible de la tradition, l'interprétation la plus ancienne, nullement jusqu'à l'événement lui-même» (40). Et d'ajouter: «Il y a *interplay* constant entre l'interprète et la question posée, entre les faits et l'interprétation, entre le pourquoi et le quoi, entre les hypothèses et la critique. Ce qui ne doit pas être considéré comme un problème mais comme une condition nécessaire de la recherche historique» (41).

Tout exégète du Nouveau Testament se réjouira de disposer de cette solide et lumineuse étude. Nous regrettons que l'éditeur ne nous ait pas dit qui était l'auteur, ce qu'il faisait et ce que l'on pouvait attendre de lui. Quant à ce dernier, nous souhaiterions qu'il sache reprendre les résultats de son importante recherche dans un livre bref, limpide et vigoureux, et déployer au mieux son propos sans se soucier de débattre avec qui que ce soit. Ce serait là une chose utile, importante même, pour de nombreux lecteurs qui, sans être des savants, s'intéressent au Jésus de l'histoire.

Rue Wilhem, 11  
F-75016 Paris

André PAUL

Andrea J. MAYER-HAAS, "*Geschenk aus Gottes Schatzkammer*" (*bSchab 10b*). Jesus und der Sabbat im Spiegel der neutestamentlichen Schriften (Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen. Neue Folge 43). Münster, Aschendorff Verlag 2003.

The book under review is the inaugural dissertation presented by Andrea Mayer-Haas to the Catholic Theological Faculty at Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, written under the direction of Prof. Michael Theobald. As such, it is laden with all the formalities that can burden a dissertation and exhibits great industry on the part of its author. Mayer-Haas' stated aim is to answer a series of questions: "In relation to which Jewish understanding of the Sabbath is Jesus to be situated? Which Sabbath praxis of Jesus throws light on the various understandings of the Sabbath in early Christianity? Did Jesus' Sabbath behavior inform the formation and the transmission of the Sabbath texts now found in the New Testament?" (31).

In light of these questions, the introduction proposes the criteria to be used in the search of the historical Jesus. However, the author only discusses the criterion of dissimilarity and the problems faced when it is applied to the reconstruction of Jesus's Sabbath observance in relation to contemporary Jewish practices. In the conclusion Mayer-Haas reconsiders the criterion of dissimilarity and offers instead Theissen/Winter's criterion of historical plausibility modified by Crossan's double *dicta*: "What did Jesus say and do that led, if not necessarily at least immediately, to such diverse understandings?" and "That is original which best explains the multiplicity engendered in the tradition" (656). For this latter criterion to work, the one employing it would have to argue for alternative explanations and then demonstrate which is the best. That is not what is found here. When Mayer-Haas asks, "Which behavior of Jesus in relation to Israel's Sabbath, which Sabbath praxis of Jesus, explains the polyform history of the Sabbath in early Christianity, taking into account the genesis and transmission of the New Testament Sabbath texts?" (657), the historically plausible answers are many. She chooses to say only that the controversies with the representatives of Pharisaism are based on a historical kernel (679).

Accordingly, Jesus' Sabbath conduct was not related to contemporary views of piety, nor to the views of the many minor groups within Judaism. "He moved in a wide spectrum of Jewish Sabbath conducts in Palestine at the time of the Second Temple" (680). Jesus stood equally remote from the ritualistic views of the Book of Jubilees, the Damascus Document, and the Sadducees, and from the Pharisees. He saw the Sabbath work prohibition neither in terms of ritual purity, nor of the post-exilic tendencies to ritualize it. This left room for his disciples after Easter to transgress the territorial and religious limits Israel had established for the Sabbath.

As a substitute for Rordorf's Jesus, whose Sabbath activity constituted deliberate acts of provocation to announce the abolishment of the Sabbath, Mayer-Haas presents a Jesus who is a pious Jew, fully obedient to Torah and observant of the Sabbath. This picture is not new. P. Fredriksen, for example, demonstrated that any reconstruction of the historical Jesus that depicts him as opposed to Torah "fails as credible explanation" (*From Jesus to Christ* [New Haven – London 1988] 108), and R.E. Brown argued that, while it is historically certain that Jesus did not follow the Rabbinic prescriptions for Sabbath observance, he certainly did not stand against the Sabbath or the Torah (*The Gospel According to John* [AB 29; Garden City 1966] 1.210).

The conclusion contains an unexpected lengthy discussion of the origins of Sunday, which are traced back to "neither an 'institution' by Jesus of Nazareth nor to his opposition to the Sabbath" (641). What justification is there for including Sunday in a discussion of the historical Jesus's relation to the Sabbath? The most plausible explanation seems to be that the book has an undeclared agenda: to not only offer an alternative to Rordorf's reconstruction of Jesus' attitude toward the Sabbath but also to his explanation for the emergence of Sunday. As such, it has, to some degree, succeeded.

The body of the book deals with the Sabbath texts in the New Testament. The first text up for consideration is 1 Cor 16,2. While related to the day of the resurrection it does not focus on community gatherings but rather deals with the private setting aside of monies (84). In Gal 4,10, Paul is not

concerned at all with the Sabbath prohibition of work but with the placing of the Torah, and the Sabbath as part of it, as a precondition. "He is defending his teaching of righteousness by faith" (94). Rom 14,5, while having to do with abstention from work and the Sabbath's role as a Jewish identity marker, also includes other feast days in which Jews had much delight. In fact these celebrations may have had syncretistic elements which were shared by many in that superstitious age. Thus, all in all, Mayer-Haas concludes that one cannot get any sense of the historical Jesus' attitude toward the Sabbath from these materials (114). Still, it can be said that Paul foresaw a Christianity that was not observant of the Sabbath (116). To the reader unaware of the conclusion, it seems curious to learn that there seems to have been no celebrations on Sundays at Rome (106).

In the Letter to the Colossians, written by someone close to Paul, the issue is to distinguish what is founded on Christ from what is founded on ephemeral things (127). Those being opposed by the author of the letter are not Jewish Christians but Jewish proselytes who failed to see that the cultic laws of Israel have lost their meaning (130). Thus, as in the letters of Paul, in Colossians the celebration of Jewish feasts is not forbidden as a matter of principle but on the basis of the Christ-event's transcending significance. From the Pauline literature in general it may be gathered that "no gentile Christian should be condemned for non observance". Mayer-Haas goes on to point out that neither Paul nor the author of Colossians appeal to Jesus in their explanation of the irrelevance of Sabbath observance on the part of gentile Christians (134). Arguments from silence are notorious for their weakness. While in this case the argument may be related to the topic of the book, its foundation is questionable. It is not clear that the strong and the weak at Rome may be identified with Jews and gentiles. And it must be remembered that the author of Colossians has a very high estimate of circumcision. To say that no gentile may be condemned for non observance is not to say that the Sabbath is irrelevant for gentiles. It would seem, rather, that Paul would have said that no Christian should be condemned for non observance, and it is not clear that the author of Colossians would have agreed.

Having not gained much from the Pauline texts, Mayer-Haas directs her attention to the gospels. In the Markan account of the plucking of corn on the Sabbath she finds the reference to David and his men when they were hungry most significant, and argues that Mark is making the case for Jesus as a David *redivivus*. This seems to me to ignore the rather explicit Markan efforts to point out that Jesus is not a son of David. In general, Mayer-Haas thinks that Mark represents a Christianity that observed the Sabbath, and was written to combat those who had already rejected Sabbath observance. The example of the Lord of the Sabbath is to be followed, rather than that of the Pharisees, especially in the gentile mission (256-257).

Like Mark, Luke also wrote an apology for Jesus and the early Christians as observers of Torah against those who suspected them to have defected (395). While the gentile branch of the Church does not follow the full Torah, the Christian community is in *heilsgeschichtliche* continuity with Israel and the Torah (397). According to Mayer-Haas, the Sabbath is more central to Luke than to any other evangelist (398). Thus, while Luke's redactional work aims to clear away any misunderstanding of Jesus as a Sabbath breaker, the

real subject of the Lucan Sabbath conflicts is the valuation of the person and the work of Jesus (331). Still, in Luke one finds the beginnings of a Christian Sabbath theology which emphasizes its power to “make free”, “to unbind”. In this it takes up Jewish eschatological expectations of a world “that is wholly Sabbath” (402).

In Matthew, the social dimensions of the Sabbath commandment stand in the foreground. More than even in Mark, the power of the Son over the Sabbath is revealed in his praxis, which is the model for Christian Sabbath observance (453). The Matthean addition of the prayer that the flight from Jerusalem at the time of its fall may not be on a Sabbath (Matt 24,20) does not say that the survival of the community is threatened by a flight on a Sabbath. Rather, by reinforcing the validity of the Sabbath commandment in a way that Rabbinic Judaism would appreciate, Matthew is strengthening the community against a split (458). Matthew’s Torah theology confronts both antinomian and rigorist tendencies which threaten the community’s unity. Thus, while insisting on the permanent validity of the Sabbath commandment, it also relativizes its claims. “The Sabbath commandment is not an absolute commandment but has to be understood in relation to the love commandment. Both aspects are tied together by the Christological foundation for understanding Torah” (488). It is not clear whether Mayer-Haas means that Jesus or Matthew is to be credited for this interpretation of “the third commandment (in Catholic counting)”. It is clear, however, that she understands that Matthew is closest to Jesus’ own Sabbath theology. In the Matthean community there was no conflict about the need to keep the seventh day of the week holy. By means of the Sabbath theme Matthew is trying to unite the Markan gentile heritage to his own tradition (493).

The Gospel of John’s Sabbath narratives reveal that in this community the Sabbath is no longer a practical problem. The provocative breaking of the biblical work prohibition on the part of Jesus indicates that this community “sanctified the Sabbath in hostile opposition to synagogal Judaism as a mark of identity” (566). The Easter accounts show that the community’s weekly rhythm was now marked by Sunday, as a memorial of God’s salvation in Christ. This is a most significant step for future Christianity, one taken not without obstacles (588). As for John’s contribution to our understanding of the historical Jesus, we do not learn anything we did not know already from the synoptics (604-605).

According to Mayer-Haas, the Epistle to the Hebrews is the only witness within the New Testament to a Christian eschatological understanding of the Sabbath. The word  $\mu\prime$  refers exclusively to God’s Sabbath, not to human Sabbath observance, and  $\epsilon\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$  never points to an earthly reality. “It is a metaphor for the yet to be accomplished full salvation in the eschatological communion of Christians with God” (613).

In summary, the author provides a good survey of the sources that might possibly be helpful in reconstructing the views of Jesus on the Sabbath, along the way taking up positions that are of interest even if usually unconvincing. Mayer-Haas submits each source to synchronic and diachronic analyses which often fail to address the syntactical and grammatical complexities in the texts and are controlled by foreign assumptions. The distinction between “the commandment” and the ritual laws provides but one example.



Regrettably, her discussion is often guided by secondary sources rather than by careful exegesis. In reference to Paul and the letter to the Colossians, her book would have been much stronger if she had paid more attention to the marked differences both in terms of tone as well as substance among these letters. With regard to the Gospels, it would still seem that the Sabbath controversies reflect real debates within Christianity concerning permissible activities on the Sabbath. Moreover, to limit eschatological interest only to Hebrews, denying it in the Gospel of John and the letter to the Colossians, in particular, appears to bypass the evidence. The author herself suggests an eschatological interest in Lucan theology. Still, Mayer-Haas corroborates the diversity that characterized early Christianity, and her concern to find a Jesus that best accounts for this diversity is welcomed.

2262 Green Elf Dr.  
Berrien Springs, MI 49103-9160  
USA

Herold WEISS

Alan J.P. GARROW, *The Gospel of Matthew's Dependence on the Didache*. (JSNTSS 254) London-New York, T&T Clark International, 2003. xxxiii-272 p. 16 × 24. £70.00.

The relation of the *Didache* to the Synoptic Gospels, in particular Matthew, has been controverted ever since its publication in 1883 by Bryennios. Two main lines of argument have been advocated. F.E. Vokes (*The Riddle of the Didache* [London 1938]) concluded that the *Didache* was dependent on Matthew, an assessment that was repeated by E. Massaux (*Influence de l'évangile de saint Matthieu sur la littérature chrétienne avant saint Irénée* [Louvain-Gembloux 1950]) and more recently by K. Wengst (*Didache (Apostellehre), Barnabasbrief, Zweiter Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet* [Darmstadt 1984]). But since the late 1950s a second line of argument has been promoted by H. Köster (*Synoptische Überlieferung bei den apostolischen Vätern* [TU 65; Berlin 1957]) and J. P. Audet (*La Didachè: Instructions des apôtres* [Ebib; Paris 1958]) who have argued that the *Didache* depends not on the written form of the Synoptics but on oral pre-synoptic tradition. This view is advocated in the recent commentary by K. Niederwimmer (*Die Didache* [Kommentar zu den apostolischen Vätern 1; Göttingen 1989]) and in the many essays of Jonathan Draper. Now, in this revised Oxford dissertation supervised by C.M. Tuckett, Alan Garrow argues a novel thesis: that not only does the *Didache* reflect pre-synoptic tradition, but that Matthew betrays dependence on a version of the *Didache* lacking only *Did.* 8,2b, 11,3b, 15,3-4 and 16,7.

The book is divided into two main parts, a compositional analysis of the *Didache* (13-156) followed by an argument that the contacts between Matthew and the *Didache* suggest Matthew knows the *Didache* (158-252). A compositional analysis is important to Garrow mainly in order to cast doubt upon the two dominant theses. For if, as most acknowledge, the *Didache* is



composite with components of varying ages and provenances, it is unlikely that every portion is literarily dependent upon Matthew. Neither, argues Garrow, is it likely that the *Didache* and Matthew drew coincidentally “on the *same* selection of Jewish paraenese, liturgical modes of expression, Old Testament sayings, and so on”, as Garrow supposes that Köster’s theory requires (6, emphasis original).

Parenthetically, it should be noted that Garrow’s argument here is fallacious, based on a misstatement of the data. Of course Matthew and the *Didache* coincide at certain points — material that Garrow calls “uniquely similar material”. But the overlap between Matthew and the *Didache* is not nearly complete nor is it the case that they draw on the “same” selection of Jewish sources. On the contrary, Matthew contains much that the *Didache* lacks and *vice versa*. The situation is not logically different from that of Matthew and Luke: there is distinctive material as well as common material — in fact far more common material than what Matthew shares with the *Didache*. Given the commonalities, it is not *a priori* more likely that Matthew depends on Luke or *vice versa* than that the two use one (or more) common source(s). Nothing is settled in the abstract.

Garrow’s compositional theory describes five stages: a “base document,” liturgical in nature which was already connected with the Two Ways document in virtually its present form; a second document that added and qualified material on the Eucharist and the reception of visitors; a redaction of the two preceding layers which showed concern for financial issues and which distinguished Jewish from Christian practices; allusions to “the gospel” added after the editing of Matthew (8,2; 11,3b; 15,3-4); and finally, the addition to 16,7 “to repair a theological deficiency created by the disappearance of the last few lines of the textual tradition” of the H manuscript (11). Hence, Garrow’s five stages are:

1. “Base Document”: *Did.* 1,1-5; 2,2-5,2a; 6,1-7a.c.e, 4a; 9,1-5a; 11,3a.4-6; 16,1-6.8-9.
2. “Prophetic Document”: *Did.* 10,1-7; 11,7-9.12; 12,1-5.
3. “Modifying Teacher layer”: *Did.* 1,5b-6; 7,1d.2-3.4b; 8,2c; 9,5b; 11,1-2.10-11; 13,3a.5-7; 14,1-15,2.
4. “Gospel layer”: *Did.* 8,2b; 11,3b; 15,3-4.
5. “Jerusalem addition”: *Did.* 16,7.

Garrow’s compositional theory is in fact even more complex than what is indicated here, since he also discusses the composition of the “Base Document,” which in his view is comprised of a Two Ways document (1,1-2a; 2,2-7; 3,8-5,2a), a “Law Summary” (1,2b.d.e; 2,1); a “Sayings Onion” (1,3-5a); the *teknon* unit (3,1-7); and the Apocalypse, which is itself evolved in three stages. The “Sayings onion” (1,3-5a) is also the result of a complex compositional process, with the warning against fleshly appetites (1,4a) forming the “hub,” around which the second person plural admonitions to love of enemies (1,3b + 3c) and the second person singular admonitions to non-resistance (1,4b) and generous giving (1,5a) are organized.

At this point Garrow considers the relationship between the *Doctrina apostolorum* and the *Didache* and concludes that the *Doctrina* is dependent on *Did.* 1-6 rather than *vice versa*. The consequence of this conclusion for his overall thesis is that *Did.* 1,3-5a, which is lacking in the *Doctrina* might still

be considered part of the original layer of the *Didache*. This is a very improbable conjecture in my view, since Garrow is also required to assume that the *Doctrina* conflated the *Didache* with *Barnabas* in order to account for various agreements of the *Doctrina* and *Barnabas* against the *Didache*.

Not all of Garrow's compositional conclusions have direct relevance to his principal thesis of determining the literary relationship between Matthew and the *Didache*, discussed in the second part of the book. What is crucial from a methodological point of view is that he shows that Matthew betrays knowledge not only of the base levels of the *Didache* but also of its subsequent modifications. To this end Garrow attempts to establish a redaction of the base level. For example, it is generally noted that 1,5b-6 appears to restrict and qualify the preceding exhortation to unconditional almsgiving (1,5a) and does so by placing strictures on the one receiving. This insertion Garrow relates to 11,1-2.10-11 and 13,1-7 which also appear to be additions to 11,3-9 and 12,1-5 and while affirming the prophets' right to support offers criteria for distinguishing true from false prophets. One wonders whether 1,5b-6 would be better connected with 11,12, assigned to Garrow to his second layer, since both take a highly reserved perspective on receiving financial support. Garrow also treats the Lord's Prayer in 8,2b-3 as an addition as well as the polemical references to the "hypocrites" in 8,1-2a. That 8,1-3 did not belong originally with the surrounding instructions on baptism and Eucharist has also been argued by Draper. But what Garrow does not show is that the material in 8,1-3 is materially connected with the other redactional features in 1,5b-6; 11,1-2.10-11; and 13,1-7.

Armed with this compositional scenario, Garrow then argues that Matthew shows awareness of elements in the first three (but not the last two) compositional layers of the *Didache*: The base layer is the source of Matt 5,5.7.21.22.27.28.33.39.42.44.45.46-47; 7,12.13-14; 15,19; 16,27; 19,18; 22,38-39; 24,10-12.30-31; 25,8.31.43.46; 28,16.19-20; the "Prophetic Document" is the source of Matt 12,31; and the "Teaching Layer" supplies Matt 5,19.24.26; 6,2.5.9-13.16; 7,6; 10,10; and 28,19.

It is Garrow's argument with respect to the "Teaching Layer" that is crucial to his case that Matthew knows not just the tradition behind the *Didache* but its redaction. For example, he argues that *Did.* 14,1-15,2 belongs to this layer (inserted apparently to elaborate *Did.* 9,1-5a; 10,1-7) and that 14,2 (  $\mu$  , "  $\mu$  "  $\mu$  , "  $\mu$  "  $\mu$  ) is a redactional qualification of 14,1 (121). Typically, says Garrow, the redactor agrees with the "host text" (14,1) and then modifies it (14,2). Since Matt 5:24 agrees with *Did.* 14,2 in the use of  $\mu$  and uses  $\mu$  for the *Didache*'s  $\mu$  , Garrow concludes that Matthew betrays knowledge of the *Didache*'s redaction and attributed the saying to Jesus because of the *Didache*'s title, "The Teaching of the Lord". Similarly, he argues that *Did.* 1,5b is a redactional qualification of 1,5a (on unconditional giving), and that Matthew has adapted the *Didache*'s  $\mu$  at Matt 5:26. He rejects both the solution that the *Didache* deliberately used Matthew — in that case, the *Didache* paid no attention to Matthew's context — and that the influence was unconscious — "this explanation requires a considerable level

of unconscious coincidence" (164) —, and instead posits Matthew's (deliberate) use of *Did.* 1,5b. Curiously, he does not explain why, in that case, Matthew ignores the context of the *Didache*.

A full evaluation of Garrow's argument would require at least a long essay. Some portions of his argument — for example, that *Did.* 16,3-6, 8 does not show dependence on Matthew 24, and that this material has probably influenced the composition of Matthew 24 — have already been argued by this reviewer ("Didache 16,6-8 and Special Matthaean Tradition", *ZNW* 70 [1979] 54–67). His case for Matthew's direct use of the *Didache* is much more problematic, both because his identification of "redactional" features in the *Didache* is at times dubious and his identification of redactional strata unconvincing — in particular the so-called "Teacher Layer," but also because he makes no effort to account for Matthew's *omissions* of materials which, one might think, would have appealed to Matthew, for example, the meditation of being "double-minded" or "double-souled" (2,4; 4,4) or the highly organized exposition of the second register of the Decalogue (3,1-7) or the elaborate rules concerning the reception of prophets which Matthew only alludes to in 7,15-20. If the thesis of Matthew's use of the *Didache* were to be persuasive, one would also have to show that the *sequence* of the *Didache*'s materials had an influence on Matthew's organization, just as Mark's order has profoundly affected both Matthew and Luke and Q's sequence has controlled the way in which Matthew and Luke fused Q with Mark. There is, unfortunately, almost no discernible pattern of borrowing from the *Didache* in Matthew.

Garrow's work deserves attention, not only because he has offered an innovative analysis of the composition of the *Didache* but also because he has argued his own thesis of Matthew's use of the *Didache* with careful attention to detail. I do not think that he has made a convincing argument but that does not mean that there is not much fine analytic work here.

Trinity College  
University of Toronto  
M5S 1H8 Canada

John S. KLOPPENBORG

George H. VAN KOOTEN, *Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School*. Colossians and Ephesians in the Context of Graeco-Roman Cosmology, with a New Synopsis of the Greek Texts (WUNT 2. Reihe 171). Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2003.

The burden of this revised Leiden dissertation (supervised by Henk-Jan de Jonge) is to illuminate the relationship between Paul and the authors of Colossians and Ephesians. It achieves this by means of an analysis of their respective cosmology in the context of Jewish, Stoic and Middle Platonist philosophy. The clear distinctiveness of Colossians vis-à-vis the authentic Pauline letters, and of Ephesians vis-à-vis Colossians, is a basic point of departure.

The argument proceeds in four long chapters. The first picks up the notion of an apparently cosmic  $\kappa\omicron\mu\omicron$  in Colossians (2,9-10.17.19) and relates this to contemporary Stoic and Middle Platonist physics. Such a link, Dr. Van Kooten suggests, has never before been systematically sustained. He is dissatisfied by the commentators' conventionally ecclesiological reading of the language of 'body', 'head' and 'bond' in 'medical, physiological' terms, because he finds this unduly dependent on a close correlation with Ephesians. In its place, Van Kooten urges a 'physical, cosmological' understanding of the terminology, which places Colossians in closer proximity to middle Platonist and especially Stoic ideas about the cosmos as a body held together with divinely constituted bonds (56-57).

Chapter 2 takes a step back in order to accentuate the cosmology of the authentic Pauline epistles, focusing specifically on Gal 4,3-10 and 1 Cor 15,23-28. The former shows that the 'constellation of the cosmos' ( $\kappa\omicron\mu\omicron$ ) has for Paul been decisively subjected and reconfigured in a Christ-centred cosmology, a phenomenon which in turn reconfigures religious and practical reality ( $\kappa\omicron\mu$  ...  $\kappa\omicron\mu$ , 5,25; cf. 6,16). In 1 Corinthians, similarly, Dr. Van Kooten finds two competing modes of embodied existence, the obsolete 'psychic' one and the new 'pneumatic one'. In both epistles Paul's view is that the present cosmos 'will disintegrate within the next few decades', and that only 'the future cosmos will be coherent' (107).

Colossians, by contrast, takes the view that even the present cosmos endures and already coheres in Christ: the old cosmological principles have already been definitively 'subdued and integrated' into a Christ-centred cosmic harmony. As unfolded in Chapter 3, Dr. Van Kooten sees this as the pseudepigrapher's attempt to generate a Hellenizing cosmology better able to account for the failure of Paul's short-term apocalypticism. Christ's triumph over the elemental powers is on this reading deliberately modelled on a similar conflict in Graeco-Roman philosophy, identified here in Plutarch's notions of Aphrodite or Eros subduing the disorder of the cosmos or Osiris the strife of the cosmic powers. While Colossians 'strikingly... resembles' Paul's view of humanity's slavery to the cosmic elements, the Pauline destruction and replacement of the cosmos is for this author replaced by its present reconciliation under a Christ who plays the part of Aphrodite, Eros, Osiris and the Demiurge.

In Chapter 4 the argument turns to Ephesians. This text was originally addressed to the Laodiceans as an 'exhaustive commentary' on Colossians, a document already known to this meta-pseudonymous author as inauthentic — and 'false' even in its Laodicean connection (Col 4,16). That connection in turn makes Laodicea available as a 'most convincing' fictitious destination (201-202). Ephesians is designed primarily to refute the cosmology and cosmic Christology of Colossians. Finding all previous synopses of Colossians and Ephesians 'far from sufficient' to the task (cf. Appendix I, 215-222), Van Kooten has set out to produce his own (Appendix II, 239-289). In his extended exposition on the basis of this synopsis (149-201), he highlights the Ephesian author's deliberate re-arrangement of the structure of Colossians in order to revise its notion of the cosmos as the body of Christ. Ephesians is seen instead to favour a view in which only the church is that body, while the

'filling' of the cosmos is a gradual process rather than a Christological *fait accompli*.

The overall thesis, then, as the concluding Chapter 5 confirms, is to read Ephesians as correcting the cosmology of Colossians in a partly 're-Paulinizing' direction (165-166). In analogy to Stoic notions of the cosmic city, Ephesians affirms Christ's subjugation of the cosmos as a gradual process crucially involving the church, rather than as a corollary to either the world's destruction or its re-conception as the fully-integrated cosmic body of Christ.

After the two aforesaid Appendices concerned with Van Kooten's synopsis, the volume ends with abbreviations, an impressively long list of primary sources and a surprisingly brief list of secondary sources, and indexes of ancient and modern authors reflecting similar proportions.

The technical presentation of the book is in keeping with Mohr Siebeck's customary high standards. My few minor complaints on this front include the relatively inaccessible layout of indexes and of the Synopsis in Appendix II. More generally, perhaps, user friendliness suffers a little from Mohr Siebeck's familiar problem of producing books in English without the benefit of a pro-active copy-editor who is also a native speaker.

Dr. Van Kooten has made an appealing and original contribution to the interpretation of Colossians and Ephesians, and to the question of the relationship between them. In this learned study, he succeeds in shining a spotlight on several familiar interpretative conundrums by means of a close reading of these letters in their ancient Graeco-Roman philosophical environment. Somewhat by the way he has also managed to add welcome grist to the mill of continuing debate about the Pauline or quasi-Pauline authorship of one or both Epistles.

In Dr. Van Kooten's view the authorship question is now a simple open-and-shut case, on which further discussion is superfluous. It is true that a study of this nature could waste much time dredging up familiar arguments that have in the view of many been long since decisively settled, one way or another... Nevertheless the posited relationship between Paul, Colossians and Ephesians is of considerable importance to Dr. Van Kooten's overall argument, and it might have been well to doff the cap to the many scholars who, especially in the case of Colossians, do not perhaps hold their views pro or contra Pauline authenticity with quite such conviction. Arguments for models of non-Pauline authorship that fall shy of straightforwardly deceptive pseudonymity (e.g. recently J. Muddiman on Eph), let alone for authenticity, do not register in the bibliography; but then nor do influential recent restatements of the case for pseudonymity (e.g. U. Schnelle, R.E. Brown). Similarly, the phenomenon of pseudepigraphy itself does not come in for scrutiny: we find no interaction with studies critical of D.G. Meade's popular but historically problematic portrayal of ancient blithe nonchalance about pseudonymity (contrast e.g. A.D. Baum, J. Duff and others). In the absence of such discussion, this reader had difficulty envisaging Dr. Van Kooten's scenario: after Colossians was composed in the 80s 'at the earliest' (2; further argument is promised but only a restatement delivered, 108), 'somewhere between 80 and 140' Ephesians was knowingly superimposed upon it as equally pseudo-Pauline. Yet Ephesians still seems to many scholars to be

presumed authoritative (even if not necessarily Pauline or even 'Ephesian'!) as early as *1 Clem.* 36,6 (cf. Eph 4,4-6) and the prologue of Ignatius' *Ephesians* (cf. Eph 1,4-6). It is of course possible to refute such doubts in favour of the proposed scenario, but not perhaps in the mere half-page here on offer.

This reviewer was impressed by the wide range of ancient Graeco-Roman primary sources under discussion. At the same time, the overall argument at times seemed weakened by the emphasis on Stoicism and Middle Platonism as predominantly determinative for the background of Colossians and Ephesians. Pan- or polytheistic analogies with Aphrodite or Osiris commend themselves unproblematically. Jewish sources, by contrast, are (with the notable exception of Philo) engaged very much less fully — and then primarily in relation to the 'authentic' Pauline cosmology of 1 Corinthians or Galatians. This may of course be correct. But themes of sudden or even gradual subjugation of cosmic conflict, for example, would not be impossible to illustrate from either apocalyptic or sapiential texts in the Dead Sea Scrolls (of which just four passages are cited in two footnotes, 28-29). A useful debate could be had here about criteria and the suitability of parallels, be they pagan or Jewish. In the absence of such discussion, one might be forgiven for wondering if the hermeneutically charged playing field of 'backgrounds' is in this case altogether level.

A corollary of the previous point relates to the relative weight of primary versus secondary literature. If ancient Jewish literature apart from Philo may surface somewhat sporadically (with referenced scholarship often restricted to Schürer/Vermes), Dr. Van Kooten's engagement especially with Platonic and Stoic sources certainly opens an impressive window on a wealth of background material about which this reviewer knew rather less than he should, and from which he learned a good deal. And there is something bracing and refreshing about an approach that cuts through New Testament scholarship's excessive froth of second-order discourse in favour of a return *ad fontes*. There is, however, a price to pay: in a number of cases Dr. Van Kooten's analysis shows little engagement with recent major studies on the pertinent subjects. To cite only two examples, there is no mention either of recent literature on Paul and Stoicism (e.g. T. Engberg-Pedersen's works, including *Paul and the Stoics* [Edinburgh 2000]) or of key treatments of Pauline (e.g. E. Adams, *Constructing the World. A Study in Paul's Cosmological Language* [SNTW; Edinburgh 2000]) or Jewish cosmology (e.g. A. Yarbro Collins, *Cosmology and Eschatology in Jewish and Christian Apocalypticism* [JSJSup 50; Leiden 1996]). None of this, of course, invalidates Dr. Van Kooten's stimulating proposals, although it may be that his conclusion could have benefited from a clearer statement of their scope and limitations.

Issues of authorial posture and setting would be worth debating at greater length than is possible in the present context. One final question to mention here is whether the cosmology of the authentic Paulines is as easily distinguishable from that of Colossians (or indeed Ephesians) as Dr. Van Kooten suggests. In this respect the focus on Galatians and 1 Corinthians may be misleading. The notion of a sudden eschatological subjugation of cosmic forces does indeed predominate in those letters. The reviewer was, however,



left wondering if a closer look at the later authentic epistles might not cast doubt on the assertion that Pauline development on this question is ‘unlikely’ and that there are ‘definitely no traces of a change’ in understanding (108), whether within Paul himself or from Paul to a disciple somewhat closer to the Apostle’s orbit than Van Kooten’s envisaged pseudepigrapher. Authentic statements that might appear to mediate between the two supposed extremes receive no serious attention here. These include the claims in Rom 11,19 or 2 Cor 5,19-21 of cosmic reconciliation as both *fait accompli* and, arguably, an ongoing process due to culminate in the eschaton; or indeed the assertion of Phil 2,9-11 (a passage with interesting similarities to Col 1,15-20) that as a result of his obedient self-humbling Christ has *already* been exalted over all human and cosmic forces, *in order that* they will submit and confess his eschatological Lordship (cf. Phil 3,21).

All in all, Dr. Van Kooten has rendered a valuable service in shedding fresh light on the theological similarities and differences between Ephesians and Colossians, as well as between these letters and the authentic Pauline correspondence in the first half of the 50s. This is no small achievement, and future commentators will need to engage with his proposed solution as a significant point of reference in the debate.

Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge  
Cambridge CB3 9BS, U.K.

Markus BOCKMUEHL

## Varia

Emanuela ZURLI, *La giustificazione “solo per grazia” negli scritti di Qumran*. Analisi dell’inno finale della Regola della Comunità e degli Inni. Napoli, Chirico 2003, 233 p.

Quizás nos encontramos ante una obra descatalogada desde el primer momento. El título debería situarnos ante una opción de parámetros teológicos claros. Sin embargo, al leer el título de la obra, el lector se sorprende de la aparente mezcla de conceptos contrapuestos y de ideales contradictorios. Cuando alguien habla de la justificación “sólo por la gracia” se piensa — casi de forma automática — en la literatura paulina del Nuevo Testamento. Pero cuando esta justificación por la gracia se refiere a la literatura de Qumrán, el lector — casi también automáticamente — se sitúa a la defensiva pensando estar ante una obra más de sensacionalismo qumránico, de periodismo bíblico o ante la sorpresa cataléptica de la confirmación bruñida de que los primeros cristianos, y hasta el mismo Jesús, fueron o estuvieron vinculados al movimiento esenio o al mismo grupo de Qumrán. Nada más lejos de esta



intención es la propuesta de la obra de Emanuela Zurli (se trata de su tesis doctoral dirigida por Joseph Sievers) que, con rigor y precisión, se asoma a las alusiones propuestas en la literatura litúrgica (en los himnos) y en la legal (en el *Serek*) de Qumrán.

La introducción inicial es una presentación de la problemática que ha venido causando a lo largo de la historia el tratado teológico sobre la justificación. Su presencia en la literatura de Qumrán hace que Zurli abra las puertas a los teólogos para que lean, también, esa literatura intertestamentaria como es la de los manuscritos del Mar Muerto. En este sentido, considero justificado afirmar que Zurli ha atinado perfectamente a la hora de enfocar su trabajo hacia ese empeño de demostrar que la literatura intertestamentaria es la base para poder comprender una buena parte del Nuevo Testamento. Digamos, para mayor claridad, que este tipo de trabajos ayudan a descubrir que tal vez, lo que se considera exclusivo y apropiado de la literatura cristiana no sea otra cosa que una traducción o cristianización de un pensamiento que andaba rondando por las cabezas del judaísmo contemporáneo a Jesús y a los primeros cristianos. La originalidad de llamar a Dios Padre, de bautizarse de una manera determinada, de optar por la pobreza, de proponer una vida en comunidad, y muchas otras cuestiones que podrían considerarse comunes al cristianismo primitivo y a la comunidad de Qumrán no son sino el reflejo de un contexto social común, de una misma atmósfera cultural, de un mismo momento de la historia. Todo eso hace que a estas alturas, la investigación y el mundo de la Biblia no pueda permanecer ajeno a lo que pensaban, decían y vivían grupos judíos del primer siglo de nuestra era.

La obra de Zurli recurre a la fórmula de la justificación “sólo por la gracia” tal y como aparece en la literatura de Qumrán a través de su propio campo semántico, el de la justificación de un grupo judío con tintes fundamentalistas, ortodoxos, radicales y en cierto sentido — visto desde hoy — excéntrico. El análisis del himno final de la *Regla de la Comunidad* así como de los *Himnos*, pone de manifiesto esta intención. De lo que se trata es de volver a descubrir que la cuestión de la justificación “sólo por la gracia” tiene — una vez más — su precedente en la literatura judía contemporánea o inmediatamente anterior a la cristiana. Lo cual no resta importancia ni originalidad a la oferta cristiana, al contrario, hace de ella un instrumento novedoso que adquiere su desarrollo y esplendor con la experiencia de resurrección de los primeros cristianos. Se trata, por tanto, de una nueva conexión entre el cristianismo primitivo, el que llamaríamos “cristianismo anterior al Nuevo Testamento” y el judaísmo contemporáneo o inmediatamente anterior al del cristianismo naciente. No olvidemos que los primeros cristianos eran judíos y que una buena parte de su mensaje se trata de una actualización a la luz de la resurrección de las tradiciones judías más antiguas.

Emanuela Zurli comienza su trabajo presentando las cuestiones introductorias que tienen que ver con la problemática de los escritos de Qumrán definiendo el vocablo “justificación” en los textos del Mar Muerto. De esta manera ofrece al lector la posibilidad de situarse ante el estado actual de la investigación en que se encuentra el estudio de los manuscritos del Mar Muerto y su metodología de análisis, estudio e investigación.

El primer capítulo de la obra presenta los vocablos y términos relacionados con el campo semántico de la justificación en la Biblia Hebrea. En el

segundo capítulo estudia los términos relacionados con el campo semántico de la justificación en los manuscritos de Qumran, para focalizar la atención en la literatura legal de los fragmentos de la *Regla de la Comunidad* (QS) y el himno final que acompaña el documento de la cueva 1. Éste es el momento central de la obra de Zurli, el núcleo de su trabajo y la aportación destacada de la investigación. Con buen criterio analiza las formas terminológicas derivadas de los términos relacionados con la “justificación” y con la “gracia” que aparecen en el himno final del 1QS. El estudio incluye, además, el análisis comparativo de la forma verbal “justificar” y el sustantivo “gracia”, así como las diversas interpretaciones que se pueden dar de su análisis y lectura. Por esta razón y con acierto, Zurli presenta las traducciones derivadas de los términos en cuestión en los principales idiomas occidentales, así como el sentido que exprime la fórmula en el contexto literario del himno final del documento legal siguiendo la fórmula establecida y descriptiva de la justificación “sólo por la gracia”. Las expresiones para este análisis están tomadas de 1QS X,11; XI,2.5.12.14-15 para referirse al himno final del texto constitucional de la comunidad. La misma operación se ejerce sobre el libro de los *Hodayot* en donde Zurli rescata las afirmaciones de la justificación a la luz de la “sola gracia” tal y como había realizado previamente con el documento legal de la *Regla de la Comunidad*. El resultado, tras la correspondiente presentación del *Libro de los Himnos*, nos sitúa ante la literatura litúrgica como género literario relacionado con la literatura legal del *Serek*. En 1QH XIII,16-17 [V,22-23] nos encontramos con la declaración explícita de la justificación “sólo por la gracia”. Una fórmula (siguiendo la traducción de F. García Martínez, *Textos de Qumrán* [Madrid 1992] 358) que dice: “*Sólo por tu bondad el hombre es justificado, / [es purificado] por la abundancia de tus mise[ricordias].*” (1QH V,22). En este apartado, para Zurli, la fórmula “dos más dos” unida a la imagen de la justicia divina lleva implícita la teología de la justificación “sólo por la gracia” que depende exclusivamente del cumplimiento de la Ley y de la predestinación de los elegidos.

Quedan algunas cuestiones por discutir, elementos que podrían ser desarrollados con mayor profundidad y mis dudas sobre la pertinencia del amplio capítulo dedicado a analizar el contenido de la terminología a debate en la Biblia Hebrea. Puntos y cuestiones discutidas sobre las cuales la autora debería profundizar en la elaboración de una tesis. Mientras tanto nos quedamos con la excelente valoración de la parte central del trabajo el capítulo dedicado al análisis de la fórmula teológica en el final del documento legal y en el cuerpo del libro de los *Hodayot*.

La obra termina con una amplia colección de índices y abreviaturas de las obras utilizadas, así como un buen capítulo bibliográfico que presenta las obras más representativas del mundo de los manuscritos del Mar Muerto y de la literatura judía intertestamentaria. Le acompaña un índice de los términos hebreos más utilizados a lo largo del trabajo y un índice onomástico de todo el trabajo. Nos queda felicitar a Emanuela Zurli por su trabajo. Sin duda, la autora sabe llegar al lector con un lenguaje ágil, divulgativo y bien documentado. Todo ello hace que su lectura sea recomendable no sólo para el investigador conocedor y especialista en la materia sino, también, para el público en general y para el pensador en particular. La literatura intertestamentaria está de actualidad, prueba de ello es este trabajo. Pero a pesar de la

actualidad de este campo de investigación, hay pocas obras realizadas con el rigor que corresponde a una investigación seria y precisa. Esta obra es ejemplo de ello y, por tanto, digna del reconocimiento que le corresponde.

Facultad de Teología  
 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca  
 Compañía, 5  
 37002 - Salamanca

Jaime VÁZQUEZ ALLEGUE

Hennie J. MARSMAN, *Women in Ugarit and Israel. Their Social and Religious Position in the Context of the Ancient Near East* (OTS 49). Leiden-Boston, Brill 2003. x-781 p. 16 × 24

Feminist biblical scholarship must surely have come of age when an extensive and erudite doctoral dissertation with “Women” in the title becomes a massive tome published by a major international publisher specializing in humanities research. *Women in Ugarit and Israel* is just such a book. It is indeed lengthy, but its project is rather simple and straightforward. Marsman delves deeply and broadly into two Levantine cultures, represented largely by the Hebrew Bible and by the texts recovered from ancient Ugarit, one considered monotheist and the other polytheist. Her goal is to ascertain “whether the social and religious position of Israelite women was worse, equal, or better than those living in neighbouring polytheistic cultures” (1). She is deeply concerned about what she sees as the subordinate position of women in synagogues and churches and also with the claims that monotheism is to blame. She questions whether literary analysis of biblical texts is appropriate or adequate for dealing with these issues, and thus she suggests that a more historical and comparative approach should be able to resolve questions about the putative subordination of women in ancient Israel in relation to the position of women in surrounding cultures.

To that end, she has organized her book by first examining in great detail the “social position” of women in biblical Israel and ancient Ugarit (chap. 2). This lengthy chapter, comprising more than half of the book, discusses women (wives, mothers, sisters, daughters, widows, and orphans) in family life, with the section on wives including subsections dealing with various aspects of marriage and married life. In other words, the various family relationships that women experienced are appraised, based on relevant passages in the Hebrew Bible and in Ugaritic literary texts. This chapter also explores the roles of women in society apart from such relationships: in various royal contexts and as professionals, businesswomen, performers of domestic activities, and slaves. She then culls literary biblical texts and Ugaritic literary documents for information about the “religious position” of women (chap. 3). This chapter devotes separate sections to women as religious specialists and to women as worshippers. Finally, she performs what she calls a “check on reliability” (chap. 4). That is, she scrutinizes non-literary texts — administrative documents from Ugarit and epigraphic data (bullae,

seals, ostraca, and letters) from Palestine and Elephantine — in order to determine whether the information about women's social and religious roles in these materials supports the conclusions she reaches on the basis of the literary texts.

An introductory chapter (chap. 1) provides a useful and insightful review of the history of feminist biblical interpretation and the various approaches that characterize the study of gender in biblical Israel; it also outlines the methodology of this book. A concluding chapter (chap. 5) summarizes the results of her exhaustive analysis. Aids for the reader include a subject index, an index of the many biblical and extra-biblical texts cited, and an author index.

The length of *Women in Ugarit and Israel* is the result, to a certain extent, of Marsman's extensive summaries at the end of the three major chapters as well as her summation in the concluding chapter. It also stems from the fact that, despite the book's title, which indicates a focus on Ugarit and Israel, each major subsection (e.g., those dealing with: wife, marriage, queen, women as religious specialists, etc.) also includes a thorough survey of relevant ancient Near Eastern materials from Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Anatolia. In addition, Marsman provides comprehensive and often detailed reviews as well as cogent critiques of pertinent secondary literature. And, especially in the chapter on non-literary materials, she quotes and analyzes many of the relevant texts. Such an ambitious and wide-ranging work is remarkable, especially coming at the dissertation level.

A work of this magnitude inevitably contains problematic assertions and suppositions, many of which stem from the overall conceptual and methodological grounding of this project. One wonders how legitimate it is to compare the information in biblical texts produced in Jerusalem, a relatively small site for most of the biblical period, with that gleaned from documents discovered at Ugarit and other extensive and complex metropolitan if not imperial centers. Compounding that problem is the chronological one, that is, the considerable chronological range represented by biblical texts of the Iron Age and later versus the much earlier fourteenth century date of the Ugaritic texts, even though the latter may represent the final stage in a longer development. Marsman acknowledges the considerable chronological span of biblical texts; and she properly asserts that one cannot generalize about all Israelite women on the basis of specific texts. However, by considering biblical texts seriatim and summarizing what they show in the aggregate, her analysis gives the impression that information gleaned from a biblical text of one period represents Israelite practices more broadly. This is particularly problematic in the analysis of priestly texts, some of which may be exilic or later and deal with purity issues that were probably irrelevant for most Israelites. Yet her discourse inevitably implies at times that what she sees in priestly passages, along with other Pentateuchal legal and narrative materials, applies to all Israelite women, in all sectors of society, throughout the biblical period.

The chronological problem is compounded by other issues concerning how one is to read biblical passages. Marsman frequently assigns historicity to what various narratives describe, although the weight of biblical scholarship would preclude such interpretations. Moreover, although Marsman

properly recognizes that the sources she examines deal with “upper” classes, with more than half of the section on women in society devoted to royalty, she nonetheless seems to attribute aspects of the roles she identifies to all women in ancient Ugarit and Israel. The claim, for example, that formal marriage contracts were “commonly used” (455) would be hard to verify for peasant life.

Perhaps the most serious methodological problem is the tendency to adopt the perspective of the texts themselves and their interpretive trajectory rather than situating them in a social context that can be understood better by using social science approaches. For example, the extensive discussions of virginity, marriage, adultery, divorce, even motherhood do not look beyond consideration of legal and religious aspects as depicted in the texts. That is, the socio-economic and demographic factors underlying the textual materials are hardly visible. The issue of paternity and property transmission in lineages as a factor in the gender asymmetry of family arrangements that involve the control of female sexuality is not considered. The discussion of adultery involves trying to establish whether it is considered immoral rather than seeking to understand the social function of harsh penalties and the possibility that religious condemnation is an extreme form of social sanction against behaviors that threaten to rupture the fabric of a traditional society. Furthermore, the repeated assertion of the existence of male authority is not balanced by an adequate examination of how that authority is frequently offset by the informal power of women to accomplish goals within the family and also in matters transcending individual households.

Moreover, the discussion of women’s work suffers from utilization of the public-domestic binary that social scientists now realize is deeply flawed as a model for analyzing traditional societies. The fact that men appear to control commerce, for example, leads to the conclusion that economic life is male-dominated, thus failing to consider the foundational role of women in economic life more broadly construed. Women’s household labor is portrayed as “housekeeping” (153-154; 457) or the performance of “tasks” (404; 466-467; etc.), terms unsuitable for analyzing pre-modern households; they tend to minimize the economic importance and technological skill involved in many household operations and to mask the way that female expertise entails female hierarchies and authoritative roles that crosscut “patriarchal” ones. And, although Marsman understands the problem of using contemporary values in assessing ancient societies, the lack of anthropological perspective leads to frequent judgmental comments, such as calling certain cultural patterns oppressive or inexcusable or restrictive, which reflect contemporary ideology. In her eyes, gender differences in roles, rights, and responsibilities tend to become issues of inequality. Her scrutiny of ancient peoples becomes an *etic* operation that does not sufficiently avoid the subjectivity of her own social location.

In the chapter on religious life, Marsman discusses at length the absence of priestly roles for women in ancient Israel. Her conclusion that Israelite monotheism is implicated in the restriction of priesthood to males may not be compelling in light of the fact that monotheism comes so late to the Israelites; but her treatment of the existing theories is thorough and invaluable. She puts to rest long-held notions that the Israelites were avoiding sacred prostitution

by establishing a male-only priesthood as well as suppositions that purity concerns were a relevant factor. This chapter commendably eschews the popular-official dichotomy often used in discussion of Israelite religion. Yet it suffers from another interpretive dichotomy, one that tends to occlude women's roles, by assuming that religious life involves either cultic specialists or professionals on the one hand or worshippers on the other. In considering non-professional religious life, she suggests that "prayer was one of the main expressions of worship open to women" (572-573), aside from "heterodox" cultic practices, but does not explore the highly important set of religious practices that stand outside the officiant-worshiper continuum and are retrievable only through anthropological methods that consider archaeological remains and ethnographic analogies as well as texts. Religious activities surrounding reproductive processes, for example, were surely practiced by women in their households and were arguably more important, in terms of daily life, than the formal practices at community shrines.

Perhaps the most noteworthy and original section of the book comes in the detailed examination of non-literary epigraphic texts. To her great credit, Marsman rejects what she published in a recent article, based on an earlier stage of her dissertation, in which she asserted that the position of women in Ugarit was better than that of Israelite women. She reached that conclusion through a statistical comparison of the mentions of women and deities in non-literary documents. But in this book, she looks more closely at the content of all of the various letters, seals and bullae, contracts, and administrative texts that constitute the corpus of non-literary materials. She now concludes that the information in these documents corresponds rather well to the data in the literary texts and that the status of women in ancient Israel was similar to that of women in Ugarit and surrounding areas. Such a conclusion is significant in confronting claims — based on the hypothesis that the development of monotheism was inherently restrictive with respect to women and thus had a negative impact on women's lives — that women were better off in Canaanite than in Israelite culture.

This book has provided an enormous service by drawing together so many diverse materials, both primary and secondary, and by subjecting them to extensive analysis and discussion. As long as readers remain aware of the methodological issues that may mitigate the value and veracity of what the author claims in specific instances, they will find Marsman's work an invaluable contribution to the consideration of gender in the biblical world. It is a careful and comprehensive work, providing access to the scholarship bearing upon the investigation of the lives of women in ancient Israel and the ancient Near East and offering many worthwhile perspectives.

Box 90964, Duke University  
Durham, NC 27708-0964

Carol MEYERS

# NUNTII PERSONARUM ET RERUM

## **Pontificium Institutum Biblicum Annus academicus 2004-2005. II semestre**

Auditores inscripti erant 301, qui in diversas categorias sic distribuebantur:

	Ad Doctoratum	Ad Licentiam	Hospites	Universi
Fac. Biblica	29	236	19	284
Fac. Orientalistica	2	3	12	17
Universi	31	239	31	301
Nationes	69	Alumni	301	
Dioeceses	162	Alumni	169	
Inst. Religiosorum	42	Alumni	81	
Inst. Religiosarum	16	Alumnae	17	
Ex statu laicali	34	Alumnae	20	
		Alumni	14	

### **Laureae**

Laureae in Re Biblica digni declarati sunt:

BROCCARDO Carlo (14.04.2005). *Fede e cristologia in Lc 4-9. Analisi narrativa dei personaggi minori* (magna cum laude). Moderator: ALETTI Jean-Noël, S.J.

CARBAJOSA PEREZ Ignacio (15.04.2005). *Las características de la versión siríaca (Peshitta) de los libros 4º y 5º de salmos (Sal 90-150)* (magna cum laude). Moderator: PISANO Stephen, S.J.

DIAS DA SILVA Cássio Murilo (27.05.2005). *Colui che manda la pioggia sulla faccia della terra* (magna cum laude). Moderator: SIMIAN-YOFRE Horacio, S.J.

Doctores in Re Biblica renuntiati sunt, typis edita thesi:

MASCARENHAS Theodore, *The Missionary Function of Israel in Psalms 67, 96, and 117* (Univeristy Press of America, Lanham, MD 2005, pp. XXVI+380).



## LIBRI AD DIRECTIONEM MISSI

En este Elenco aparecen todos los libros enviados a *Biblica*, de alguna manera relacionados con los estudios bíblicos. La mención de un título en este Elenco no implica por tanto juicio acerca de la obra. El consejo de dirección determina qué libros serán recensionados en *Biblica*.

Los libros y fascículos que non han sido expresamente pedidos por *Biblica* no serán devueltos al remitente, aún cuando no parezca conveniente publicar una recensión sobre ellos.

Todos los libros y fascículos enviados a *Biblica* se trasmiten al Editor del *Elenchus of Biblica*, y aparecen en él a juicio de dicho Editor.

Envíense los libros a: Dirección *Biblica*, Pontificio Istituto Biblico, via della Pilotta, 25 I-00187 Roma, Italia.

**AA. VV.**, *Marie dans les récits apocryphes chrétiens*. Tome I. 60<sup>e</sup> session de la Société Française d'Études Mariales, Sanctuaire Notre-Dame-du-Chêne, Solesmes, 2003. (Études Mariales). Paris, Médiaspaul, 2004. 285 p. 15,5 × 22. €35

**Aejmelaeus**, Lars, *Schwachheit als Waffe*. Die Argumentation des Paulus im "Tränenbrief" (2.Kor.10-13) (Schriften der Finnischen Exegetischen Gesellschaft 78). Helsinki, Finnische Exegetische Gesellschaft – Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000. 436 p. 17,5 × 23,5

**Aitken**, Ellen Bradshaw – **Macleane**, Jennifer K. Berenson (eds.), *Philostratus's Heroikos*. Religion and Cultural Identity in the Third Century C. E. (Writings from the Greco-Roman World 6). Atlanta, Society of Biblical Literature, 2004. xxxiv-408 p. 15 × 23. \$49.95

**Álvarez Barredo**, Miguel, *La iniciativa de Dios*. Estudio literario y teológico de Jueces 9-21 (Publicaciones Instituto Teológico Franciscano, Serie Mayor 40). Murcia, Instituto Teológico Franciscano, 2004. 595 p. 17 × 24. €30

**Anderson**, Cheryl B., *Women, Ideology, and Violence*. Critical Theory and the Construction of Gender in the Book of the Covenant and the Deuteronomic Law (JSOTSS 394). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. xii-148 p. 16 × 24. £55.00

**Arnal**, William, *The Symbolic Jesus*. Historical Scholarship, Judaism and the Construction of Contemporary Identity (Religion in Culture: Studies in Social Contest and Construction). London – Oakville, Equinox, 2005. viii-98 p. 14 × 21,5. Cloth: £45.00 – \$65.00; paper: £12.99 – \$22.00

**Arnold**, Bill T., *Who Were the Babylonians?* (Archaeology and Biblical Studies 10). Atlanta, Society of Biblical Literature, 2004. xi-148 p. 15 × 23. \$15.95

**Atwell**, James E., *The Sources of the Old Testament*. A Guide to the Religious Thought of the Hebrew Bible (Understanding the Bible and its World). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. viii-252 p. 14 × 21,5. £16.99

**Auwers**, Jean-Marie, *Concordance du Siracide* (Grec II et Parallele) (Cahiers de la Revue Biblique 58). Paris, J. Gabalda et C<sup>ie</sup>, Éditeurs, 2005. 93 p. 16 × 24. €25

**Azcárraga Servert**, María Josefa de, *Las Masoras del Libro de Levítico*. Códice M1 de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Textos y Estudios «Cardenal Cisneros» de la Biblia Políglota Matritense 74). Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto de Filología, Departamento de Filología y de Oriente Antiguo, 2004. xix-265 p. 19 × 27

**Bach**, Alice, *Religion, Politics, Media in the Broadband Era* (The Bible in the Modern World 2). Sheffield, Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2004. x-190 p. 16 × 24. £40.00 – \$70 – €60

**Barmash**, Pamela, *Homicide in the Biblical World*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. xvi-253 p. 15 × 23. Cloth: £40.00 – \$70.00; paper: £15.99 – \$25.99

**Barr**, George K., *Scalometry and the Pauline Epistles* (JSNTSS 261). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. xi-178 p. 16 × 24. £60.00

**Beauchamp**, Paul, *Création et séparation*. Étude exégétique du chapitre premier de la Genèse (LD 201). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 2005. 423 p. 13,5 × 21,5. €35

**Beauchamp**, Paul, *Pages exégétiques* (LD 202). Préface de Yves Simoens. Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 2005. 448 p. 13,5 × 21,5. €35

**Becker**, Dan, *Arabic Sources of Isaac Ben Barūn's Book of Comparison between the Hebrew and the Arabic Languages* (Texts and Studies in the Hebrew Language and Related Subjects 12). Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University, 2005. viii-227 p. 17,5 × 24,5

**Becker**, Eve-Marie, *Letter Hermeneutics in 2 Corinthians*. Studies in Literarkritik and Communication Theory (JSNTSS 279). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. xv-271 p. 16 × 24. £60.00

**Bekkenkamp**, Jonneke – **Sherwood**, Yvonne (eds.), *Sanctified Aggression*. Legacies of Biblical and Post-Biblical Vocabularies of Violence (JSOTSS 400; Bible in the Twenty-First Century 3). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2003. xii-248 p. 16 × 24. £65.00

**Bennema**, Cornelis, *The Power of Saving Wisdom*. An Investigation of Spirit and Wisdom in Relation to the Soteriology of the Fourth Gospel (WUNT 148). Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2002. xii-318 p. 15,5 × 23. €59

**Berder**, Michel (sous la direction de), *Les Actes des Apôtres*. Histoire, récit, théologie. XX<sup>e</sup> congrès de l'Association catholique française pour l'étude de la Bible (Angers 2003) (LD 199). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 2005. 281 p. 13,5 × 21,5. €31

**Bergman**, Nava, *The Cambridge Biblical Hebrew Workbook*. Introductory Level. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. xvi-375 p. 17,5 × 24,5. £17.99 – \$31.99

*La Bible d'Alexandrie*. *Baruch, Lamentations, Lettre de Jérémie* (La Bible d'Alexandrie 25.2). Traduction du texte grec de la Septante. Introduction, et notes par Isabelle **Assan-Dhôte** et Jacqueline **Moatti-Fine**. Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 2005. 243 p. 14 × 20. €45

**Borghino**, Angelo, *La «Nuova Alleanza» in Is 54*. Analisi esegetico-teologica (Tesi Gregoriana, Serie Theologia 118). Roma, Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2005. 475 p. 17 × 24. €25

**Bortone**, Giuseppe, S. J., *Maria nella Bibbia*. Dalle prefigurazioni alla realtà. XXIV Corso Biblico. L'Aquila, Studio Biblico Teologico Aquilano, Edizioni ISSRA, 2004. xiv-336 p. 14,5 × 21. €22

**Bridge**, Steven L., *Getting the Gospels*. Understanding the New Testament Accounts of Jesus' Life. Peabody, Hendrickson Publishers, 2004. xvii-140 p. 14 × 21,5. £9.99

**Britt**, Brian, *Rewriting Moses*. The Narrative Eclipse of the Text (JSOTSS 402). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. xi-208 p. 15,5 × 23,5. £25.00

**Brockmüller**, Katrin, „Eine Frau der Stärke – wer findet sie?“ Exegetische Analysen und intertextuelle Lektüren zu Spr 31,10-31 (BBB 147). Berlin – Wien, Philo, 2004. 308 p. 17 × 23,5. €59,80

**Brodie**, Thomas L., *The Birthing of the New Testament*. The Intertextual Development of the New Testament Writings (New Testament Monographs 1). Sheffield, Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2004. xxxi-653 p. 16 × 24. £65.00 – \$115.00 – €97.00

**Buscemi**, Alfio Marcello, *Lettera ai Galati*. Commentario esegetico (Studium Biblicum Franciscanum Analecta 63). Jerusalem, Franciscan Printing Press, 2004. xxv-691 p. 17 × 24

**Byatt**, Anthony – **Flemings**, Hal (eds.), 'Your Word is Truth'. Essays in Celebration of the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the *New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures* (1950,1953). Malvern, Golden Age Books, 2004. 303 p. 17 × 24,5. £15.00

**Cameron**, Ron – **Miller**, Merrill P. (eds.), *Redescribing Christian Origins* (Symposium Series 28). Atlanta, Society of Biblical Literature, 2004. xvi-539 p. 15 × 23

**Carden**, Michael, *Sodomy*. A History of a Christian Biblical Myth (BibleWorld). London – Oakville, Equinox, 2004. xv-226 p. 15,5 × 23,5. Cloth: £60.00; paper: £15.99

**Carter**, Warren, *Matthew*. Storyteller, Interpreter, Evangelist. Revised Edition. Peabody, Hendrickson Publishers, 2004. xvi-287 p. 14 × 21,5. £12.99

**Chenu**, Bernard, *I discepoli di Emmaus* (Itinerari biblici). Brescia, Editrice Queriniana, 2005. 127 p. 13 × 21. €9,50

**Cook**, Stephen L. – **Patton**, Corrine L. (eds.), *Ezekiel's Hierarchical World*. Wrestling with a Tiered World (Symposium Series 31). Atlanta, Society of Biblical Literature, 2004. xiii-288 p. 15 × 23. \$39.95

**Cook**, Stephen L., *The Social Roots of Biblical Yahwism* (Studies in Biblical Literature 8). Atlanta, Society of Biblical Literature, 2004. xii-310 p. 15 × 23. \$39.95

**Cornelius**, Izak – **Niehr**, Herbert, *Götter und Kulte in Ugarit*. Kultur und Religion einer nordsyrischen Königsstadt in der Spätbronzezeit (Zaberns Bildbände zur Achäologie). Mainz am Rhein, Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 2004. 92 p. 21 × 30. €37,90

**Cosgrove**, Charles H. (ed.), *The Meanings We Choose*. Hermeneutical Ethics, Indeterminacy and the Conflict of Interpretations (JSOTSS 402). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. xiii-223 p. 16 × 24. £65.00

**Crociata**, Mariano (ed.), *L'uomo al cospetto di Dio*. La condizione creaturale nelle religioni monoteiste (Collana di teologia 51). Roma, Città Nuova Editrice, 2004. 447 p. 14 × 21. €32

**Crossley**, James G., *The Date of Mark's Gospel*. Insight from the Law in Earliest Christianity (JSNTSS 266). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. xv-245 p. 16 × 24. £65.00

**Cyss Crocker**, Cornelia, *Reading 1 Corinthians in the Twenty-first Century*. New York – London, T&T Clark International, 2004. vii-253 p. 15,5 × 23,5. £22.00

**Davies**, Philip R. (ed.), *Yours Faithfully*. Virtual Letters from the Bible (BibleWorld). London – Oakville, Equinox, 2004. xi-160 p. 15,5 × 23,5. Cloth: £55.00; paper: £14.99

**de Boer**, Esther A., *The Gospel of Mary*. Beyond a Gnostic and a Biblical Mary Magdalene (JSNTSS 260). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. x-240 p. 16 × 24. £65.00

**Deiana**, Giovanni, *Levitico*. Nuova versione, introduzione e commento (I Libri Biblici, Primo Testamento 3). Milano, Paoline, 2005. 364 p. 15,5 × 23,5. €27

**Denton**, Donald L., Jr., *Historiography and Hermeneutics in Jesus Studies*. An Examination of the Work of John Dominic Crossan and Ben F. Meyer (JSNTSS 262; Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus Supplement Series). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. vi-239 p. 16 × 24. £65.00

**Dibelius**, Martin, *The Book of Acts*. Form, Style and Theology (Fortress classics in biblical studies). Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 2004. xix-228 p. 15 × 22,5. \$18.00

**Dietrich**, Walter (Hrsg.), *David und Saul im Widerstreit – Diachronie und Synchronie im Wettstreit*. Beiträge zur Auslegung des ersten Samuelbuches (OBO 206). Fribourg, Academic Press – Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004. 312 p. 16 × 23,5. €49 – SFr 76,-

**Dille**, Sarah J., *Mixing Metaphors*. God as Mother and Father in Deutero-Isaiah (JSOTSS 398; Gender, Culture, Theory 13). London – New York, T&T Clark International, 2004. xiii-200 p. 16 × 24. £55.00

ISSN 0006-0887

This periodical is indexed in the ATLA Religion Database, published by the American Theological Library Association, 250 S. Wacker Dr., 16th Flr., Chicago, IL 60606.  
E-mail: atla@atla.com. <http://www.atla.com/>

---

PIETRO BOCCACCIO, Direttore Responsabile

---

Autorizz. Tribunale di Roma n. 6229 del 24-3-1958 del Reg. della Stampa



Associato all'Unione Stampa Periodica Italiana

---

Finito di stampare il 12 luglio 2005

Tip.: Ist. Salesiano Pio XI - Via Umbertide, 11 - 00181 Roma